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Abstract 
 
 
Welfare-to-work services have been a key area of experimentation in quasi-marketised 
public service delivery. The British flagship Work Programme is seen as an 
international pioneer in its reliance on outsourcing, payment by results and provider 
flexibility allied to promises of innovation and performance improvement. Within 
schemes dominated by such marketised accountabilities there are well-known risks 
and tensions around creaming, parking and churning. International literature equally 
makes clear that the design specificities of programme governance and 
accountabilities can play a key role in either facilitating or buttressing against these 
negative provider practices. 
 
In this context, the overarching question which animates this thesis is whether this 
crafted Work Programme design structure is sufficient and appropriate to steer its 
quasi-marketised providers to the achievement of the full suite of government policy 
objectives. Unprecedented academic access to the commissioning Department’s 
administrative datasets alongside sophisticated and conceptually tailored multivariate 
quantitative analyses underpin the thesis’ empirical contributions. The analysis is 
framed by an original multi-dimensional analytical framework articulating multiple 
potential alternative types of quasi-markets. This conceptually broad and empirically 
focused study provides a rare opportunity to trace outcomes directly from the plans 
and promises of a particularly bold quasi-market experiment and to consider the ways 
in which key design elements cascade through to, and are detectable in, the patterning 
of employment and earning outcomes of programme participants on the ground. The 
empirical analyses highlight myriad ways in which Work Programme promises end up 
in performance pitfalls despite, if not because of, its particular variety of quasi-
marketised governance.
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1 Introduction: making markets in employment support 
 
A fundamental shift has taken hold of welfare state governance in developed 
economies since the 1980s with the increasingly widespread use of privatisation and 
market-like methods for the delivery of public services. ‘Bureaucracy’ has become a 
pejorative term with few advocates and many critics and a path has been charted that 
seeks to introduce an ‘enterprising’ spirit to social provision (Considine, 2001; 
Fournier and Grey, 1999; Gingrich, 2011). Government purposes are increasingly 
deployed through an outsourced dynamic in which an ‘enabling state’ (Deakin and 
Walsh, 1996) becomes a purchaser and overseer of services rather than their provider 
(Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993). This increased use of market-like methods is justified 
by claims that markets increase efficiency, efficacy and service responsiveness (Le 
Grand and Bartlett, 1993; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), although the evidence for such 
claims in the sphere of complex services is equivocal at best (de Graaf and Sirovátka, 
2012; Warner and Hefetz, 2012). 
 
In the field of (un)employment policy specifically, in parallel to these governance 
shifts there has been an important recasting of policy objectives with countries across 
the OECD making decisive shifts from a ‘passive’ to an ‘active’ welfare system in 
which eligibility for out-of-work social security benefits is tied increasingly tightly 
and explicitly to the stated obligation to seek paid work. Unemployment is no longer 
framed as a structural issue of demand management but has been reconfigured as a 
supply-side challenge of improving the employability of the unemployed. This 
decisive turn has ushered in an ‘activation orthodoxy’ based on a programme of 
policies which aim to propel working-age welfare recipients (back) into the labour 
market as quickly as possible through a combination of applying more stringent 
conditions to benefit receipt, improving financial returns to work, enhancing 
employability, and providing in-work support (Bonoli, 2010; Peck and Theodore, 
2000). This is then a double dynamic where both citizens who are in receipt of out-of-
work benefits and the system of service provision itself are being ‘activated’ through 
new tools and logics.  
 
Throughout the thesis the term ‘activation’ is used to capture the overarching 
governmental ambition to move people away from ‘inactively’ claiming 
unemployment benefits and instead towards ‘active’ contributions through paid 
employment in the labour market. More specifically, ‘welfare-to-work’ and 
‘employment support’ are terms used interchangeably to connote programmatic 
services and interventions directed at people who are unemployed to support them into 
employment. 
 
At the nexus of these two trends – marketisation and activation – a small but rich seam 
of comparative literature explores the trends of governance reforms and activation 
policies and considers the influence of governance on the dynamics of national 
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activation approaches (Lødemel and Moreira, 2014; van Berkel et al., 2012; van Berkel 
and Borghi, 2007; Wiggan, 2015a, 2015b). Analytically, marketisation sits beneath an 
umbrella of wider governance configurations and options – procedural, corporate, 
market and network for Considine (2001) – of which marketisation has been a 
particularly potent trend internationally in recent decades. This literature 
acknowledges a distinction between the ‘substantial’ formal content of policy and the 
‘operational’ level of governance – that is, the mode of coordination underpinning the 
provision of services – but considers these forms to be mutually constitutive and 
dependent (Carmel et al., 2003; de Graaf and Sirovátka, 2012; van Berkel et al., 2012). 
The result is a key discernment: that governance reforms cannot be without 
consequence for the content and effects of activation. This acknowledgement in turn 
sparks an important impetus both for this thesis and the wider field given that the logics 
of particular governance forms (and accountability levers) will inform the nature and 
content of social policies as well as having important (and heterogeneous) implications 
for service user experiences and outcomes. And if we wish to know and improve the 
latter, research must deeply engage with the former. In short, governance matters. 
 
1.1 Fracturing the understanding of marketisation in public services 
Alongside the pervasive application of market-like principles to the organisation of 
public services since the 1980s there is a broad acknowledgement that the term 
‘marketisation’ is descriptively inadequate, indeed inaccurate, given that markets in 
public services are in important ways artificial quasi marketised constructs which 
diverge from a conventional understanding of market functioning (Bartlett and Le 
Grand, 1993; Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993).  
 
Less widely acknowledged within this, however, is the degree to which a common 
language of ‘market’ reform has obscured the extent to which the process of market 
making in the sphere of public services in reality refers to a highly varied set of quasi-
market forms and reform processes (Jacobs, 1998; Greener, 2008). The homogenised 
conception of a singular marketising endeavour has been powerfully deconstructed by 
advocates of ‘the difference thesis’ (Powell, 2015; Gingrich, 2011; Zehavi, 2012; 
Meagher and Goodwin, 2015). Briefly, this cluster of academic work suggests that 
‘marketisation’ is not a singular phenomenon but rather that it captures a diverse range 
of “practices, rationales, trajectories, actors and impacts” (Meagher and Goodwin, 
2015, p. 4). This is a key theoretical grounding for the thesis as it enables the discussion 
to progress from the usual polarising debate “between markets in services as “good” 
and markets in services as “bad” [which] misses much of what markets in services are 
doing. Markets have dramatically changed the way services operate, but not in a 
uniform way” (Gingrich, 2011, p. 7, emphasis added). Fundamentally, the differential 
nature and function of markets “empower different actors and thus trade off different 
incentives” (Gingrich, 2011, p. 3). 
 
Central to this thesis is a consideration of how the quasi-marketised relationships are 
structured since “depending on how information, contracts, and demand are shaped, 
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the incentives that producers face in the delivery of services may promote attention to 
the buyer, or to the user, or even give new producers the scope to follow their own 
interests” (Gingrich, 2011, p. 9).  
 
Empirically, there is considerable variation in the design of markets for the provision 
of welfare-to-work services internationally (de Graaf and Sirovátka, 2012; van Berkel 
et al., 2012) but, as van Berkel et al. (2012, p. 273, emphasis added) note, much of the 
current research “pays little attention to the issue of diversity in the design and 
functioning of markets”. There is in this context an analytic gap and a need for a 
systematic consideration of the particular formulations or varieties of quasi-markets 
and their links to user experiences and programme performance (van Berkel et al., 
2012). The thesis takes this analytic necessity as an invitation for the development of 
an extended and multi-dimensional graduated analytical framework articulating 
multiple potential alternative types of quasi-markets. 
 
The empirical aspects of the thesis examine the practice of marketised governance 
from the perspective of just one central public service – the contracted employment 
support (aka ‘welfare-to-work’) provided to people who are long-term unemployed – 
in Britain post 2010. This conceptually broad and empirically focused study provides 
a rare opportunity to trace outcomes directly from the plans and promises of a 
particularly bold quasi-market experiment and to consider the ways in which key 
design elements cascade through to, and are detectable in, the patterning of 
employment and earning outcomes of programme participants on the ground.  
 
1.2 British welfare-to-work in context 
In the UK overall policy for employment services and the administration of out-of-
work benefits is the responsibility of the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). 
Jobcentre Plus is the UK’s public employment service (PES) and DWP’s key 
operational agency tasked with delivering employment services across a large network 
of frontline offices. In contrast to decentralised arrangements which are more prevalent 
across the rest of Europe it is the highly centrist DWP which controls design and 
delivery of employment policy and, allied, social security policy, in terms both of the 
Jobcentre Plus PES and major contracted-out programmes (Wiggan, 2015a).  
 
In the UK people who are unemployed and of working age may be eligible to receive 
means-tested social security benefits, typically either Jobseekers’ Allowance (JSA) or 
Employment and Support Allowance (ESA). JSA is the main out of work benefit for 
people who are assessed as being ready and able to seek employment and enter work. 
As a condition of their continued benefits eligibility recipients are required to sign a 
‘claimant commitment’ setting out the steps they will take to actively look for work 
and must attend a fortnightly job-search review at a Jobcentre Plus office or face 
sanctions. People who have a disability or long-term health condition may apply for 
ESA and will undergo a ‘Work Capability Assessment’ to assess their ability to look 
for work and/or carry out preparatory work-related activities. People who do not meet 
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the criteria of the Work Capability Assessment are directly diverted to JSA and are 
required to seek work immediately. Dependent on the prognosis of the Work 
Capability Assessment those who are entitled to claim ESA may be directed to a ‘Work 
Related Activity Group’ (who are entitled to just 88 minutes a year of Jobcentre Plus 
support, LWI, 2016a) or, for more severe health conditions, a ‘Support Group’ who 
may volunteer but will not be mandated to participate in any work preparation 
activities (indeed they will not actively be offered any employment support). The 
recent introduction and ongoing roll out of Universal Credit – the rationalised 
integration of key working age benefits and tax credits – is gradually replacing these 
‘legacy’ benefit types, but without fundamental reform to the underlying groupings, 
obligations and supports for people who are out of work.  
 
Since the late 1990s the UK’s provision of employment services has shifted away from 
the state as the main provider (through Jobcentre Plus) to independent organisations 
in the voluntary and private sectors. Initially this shift was small scale, gradual and 
highly variable as partnership arrangements were struck between local Jobcentres and 
alternative provider organisations (Sainsbury, 2017; Sunley et al., 2006). Up until 2011 
by far the main provider of employment support services was still the state via 
Jobcentre Plus (Sainsbury, 2017).  
 
In 2011 the new Conservative-led Coalition Government dramatically expanded the 
UK’s market for contracted employment support by independent providers through its 
rapid introduction of the Work Programme, the largest outsourced ‘payment-by-
results’ programme ever launched in the UK (NAO, 2015). In international perspective 
the UK is generally understood as a committed marketiser in welfare-to-work 
(Wiggan, 2015a, p. 119) and the size, scope and experimentation involved in Work 
Programme’s marketising efforts position it at the bleeding edge of international 
reform experiences. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Key British welfare-to-work arrangements 2011-2018 
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1.3 The Work Programme  
In 2011, the Coalition Government’s cancellation of the still young Flexible New Deal 
contracts and the rapid introduction of the Work Programme at a stroke replaced 
virtually all welfare-to-work services administered by the DWP in England, Scotland 
and Wales. The programme offers support to people who are long-term unemployed 
or who are deemed at risk of becoming and aims to help them get, and keep, jobs. The 
Work Programme is a single scheme, larger than any previous British employment 
programme and serves an unprecedented range of unemployed people. It is a monolith 
in terms both of its size and its breadth: the Work Programme is expected to cost 
between £3 billion and £5 billion and could help up to 3.3 million people with diverse 
needs, circumstances and barriers (NAO, 2012). 
 
As discussed further in Chapter 3, delivery of the Work Programme takes place 
through contracts between the DWP and large-scale, mainly private sector Prime 
providers which can both deliver services themselves and/or sub-contract to 
organisations within large and (sometimes) complex supply chains sitting underneath 
each Prime. The Work Programme is structured geographically into 18 large ‘regional’ 
Contract Package Areas with two or three Primes in each, to whom claimants are 
randomly allocated from Jobcentre Plus if they have not found work within an initial 
period of Jobcentre Plus provision, the duration of which depends largely on the type 
of out-of-work benefit received and the Work Programme ‘claimant group’ into which 
they are therefore placed. Figure 1.1 outlines these overarching relationships. 
 
The Work Programme embraces fully market accountability principles. It is a pioneer 
and radical experimenter in the heavy extent to which payment to providers is 
predicated on the achievement of employment outcomes, with payments to providers 
tied entirely to job outcomes since 2014. The Work Programme implements a ‘black 
box’ delivery model so that providers have almost complete flexibility over their 
interventions. This flexibility is argued to be required since, unlike previous contracted 
employment programmes, Work Programme is ‘universal’ and therefore has to cater 
for the needs of a wide range of unemployed programme participants within a single 
scheme. In its size, breadth and extent of quasi-marketisation therefore, the Work 
Programme is a vanguard of radical experimentation in welfare-to-work quasi-markets 
not only within the British context but also within international comparative 
perspective (Finn, 2011; Mulheirn, 2011; this author in Carter and Whitworth, 2015). 
It is, for these reasons,  and its importance within the UK employment policy landscape 
that it is an important case study to assess empirically in this thesis. More broadly, the 
Work Programme is a valuable case due to the wider lessons that can be drawn around 
the performance of alternative governance arrangements for employment polices 
beyond the UK and, indeed, social policies beyond the field of employment. 
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1.4 Perennial risks and hubristic design promises: the research focus and 
chapter summaries 
Within public services dominated by marketised accountabilities – such as the Work 
Programme – it is expected that opportunism or ‘gaming’ will be a particular design 
challenge. Hart et al. (1997) contend that where there are incomplete contracts (which 
is almost inevitably the case in complex public services) and producers have great 
control then private providers demonstrate an ability to pursue cost-cutting innovations 
(i.e. improve crude efficiency) but that they are also more likely to do so at the expense 
of quality and other unspecified but potentially important aspects of provision. 
Specifically, there are risks within the Work Programme – as in all such quasi-
marketised employment support programmes – that providers will seek to ‘cream off’ 
and take easy payments for participants close to the labour market whilst ‘parking’ 
those participants who face multiple barriers to work and whose payments are 
therefore substantially more difficult and/or more costly to achieve. Mitigating such 
risks is a perennial design challenge within quasi-marketised welfare-to-work schemes 
relying strongly on marketised accountability levers such as payment-by-results as 
demonstrated by the plentiful international evidence of creaming and parking in 
practice across such programmes (Struyven and Steurs, 2005; Bredgaard and Larsen, 
2007; Finn, 2010a, 2010b; Considine et al., 2011; de Graaf and Sirovátka, 2012).   
 
In addition, the international literature also makes clear that the specificities of 
programme design and payment structures can play a key role in either facilitating or 
buttressing against such risks and provider behaviours (Considine, 2000; Considine et 
al., 2011; Finn, 2009, 2011, 2012; Struyven and Steurs, 2005; van Berkel and van der 
Aa, 2005; Koning and Heinrich, 2013). The implication is that through careful 
contractual specification and regulation it may be possible to overcome, or at least 
mitigate, these behaviours and ensure that providers act in support of the full suite of 
programmatic objectives. The challenge then is for policymakers – through design 
savvy – to configure and implement a suite of steering tools that retain the perceived 
innovative and efficient impetus of quasi-markets whilst ensuring that a complex set 
of public sector objectives are met.  
 
As discussed further in Chapter 5, for DWP beneath the headline objective of moving 
people who are long-term unemployed into employment the Work Programme aspires 
to achieve four main, and potentially conflicting, objectives: efficiency (purchasing 
employment outcomes at a lower unit cost than preceding schemes); efficacy 
(increasing aggregate time in employment through sustained jobs); economy 
(providing savings to HM Treasury through reduced benefit spending and increased 
tax revenue); and equality (reducing the gap in employment rates between 
disadvantaged groups and other participants). 
 
Within DWP’s design response to the criticisms of previous quasi-marketised schemes 
there are three bold and untested marketised accountability elements within Work 
Programme which seek to mitigate these known quasi-market risks towards the 
delivery of this set of programmatic objectives: differential payments; the 
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geographical scale and structure of Prime contracts; and sustainment payments. The 
overarching question which animates this thesis is whether this crafted Work 
Programme design structure is sufficient and appropriate to steer its quasi-marketised 
providers to the achievement of DWP’s full gamut of policy objectives. Enabled by 
the combination of unprecedented access to DWP’s key administrative data alongside 
sophisticated and conceptually tailored multivariate quantitative analyses, the thesis’ 
contributions both relate to and flow from its inter-related examination of conceptual 
debates around the governance of quasi-markets, systematic empirical understanding 
of the programmatic performance implications of Work Programme’s internationally 
innovative quasi-marketised governance attempts, and new policy understandings 
around the nature, limits and interactions of alternative governance mechanisms within 
alternative varieties of quasi-marketised public services.  
 
The remainder of the thesis is structured across eight chapters. 
 
Chapter 2 introduces the key concepts of governance and accountabilities before 
setting out the thesis’ original analytic framework that develops and critically extends 
Gingrich’s (2011) typology for considering variation in the form of quasi-marketised 
public service. Specifically, the chapter develops an original multidimensional 
analytical framework which maps and illustrates graduated dimensions of market 
allocation and market production that serve as a scaffold against which to trace crucial 
aspects of variation in the formulation of quasi-markets in practice. A key justification 
for this conceptual approach is the expectation that the way the market is structured 
will have important implications for attuning the attentiveness of service providers to 
the priorities and preferences of either the state, service users, or providers themselves. 
This in turn is expected to have important implications for the quantity, quality and 
distribution of services and consequently on the lived experience and ‘outcomes’ of 
programme participants. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a firmer grounding in the specific policy context of UK welfare-
to-work. The chapter outlines the wider chronology of policy evolution since the early 
1990s. The analytic framework developed in the preceding chapter is then used as a 
tool to systematically unpack the form of quasi-market instigated within the Work 
Programme. This reveals the Work Programme to embody a private power market in 
which the preferences of service providers are dominant. 
 
Chapter 4 sets out the data and methods which underpin the empirical contribution. 
The chapter sets out the ways in which the thesis benefits from unique academic access 
to DWP’s comprehensive administrative datasets combined with methodologically 
sophisticated and conceptually tailored multivariate quantitative analyses to explore in 
unprecedented depth, detail and specificity the key linkages between governance 
mechanisms and programme performance.  
 
Chapter 5 assesses critically the differential payment structure and considers the 
success of this design feature in narrowing the gap in job outcomes between 
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disadvantaged groups and everyone else. The research question flowing from this then 
is: Has the Work Programme’s differential payment structure calibrated provider 
incentives within the private power market such that all programme participants have 
the same likelihood of entering and sustaining paid work, regardless of their 
characteristics and circumstances? 
 
Chapter 6 investigates the geography of incentives and performance in the Work 
Programme, assessing potential tensions between the spatially extensive contracting 
areas and local labour market contexts. The research question here asks Is the 
geographical container of regional Contract Package Areas an appropriate spatial 
scale at which to uphold minimum performance levels and incentivise competition 
between Prime providers? 
 
Chapter 7 considers the use of sustainment payments and the structure of financial 
incentives which extend well beyond an initial period of employment. The research 
question asks What are the employment and earning trajectories of Work Programme 
participants? Has the use of sustainment payments broken the low-pay no-pay cycle? 
 
Chapter 8 offers a more synoptic reflection on the Work Programme’s private power 
market. The research questions whether the neglect of participants with health 
conditions and disabilities is inevitable, asking Does the variety of quasi-market matter 
for people with disabilities and health conditions?  
 
In summary, therefore, the focus of the thesis is both narrower and broader than the 
Work Programme itself. It is narrower in the sense that the research does not seek to 
offer a full evaluation of the scheme (although the empirical work represents in various 
ways contributions that are original, novel and significant compared to existing 
analysis of the programme) but rather looks to assess – using a range of robust 
multivariate quantitative analyses – the very specific design promises made within the 
private power market.  
 
And yet the empirical findings also take on a much broader application. In 
international perspective the UK is generally understood as a committed marketiser in 
welfare-to-work (Wiggan, 2015a, p. 119) and the scope and experimentation involved 
in Work Programme’s marketising efforts position it at the bleeding edge of reform 
experiences. Relatedly, welfare-to-work can be seen as something of an unchartered 
pioneer in its extensive use of outsourcing and payment-by-results which is now 
increasingly being adopted within other policy spheres (Albertson et al., 2018; NAO, 
2015), and Work Programme is at the vanguard of this internationally.  
 
This thesis’s original conceptual framework, in conjunction with the unprecedented 
depth and targeted sophistication of empirical scrutiny advanced, offers policymakers 
a powerful lens through which to consider the linked conceptual-empirical 
implications of variation in quasi-market types. The work offers critical reflections on 
the design fixes available to policymakers internationally who seek to better balance 
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the competing priorities of government, service users, and providers both within and 
beyond the field of welfare-to-work services. 
 
Chapter 2 begins by setting out the thesis’s conceptual foundations around governance 
and accountabilities and, building on these ideas, by advancing its original analytical 
framework to enable better understanding of varieties of quasi-markets and their 
implications for providers, commissioners and service users.  
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2 Making (quasi) markets in the welfare state 
2.1 Chapter summary 
Welfare-to-work services have been a key area of experimentation internationally in 
quasi-marketised public service delivery. Critical discussion of these varied market 
forms, however, and their differing implications for policy delivery and performance, 
are less well advanced in the academic literature and policy debates. This chapter 
builds the conceptual backbone to support the subsequent policy discussion and 
empirical chapters by developing an original analytical framework to guide thinking 
on the governance of welfare-to-work services which is sensitive to the varieties of 
marketisation on offer and the key dimensions on which the organisation of service 
provision might vary. Analysing the diversity in governance formulations – that is, the 
mode of coordination underpinning the provision of services – provides a key route to 
consider divergence in the priorities of service delivery and to unpack the potentially 
heterogeneous implications for service user experiences and programmatic 
employment outcomes.  
 
The chapter begins with an introduction to the key concepts of governance and 
accountabilities before moving to a more subtle discussion than is currently seen in the 
literature around varieties of quasi-markets and the artificiality of those market forms 
which are constructed to underpin public service delivery. The chapter is informed by, 
and crucially develops and extends, Gingrich’s (2011) framework for considering 
variation in the form of quasi-marketised public service. Specifically, the chapter 
develops an original analytical framework which maps and illustrates graduated 
dimensions of market allocation and market production which in turn serve as a 
scaffold against which to trace crucial aspects of variation in the formulation of quasi-
markets in practice. 
 
A key justification for this conceptual approach is the expectation that the way the 
market is structured will have important implications for attuning the attentiveness of 
service providers to the priorities and preferences of either the state, service users, or 
providers themselves. This in turn is expected to have important implications for the 
quantity, quality and distribution of services and consequently on the lived experience 
and (employment, but also broader) ‘outcomes’ of programme participants. 
 
2.2 Shifting modes of governance in public service delivery 
A fundamental shift has taken hold of welfare state governance in developed 
economies since the 1980s with the increasingly widespread use of privatisation, 
private firms and market-like methods for the delivery of public services. This 
conceptual chapter considers the broader shifts at play in the arrangement of public 
services (that is, the “how” in policy implementation processes) and introduces the 
changing levers through which governments configure the provision of social 
programmes. 
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Until recently, social policy scholars typically paid little attention to issues of 
governance in the study of social policy reforms, programme evaluation and welfare 
state transformations (van Berkel and Borghi, 2007). A growing number of studies 
however increasingly recognise the centrality of governance to policy design, 
experience and performance. Beyond this, researchers are crossing traditional 
disciplinary boundaries and integrating a discussion of ‘operational policy’ or 
governance – that is, the organisation and management of policy making and 
programme delivery processes – with that of the ‘formal’ programmatic intent and 
substance of those social policies (for example, Considine, 2001; Henman and Fenger, 
2006; Rees et al., 2014; Sol and Westerveld, 2005; Struyven and Steurs, 2005; van 
Berkel and van der Aa, 2005; Wiggan, 2015a, 2015b). Put differently, these studies 
explore the connections between the governance of public services and the substantive 
aspects of their provision, content and emphasis of programme implementation. 
 
Van Berkel and Borghi suggest that we should welcome research that sits across social 
policy and issues of governance “because governance reforms are not without 
consequences for the content of social policy programmes” and because the 
introduction of new modes of governance may have intended as well as unintended 
consequences for policy substance (2007, p. 280). What this emergent body of work 
suggests is that: 
 
“The question of what mode of coordination of the provision of social services is used, 
is not simply a ‘‘technical’’ issue about what actors to involve in service provision, or 
how to structure the relationships between them. It is also based on, or has 
consequences for, a range of other issues, such as the values that will guide the service 
provision process, the role and position of service users in service provision, the 
accountability of service providers, the discretion of frontline workers involved in 
service provision, opinions on how the behaviour of service providers and service 
users should be steered…” 
van Berkel and Borghi, 2007, p. 281 
 
In short, the nature and content of social programmes are not simply a product of 
‘official policy’. Programme governance sits as a key mediator between formal policy 
– as embodied in strategy documents and edicts – and the implementation, lived 
experience and ‘outcomes’ of programme participants on the ground. 
 
In this chapter a deeper engagement with the theoretical considerations of governance 
regimes enables the anticipation of particular weaknesses and failings which may be 
experienced under alternative governance and accountability formulations. This 
enables the research to be more alert to tensions and potential unintended 
consequences when reconciling programmatic intent with the logics of particular 
modes of service coordination.  
 
The chapter proceeds across five key sections. Firstly, it introduces the key grounding 
concepts of governance and accountabilities to trace the alternative modes of 
coordination underpinning the delivery of public services and sets out important 
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distinctions between these terms. The second section charts the rise of quasi-
marketised forms of public service governance. Thirdly, the chapter problematises 
‘marketisation’, suggesting that it is not a singular homogeneous phenomenon (as 
often discussed in the literature) and draws on the difference thesis to fracture and 
decompose this as a trend which encompasses multiple varieties of quasi-market. The 
fourth section provides an extension to previous work on the difference thesis by 
explicitly unpacking and reconceptualising the underlying dimensions against which 
quasi-marketised formulations might vary. This provides a new analytical framework 
through which to compare alternative quasi-marketised arrangements and, 
importantly, their expected differing impacts for service users and programme 
outcomes. Finally, the chapter progresses the conceptual understanding further by 
drawing new links between the literatures on accountabilities and quasi-market 
varieties in order to  enable researchers and policy makers to better identify where 
alternative accountability structures might serve as a corrective to perceived 
weaknesses in current quasi-market programmes. 
 
2.3 Governance as a grounding concept 
The term ‘governance’ has become ubiquitous as a topic of academic discussions 
(Henman and Fenger, 2006; Jessop, 1998; van Berkel et al., 2012b) and reviews of the 
literature typically conclude that the term is used in a range of ways and with a variety 
of meanings (Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998; Kooiman, 2003; Treib et al., 2007). As a 
result, some have reviewed core components of the literature and suggest cynically 
that: “if it means everything, perhaps it means nothing” (Prätorius, 2003, p. 237).  
 
Despite this eclecticism and fluidity, governance continues to hold value as a 
grounding concept in this thesis through its capacity to provide a rich conceptual 
framework for understanding changing processes and forms of government function. 
It helpfully marks a distinction from conventional understandings of ‘commanding’ 
government and instead places a focus on ‘steering’ and ‘influencing’ mechanisms 
that do not rest on recourse to the crude authority and sanctions of government (Stoker, 
1998). In this spirit, Jessop (1998, p. 30) traces the rise of the governance paradigm 
noting that a key factor in the escalating use of the term is “the need to distinguish 
between ‘governance’ and ‘government’”. 
 
Governance then signifies a set of elusive but significant shifts in the way in which 
government seeks to govern (Pierre and Peters, 2000). Importantly the term expands 
the set of institutions and actors that are drawn from, but also beyond, government; 
blurs the boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues; and 
reformulates the roles and relationships (particularly the power dynamic) between the 
institutions involved in collective action (Stoker, 1998). It is not that the state is 
without power or control, rather it draws on different, new repertoires through which 
to steer and achieve objectives (Jessop, 1998). 
 
Treib et al., (2007) support the disambiguation of the term by outlining three 
conceptions or realms of governance. The first is governance as politics, where state 
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actors share power with private actors in the process of policy formulation. The second 
conception is polity, the governance of institutional rules, norms and actions and which 
for Treib et al., (2007) spans between the logics of the market and that of hierarchy. 
The third frame describes governance as the specific steering instruments of policy 
implementation, for example, command and control, incentive and supply, 
information, deliberation and persuasion. Most particularly for the present study, the 
focus straddles the second two conceptions of polity and policy, that is, subsequent to 
decision making on appropriate political objectives (which have indeed shifted over 
time, and which are elaborated in the subsequent chapter on activation policy). 
The empirical focus of the thesis is informed by Considine’s (2001; Considine et al., 
2011) work on governance transformations in the sphere of welfare-to-work which 
similarly identifies two crucial aspects to the shifting governance dynamic. The first 
transformation involves organisational changes within the public service itself: 
“bureaucrats find themselves having to define their roles according to new demands” 
(Considine, 2001, p. 10). This parallels the polity shift and captures revised 
institutional logics and rationalities. The second process for Considine (2001) involves 
the development of new relationships – and, indeed, new tools for navigating 
relationships – with other public and private agencies. Considine refers to an 
‘enterprise toolkit’ of now familiar devices including contracts, targets, and pricing 
which accumulate and interact to support a process of changed governance.  
Although Considine does not adopt a separate nomenclature for these two discrete but 
related concepts, this thesis makes a key analytical separation between the underlying 
institutional logic – henceforth termed ‘governance’ or ‘governance framework’ – and 
the specific tools and devices for negotiating the changed relationships inferred by 
those particular logics and rationalities – henceforth referred to as ‘accountabilities’ or 
‘accountability levers’. These distinct ideas, and the interactions between them, are 
elaborated further throughout this chapter’s later discussion. For Considine, 
governance takes four types: procedural, managerial, market, and network (2001). Of 
the first three, each “has different legislative enactments of public service regulations, 
different expectations about the roles of public managers, together with alternative 
strategies for resource allocation, organisational dependency and interdependency…” 
(Considine, 2001, p. 23). The fourth variety of ‘network’ governance was considered 
to be more of a hypothetical formulation at the time of Considine’s 2001 study. 
Arguably, and as discussed further in the closing chapter of the thesis, since this variety 
of governance is understood as a “synonym for multi-agency co-ordination, 
reciprocation, lateral communication and discretionary bargaining by local actors” 
(Considine, 2001, p. 24) it remains an emergent and not fully prevalent form in the 
still highly centralised realm of UK welfare-to-work services.  
 
Figure 2.1 reproduces and extends Considine’s (2001) summary of the organisational 
character associated with each form of governance with the addition of the 
‘democratic’ form informed by Jantz et al. (2015; see also Whitworth and Carter, 2018; 
Carter, Forthcoming). For each governance ideal Figure 2.1 conveys the key essence 
of each type: “its form of rationality, form of control, primary virtue, [as specified by 
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proponents] and the nature of its service delivery focus” (Considine, 2001, p. 24). 
 
Governance 
mode 
Source of 
rationality 
Form of control i.e. core 
accountability levers 
Primary 
virtue 
Service 
delivery focus 
Procedural  Law Rules and regulations Reliability Universal 
treatment 
Corporate  Management Plans and targets Goal-driven Targets 
Market  Competition Contracts, competition and 
pricing 
Cost-driven Prices 
Democratic  Citizen voice User choice and voice User-
responsive 
User 
satisfaction 
Network  Relationships Co-production Flexibility Brokerage 
Figure 2.1 Governance and accountability types, adapted from Considine, 2001 and Carter, Forthcoming 
Closely entwined with this distillation of governance models there is a small but 
growing number of academic articles (for example, Jantz et al., 2015; Jantz and Jann, 
2013; Koppell, 2005; Romzek et al., 2012; including from this author, Whitworth and 
Carter, 2018) using the language of ‘accountabilities’ to capture the shifting 
instrumental toolkit prioritised under alternate governance conceptions. This thesis is 
informed in particular by Jantz et al., (2015, p. 5) who understand accountability as 
“a) a system of knowing and evaluating someone’s behavior [sic] according to some 
standards and b) as a system of rewards or sanctions that are depending on these 
evaluations”. 
 
At first sight ‘accountabilities’ appears as a potentially perplexing duplication of 
aspects of ‘governance’. However, there are three core reasons for accountabilities 
being a valuable addition to this chapter’s conceptual lexicon. Firstly, Jantz et al., 
(2015) introduce a valuable separation between administrative (i.e. bureaucratic 
procedural) forms and democratic accountabilities. As will be discussed further, this 
additional ‘democratic’ service-user-centred form is a valuable lens through which to 
consider a crucial additional set of preferences and values to which service provision 
may be oriented.  
 
The second key contribution is the emphasis this conception places on the range of 
accountability levers not as a singular institutional arrangement but as an 
agglomeration and interaction of types which sit together within a broader multi-
dimensional ‘accountability framework’ (Whitworth and Carter, 2018) or “web of 
accountability relations” (Jantz et al., 2015, p. 20). Whilst one particular accountability 
dimension may be expected to dominate within given governance contexts, at 
particular points in time, it is understood that this will not necessarily be the only 
accountability lever in play. For example, whilst Great Britain as a “committed 
marketizer” of employment services (van Berkel et al., 2012a) “could be expected to 
have gone furthest in embedding market instruments as the dominant form of 
accountability … this does not translate into the replacement of all alternative 
accountability instruments” (Jantz et al., 2015, p. 4, emphasis added). It is important 
then to  tease apart any overarching and dominant logic or ‘governance type’ whilst 
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continuing to identify the on-going presence of alternative accountability levers and 
forms which fall outside of this hegemonic governance formulation. Importantly then, 
and as discussed further in relation to Figure 2.5 below,  the suite of accountability 
forms in practice tend to co-exist and intersect with one another.  
 
Related, this connects to the third and final benefit of ‘accountabilities’ which is to 
open up explicitly a more detailed recognition and discussion of governance hybridity, 
still a relatively neglected area of scholarly attention.  Greater awareness of these 
hybrids facilitates a fuller investigation of how a range of accountability types mesh 
(or fail to mesh) together, with the potential for more supportive configurations where 
the strengths of some accountability forms have the potential to rectify or partially 
correct for weaknesses in others if their interactions are incorporated more explicitly 
and more fully into policy design and delivery.  
 
Previous work published by this author (Whitworth and Carter, 2018) then outlines 
five accountability mechanisms: 
 
• Procedural accountability draws on Weberian hierarchy, rule-based principles 
and norms of reliability and procedural fairness. Key devices include set 
processes, rules and requirements;  
• Corporate accountability utilises contractualised performance targets to 
monitor and compare provider performance so as to reward or punish providers 
accordingly (e.g. contract renewals/terminations, additional/reduced referrals 
or payments);  
• Market accountability steers using levers of price and competition between 
providers. Payment-by-results, accelerator pricing, or other financial 
incentives/sanctions for good/bad performance typify market accountability 
levers; 
• Democratic accountability responds transparently to the views of citizens and 
users. Whilst Jantz et al. (2015) focus ‘top-down’ on the accountability of 
politicians though the electoral cycle, Whitworth and Carter (2018) also 
include possible ‘bottom-up’ democratic accountability through user 
experience via levers of ‘voice’ (e.g. feedback, complaints, service rating) and 
‘choice’ (e.g. provider and/or intervention selection and exit) to drive service 
quality (Hirschman, 1970); 
• Network accountability coordinates provision across multiple, inter-
dependent service providers using relationships based on trust. Softer informal 
levers around the collective need for organisations to protect reputations and 
foster on-going relationships of co-operation and co-dependence offer informal 
and collectively-enforced network accountability mechanisms (Olson, 1965). 
 
Importantly, the core values and approaches associated with each of these governance 
types and operationalised through accountability mechanisms are more than 
“transitory rhetorical flourishes” but rather emerge as very real engagements enacted 
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at the core of public services (Considine, 2001, p. 18). The behaviour, relational 
dynamics and experiences of staff members, agencies and service users are profoundly 
shaped by the degree to which differing combinations of accountability levers are leant 
on within any given programme or service stream. Any public programme on paper 
may incorporate elements from across each of these five accountability types 
(Whitworth and Carter, 2018) and in practice the accountability matrix – the respective 
mix and weighting of those accountability levers – may shore up or displace the ability 
for a programme to successfully deliver policymaker (or service user) ambitions. 
Furthermore, as is ever the case there may also be a mismatch between a programme’s 
accountability devices on paper and its operational reality once implemented. Indeed, 
it is arguably the perceived weaknesses within one governance logic (underpinned by 
a dominant set of accountabilities) which make way for the ascendance of an alternate 
governance form, as succinctly described with particular attention to market 
governance below.   
 
2.4 The rise and rise of market governance and accountabilities 
 
Various scholars have helpfully traced  the evolution of these governance forms 
(Newman, 2001; Tenbensel, 2005; Knuth, 2014; Considine, 2001). Considine (2001) 
notes that procedural, corporate and marketised accountabilities broadly correspond to 
the development of public bureaucracy from its post war origins to more recent waves 
of reform. The procedural dimension captures ‘old fashioned’ notions of public 
bureaucracy where services are delivered according to rule-based principles and norms 
of reliability and procedural fairness with public servants following set processes, rules 
and requirements. Corporate governance can be seen to align with the rise of New 
Public Management (Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 2003) as a response to the rigidities and lack 
of responsiveness of traditional bureaucratic levers. Under this dimension 
contractualised plans and performance targets are used to monitor and compare service 
provider performance.  
 
The rise of market – or more precisely quasi-market – forms of governance and 
accountability since the 1980s has been a particularly potent trend. The growing use 
of market-inspired modes of coordination is of specific interest for the current study 
since British welfare-to-work policy has been at the leading edge of these reforms 
internationally (Lødemel and Trickey, 2001; van Berkel et al., 2012a). There are a 
range of arguments utilised by proponents for the introduction of market-like 
arrangements into welfare systems traced typically to the economic and political 
challenges of the post-1970s era which both challenged debates over spending (calls 
for small government), promoted a desire for greater choice, and emphasised 
constraints on traditional policy instruments (Gingrich, 2011). 
Gingrich (2011) distils two dominant ‘pro-market’ arguments belonging respectively 
to public choice theorists and advocates of ‘New Public Management’. Public choice 
theory suggests that elected politicians are rent-seekers and that “…public provision 
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creates a bureaucracy out to service its own needs and not those of users” (Tullock et 
al., 2002 in Gingrich, 2011, p. 27). The recommendation then is that markets ought to 
limit the size and scope of the state and that by shrinking public provision services will 
be replaced with a superior marketised form of allocation and production.  
A second line of ‘pro-market’ argument is generally understood as nestling within 
New Public Management (NPM) thinking, though arguably NPM is a fairly unwieldy 
and imprecise project with no fixed agreement as to what precisely it encompasses or 
entails (Hood, 1991). Proponents here suggest that government ought to be managed 
like a business either by liberating bureaucrats to act like business managers, by 
breaking bureaucracies into agencies responsible for pursuing targets (as per the 
corporate accountability lever in Figure 2.1), or by ‘contracting out’ and using 
independent providers to deliver services (steered by marketised accountabilities). 
Here the argument is not necessarily that state spending on public services should be 
reduced (the government is not presumed to be a predator or leach) but rather it is 
argued that government bureaucracies  operate inefficiently and are unresponsive to 
citizen’s demands and desires in their delivery of public services (Hood, 1991; Kettl, 
1993).  
Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992, p. 14) seminal work argued against traditional, 
procedural Weberian rule-based democracy which had “a distinct ethos: slow, 
inefficient, impersonal”. The promise from within this frame is that markets are a 
technocratic means for improving public services, not a replacement for them 
(Lundsgaard, 2002). It is this argument which has reverberated most prominently 
through recent waves of public service ‘reform’ in the UK. 
Marketised coordination is instilled by splitting apart the ‘purchasing’ function from 
that of ‘providing’ public services in the belief that government should ‘steer not row’ 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). Under this marketised approach the state retains 
important responsibilities around  financing and regulating services even if the public 
sector no longer provides those services directly. In explaining early moves to 
marketization in the UK in the late 1980s Le Grand and Bartlett (1993, p. 3) note that 
“…the state was to become primarily only a purchaser of welfare services, with state 
provision being systematically replaced by a system of independent providers 
competing with one another in internal or ‘quasi’-markets”. The behaviour of service 
providers is steered through economic stimuli such as payment incentives and any 
regulation principally takes place through contracts with public commissioners 
(typically central or local government). 
The dominant arguments in support of the marketised approach suggest that this mode 
will improve the efficiency, responsiveness and quality of services (Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1992; Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993; Savas, 2000; Lundsgaard, 2002). The 
improving power of markets is thought to be driven by two broad processes. Firstly, 
open competition between multiple independent service providers is expected to result 
in improved service efficiency such that the total costs of service delivery are 
minimised. Secondly, choice between multiple providers, exercised either by service 
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users or by government purchasers, is expected to instil greater responsiveness to need, 
increase entrepreneurialism and is expected to contribute to more tailored, better 
quality service solutions. A further benefit is thought to flow from a process of “de-
bureaucratisation” since marketised models are seen as more flexible and capable of 
responding to changes in the business cycle and the needs of target groups (Bredgaard 
and Larsen, 2007, p. 289). 
2.4.1 Public service markets as ‘quasi’-markets 
Crucially, for the promises of improved efficiency and quality to hold, important 
assumptions must be met, namely that competition and choice function as in 
theoretical markets of neoclassical economics. Specifically, “For the allocation of a 
service by a conventional market to be efficient, responsive and to offer genuine 
choice, the market concerned has to be competitive” (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993, p. 
19). The work of Julian Le Grand (Le Grand, 1991; Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993; Le 
Grand and Bartlett, 1993) has for these reasons popularised the use of the term ‘quasi’-
market since in important ways the introduction of market-like mechanisms in the field 
of public service diverges from a conventional understanding of market functioning. 
Le Grand and Bartlett (1993) emphasise that in public service markets deviations from 
a conventional market structure occur on both the supply and demand side. On the 
demand side, consumer – that is service user – preferences are not expressed directly 
in money terms through consumer purchasing power as in the key ‘invisible hand’ of 
pure markets. In contrast, within public service ‘markets’ service users are typically 
not able to express choice over their provider at all and where service users do have 
choice it tends to be highly constrained in its remit and operation. Instead, ‘choice’ is 
dominated by commissioners via purchasing decisions that are taken by a government 
agency or are delegated to a third party acting on the public sector’s behalf.  
Conventional market relationships, or even government procurement relationships in 
basic goods (stationary etc), typically have one ‘principal’ (the contractor) and one 
‘agent’ (the producer). Contrastingly, in more complex public service market 
arrangements there are three key sets of actors: payers, users, and producers of 
services. The presence of separate payers and users fragments demand, “raising the 
question of who the principal is to whom the agent is supposed to respond – the payer 
of the service or the user”? (Lowery, 1998; in Gingrich, 2011, p. 9).  
In terms of supply, in contrast to conventional markets, not all provider organisations 
are necessarily operating in direct pursuit of profit maximisation. Independent, non-
profit providers also seek to act in the space of public service provision and their 
objectives and priorities in this space – as well as their ownership structure – is not 
always clear (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993).1  
                                               
1 Work conducted by the Third Sector Research Centre (Rees et al., 2013) suggests that ownership 
structures and charitable purpose may – in the context of cost pressurised welfare-to-work provision – 
do little to differentiate provider practice. 
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Beyond these supply and demand side peculiarities in public service quasi-markets, 
Gingrich (2011) goes on to identify information asymmetries and incomplete contracts 
as further market ‘problems’ which pose challenges for structuring effective 
marketised arrangements within public services. By way of information asymmetries, 
Gingrich suggests that “where the supplier of the service, such as a doctor or social 
worker, knows more about the cost and quality of the service than the user [and perhaps 
also more than the payer, this], make[s] it difficult for consumers to shop around for 
producers or insurers” (Gingrich, 2011, p. 9). The implications of asymmetries in 
information – where greater insight is held by private providers than by the 
government payer – features in Chapter 5. The performance challenges of information 
asymmetries in the field of employment support services specifically has been 
identified in previous work commissioned by the DWP which found that in schemes 
seeking to implement a degree of user choice, the absence of relevant information 
made selecting a provider particularly challenging (Conolly et al., 2010). Relatedly, 
specifying ‘quality’ in outsourced service contracts is notoriously challenging. Whilst 
it may be possible for policy makers to specify some outcomes of interest it is highly 
questionable as to whether such a specification could fully capture all aspects of 
service quality, meaning that public services are plagued by incomplete contracting 
(Hart et al., 1997). This serves to compound principal-agent problems and underscores 
frequent challenges in quasi-marketised approaches to public service design and 
delivery, including in welfare-to-work services. 
As a result, the pursuit of market mimicking mechanisms in public service governance 
must always be considered as a trend to ‘quasi’-markets. These ‘quasi’-markets are 
not instinctive, automatic ‘natural’ market systems, but rather they are artificial 
constructs: outcomes are specified; prices must be set; contracts written; competition 
between providers arranged; ‘winning’ providers selected; performance overseen and 
steered; the ‘market’ regulated, refined, maintained. In short, the rules of the ‘game’ 
are designed by policy-makers (re-badged as ‘market stewards’) and “there is not a 
single free, competitive, benchmark against which to assess the introduction of market 
incentives in services” (Gingrich, 2011, p. 9; Gash et al., 2013). 
2.5 Fronting and fracturing understandings of market governance: the 
difference thesis 
This discussion of public service markets as ‘quasi-markets’ helpfully identifies the 
ways in which we must consider their introduction as an artificial endeavour and, as 
an implicit consequence, how there are important distinctions in the design and 
functioning of these systems when compared to theoretical pure markets of neo-
classical economics. What is perhaps less explicit in much of the literature, and indeed 
in the highly polarised academic and political debates, is the degree to which the 
common language of ‘market’ reform has obscured comparative conceptual (and 
linked, empirical) analyses of what are, in reality, a varied set of quasi-market forms 
and reform processes (Jacobs, 1998; Greener, 2008). 
Greener (2008) problematises the term ‘market’ perceptively noting that the concept 
is used to describe complex and varied forms. Powell (2015, p. 110), summarising this 
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discussion, suggests that the “phrases quasi-market or internal market have been used 
promiscuously to describe any system in which providers compete for resources. A 
convergence of terminology has created the illusion of a convergence of policy”.  
This lumping together, or convergence, around a singular marketising endeavour has 
been powerfully deconstructed by advocates of ‘the difference thesis’ (Powell, 2015; 
Gingrich, 2011; Zehavi, 2012; Meagher and Goodwin, 2015). In short, this cluster of 
academic work suggests that ‘marketisation’ is not a singular phenomenon but rather 
that it captures a diverse range of “practices, rationales, trajectories, actors and 
impacts” (Meagher and Goodwin, 2015, p. 4). It is therefore possible – and indeed 
more appropriate – to consider the analysis of marketisation as a comparative 
endeavour and consequently to draw comparisons both within and across country 
contexts to look at multiple ‘varieties’ of quasi-marketisation. 
The work of Jane Gingrich (2011) provides a powerful schematic through which to 
sharpen understandings of the – now dominant – market governance arrangements and 
fracture what has elsewhere been considered as an undifferentiated lump of 
governance reforms. Powell (2015) identifies Gingrich’s work as the most recent, 
detailed, and developed account of the ‘difference thesis’ and Wiggan (2015a, 2015b) 
has successfully used the foundations of Gingrich as a device through which to 
consider market developments in the context of UK welfare-to-work. The headline 
argument of Gingrich’s work is that:  
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“markets empower different actors and thus trade off different incentives, that markets 
in public services vary systematically and that policymakers can manipulate this 
variation strategically”.  
Gingrich, 2011 as précised by Powell, 2015, p. 110 
 
This is a key theoretical grounding for the chapter, and indeed the thesis as a whole, 
as it enables the discussion to progress from the usual polarising debate “between 
markets in services as “good” and markets in services as “bad” [which] misses much 
of what markets in services are doing. Markets have dramatically changed the way 
services operate, but not in a uniform way” (Gingrich, 2011, p. 7, emphasis added). 
Fundamentally, the differential nature and function of markets “empower different 
actors and thus trade off different incentives” (Gingrich, 2011, p. 3). 
 
This chapter thus recognises and conceives of variation in market structures not as an 
artefact of chance or state-specific teleology but as the result of particular active reform 
choices made by politicians and officials. Central to the thesis is a consideration of 
how the marketised relationships are structured since “depending on how information, 
contracts, and demand are shaped, the incentives that producers face in the delivery of 
services may promote attention to the buyer, or to the user, or even give new producers 
the scope to follow their own interests” (Gingrich, 2011, p. 9).  
 
What then are the options on the table in terms of the form that quasi-markets can take 
and the dimensions on which they may be manipulated?  
 
2.6 A differential view of markets 
As a route to unpack the specific market configurations advanced in particular areas 
of outsourced public service provision, a key contribution of this chapter is the 
development of an original analytical framework that significantly extends Gingrich’s 
(2011) contribution and starting point by more comprehensively mapping and 
illustrating the dimensions that underpin the varieties of public service markets on 
offer. In essence, this creates a richer analytical tool through which to understand the 
particular flavour of quasi-marketisation advanced in any given context and anticipate 
impacts for service users, providers and commissioners. 
 
Before introducing the chapter’s original conceptual contributions this section firstly 
outlines the typology of quasi-markets advanced by Gingrich, at the heart of which is 
a consideration of variation on two dimensions – how access to services is allocated 
(capturing financing and regulation of service provision) and how they are produced 
(referring to the structure of competition and choice in the market). On the allocation 
dimension, Gingrich separates those services that are collectively financed through 
taxation from those where individuals bear costs and risks. The production dimension 
“refers to the structure of competition and choice in the market, as how this is 
organised affects whether it is the state, the provider or the service user who is best 
placed to advance their preferences and thus shape service production” (Gingrich as 
summarised by Wiggan, 2015a, p. 118). 
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Based on these dimensions Gingrich identifies three broad categories of state-, user- 
or provider-driven markets that essentially identify “who is the ‘piper calling the 
tune’” (Powell, 2015, p. 110). State-driven markets increase the power of government 
to set incentives for cost-efficiency; consumer-led markets empower the users of 
services and create incentives for producers to respond to users’ preferences of high-
quality provision; producer-driven markets allow independent service providers to 
pursue profit maximisation (Gingrich, 2011, pp. 13–17). Service providers are 
strongest in situations where service users have a constrained ability to exit the market 
or where the contract defining the relationship between the government purchaser and 
provider has either weakly defined outputs/outcomes and/or limited monitoring of 
service quality.2 “In either circumstance the provider enjoys greater scope to direct the 
market and prioritise their preference for profit maximisation over cost control or 
service responsiveness and equity” (Wiggan, 2015a, p. 118).  
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Figure 2.2 Gingrich’s six quasi-market types. Source: Gingrich, 2011, p. 12 
As outlined in Figure 2.2, for Gingrich (2011) the destination for the allocation and 
production dimensions is a hard classification of six types of markets. The 
development of these ‘ideal types’ marks definitive progress in our understanding of 
varieties of quasi-markets in public services. Nonetheless, there is the potential to 
enhance Gingrich’s work, specifically in addressing the ‘boxing in’ of distinct types 
of quasi-markets in her classification, which is limiting in two key ways both 
analytically and for policy. 
Firstly, the classification is not particularly strong on identification strategies. In a line-
up of different quasi-marketised configurations what are the key traits that flag a 
marketised programme or policy domain as exemplifying one particular form or 
another? For example, how strong does user choice and voice need to be before a 
                                               
2 Gingrich suggests that pressures toward profit maximisation will be amplified where providers are 
privately owned and responsive to shareholders. 
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market becomes classified as ‘consumer-controlled’? Essentially, for each of the 
quasi-market types in Figure 2.2, how do we know it when we see it? A second pertinent 
limitation of Gingrich’s discussion is that of boxing in and marking an analytically 
unnecessary and unhelpful series of binary distinctions between particular forms of 
quasi-market. To some degree in any heuristic device this scalpel-sharp cleanliness of 
separation between different forms is needed for conceptual clarity and aids in 
conveying heuristically a new argument. Yet in this respect Gingrich’s (2011) 
significant original framework misses the degree to which there may be both gradation 
in dimensions, hybridity across dimensions,  and a degree of fuzziness at the edges of 
each ‘type’.  
 
To progress further the conceptual understanding of quasi-market varieties this chapter 
then responds directly to weaknesses in the forerunner framework, firstly by offering 
and extending a clear articulation of the underlying dimensions and the traits that align 
with particular quasi-market types (by developing the labelled axes in Figures 2.3 and 
2.4) and secondly by conceiving and visualising these axes as continua such that the 
framework can be more alive to subtle variations in the forms of quasi-market under 
study. 
2.6.1 Dimensions of variation in public service quasi-markets – allocation  
The analytical framework developed within this thesis, and accepted for publication 
elsewhere (Carter, 2018), begins by considering the allocation dimension (Gingrich, 
2011). The thesis makes an original contribution by separating the allocation 
dimension into two new underlying components: financing and regulation. These are 
visualised in Figure 2.3 below. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Visualising the allocation dimension in public service markets (an original illustration informed by and 
extending from Gingrich, 2011 and Wiggan 2015a, 2015b) 
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The first allocation dimension relates to whether services are collectively financed by 
society (i.e. provision costs are publicly funded through general taxation) or whether 
provision relies, in full or in part, on private resources of individuals (for example, 
through co-payments, means-testing, or incentives for private consumption). This 
financing dimension is shown in the upper portion of Figure 2.3 and the continuous 
scale seeks to reflect the ways in which the resource for service provision may be 
structured in a range of ways. Unlike Gingrich’s table in Figure 2.2, which proposes a 
binary distinction between ‘collective’ and ‘individual’ financing, Figure 2.3 suggests 
instead that there are a range of graduated potential options. At the extreme poles of 
the axes sit the ‘pure’ forms of wholly collective (leftmost) and individual (rightmost) 
financing, but between these bounds services may be funded by incorporating 
collective and individual resources to varying extent.  
 
The ultimate source of service funding, while a key dimension of variation across 
alternate market structures, is however not the only facet which can be understood as 
undergirding the pattern of service allocation.  
 
The second allocation component captures the degree and strength of regulation for 
provider activity, with an axis that spans from extensive state directed auditing and 
service assurance through to a light-touch regulation framework. This component 
therefore incorporates the suggestion from Wiggan that a high level of state-led 
regulation “ostensibly promotes equitable access to services and underpins quality” 
(2015b, p. 155) whereas weak regulation enables providers to more easily pursue 
profits by targeting the most lucrative service users and reducing costs by scaling back 
the quality of provision or reducing services for riskier and/or poorer populations 
(Gingrich, 2011; Wiggan, 2015a). The lower portion of Figure 2.3 draws out a 
spectrum of regulation ranging from extensive state-directed auditing and assurance 
on service access (leftmost) to, at the other extreme, a very light-touch stance on 
service quality and access (rightmost) and seeks to capture the degree to which the 
‘cost’ of poor or partial provision may be cascaded to service users. 
 
Overall, Figure 2.3 expands on previous work by visualising the underlying allocation 
concept as a graduated dimension with ‘more market-like’ arrangements as the 
rightmost options on the spectrum, whilst the left-hand side is further from the market 
and actively seeks to mediate the pure market lever. In sum, the allocation dimension 
captures “whether price and selection mechanisms are used to allocate services, or 
whether services preserve a strong collective guarantee of access and funding” 
(Gingrich, 2011, p. 10). 
 
2.6.2 Dimensions of variation in public service quasi-markets – production  
Alongside considerations of allocation, the second key route through which quasi-
market arrangements vary is in the realm of ‘production’.  The production dimension 
covers choice and competition: the way that a service is ‘produced’ within the quasi-
market. In his application of Gingrich’s framework, Wiggan (2015b) has argued that 
different combinations of competition and choice will influence the priorities of 
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service production. Depending on the configuration of provider competition, 
commissioner control and choice function services will be differently responsive to 
the needs and (dis)empowerment of either the state, service users or providers 
(Wiggan, 2015b).  
 
Figure 2.4 expands and visualises the discussion offered by Gingrich (2011) and 
Wiggan (2015a, 2015b). The first sub-component (upper portion of Figure 2.4) relates 
to how ‘open’ the market is to new provider entrants, and captures the degree to which 
the quasi-market arrangements service the hegemony of specific or incumbent 
providers. This spans from an open, highly contestable and accessible market (far left) 
to a situation where access is constrained or limited (and therefore appears as an 
oligopoly), be that through restrictions on the size or sector of ‘eligible’ providers or 
other facets (such as contract duration, likely sanctions for failing to meet contractual 
obligations, or pre-qualification for new provider status).  
 
 
Figure 2.4 Visualising the production dimension in public service markets (an original illustration informed by 
and extending from Gingrich, 2011 and Wiggan 2015a, 2015b) 
The second axis (in Figure 2.4) captures the control apportioned to the state (vis-à-vis 
service providers) in the design and stipulation of provider activity. At the left-most 
extent, there is a high degree of public sector control over provider activity since 
payment to providers is explicitly tied to the delivery of fixed service components. 
Shifting rightwards, the dimension portrays an increasingly outcomes-led approach 
whereby service providers are afforded the freedom to innovate and design flexible 
services geared to pursuing specified outcomes but where the public sector takes a 
position of agnosticism on the means of securing these outcomes. 
 
The final axis in the lower portion of Figure 2.4 captures the function of user choice 
and voice within service production (Hirschman, 1970). Here, the left-most portion of 
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the axis conveys a situation where service users are powerful agents and where the 
choice and/or voice of those citizens who use a service provide a powerful steering 
rein to the behaviour of providers. By contrast, at the right-hand extent service users 
have limited if any ‘choice’ and their perspectives therefore have no traction for 
service provider behaviour. For each axis within Figure 2.4 a position closer to the 
extreme right-hand side reflects a stronger provider position, be that through minimal 
competition (upper axis), minimal state control (middle axis) or minimal 
responsiveness to user preferences (lower axis). 
 
2.7 Varieties of quasi-market: where non-market accountabilities overlay 
marketised governance  
What becomes apparent in mapping out the dimensions of variation in quasi-markets 
is the degree to which ‘variation’ can in part flow from the ways in which non-market 
accountabilities overlay and intersect with the ‘marketised’ forms. For example, in 
relation to the allocation dimension it is possible for the quasi-market to take a 
formulation that is a closer approximation of natural clearing markets (the right-most 
portion of Figure 2.3) but other non-market accountabilities can be used to ensure 
service access, for example, with the accompaniment of procedural rules, norms and 
regulation – perhaps through the regime of minimum service requirements or via 
corporate accountabilities, with targets set around user access and waiting lists.  
 
Relatedly, on the production dimension each axis can be seen to pivot from a relatively 
unfettered, provider-dominant situation (right-most portion of Figure 2.4) through a 
‘softened’ or hybridised form (in the middle portion of the axes) to a situation (in the 
left hand portion) where another stakeholder’s set of preferences are more fully met.  
 
Considering the middle axes of Figure 2.4, at the left-most extreme state preferences 
for control over service provision, equity, and efficiency are prioritised. Specifying 
core components of services that are to be received by all participants holds up 
procedural fairness (i.e. overlays procedural accountabilities). In situations where it is 
possible to tightly specify service components which are known to correlate with 
programmatic outcomes this position can drive efficiency by minimising activities 
which are not known to influence the public service outcomes of interest (this might 
be achieved through overlaying corporate accountabilities). This can be considered as 
equivalent to coupling procedural or corporate accountabilities to the marketised 
arrangement.  
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Figure 2.5 Overlaying non-market accountabilities on the production dimension 
On the bottom axis of Figure 2.5, the left extreme of the chart strongly exerts service 
user preferences for quality, responsive services. This can be understood as analogous 
to the overlaying of democratic accountabilities to the otherwise marketised 
arrangement such that providers are strongly beholden to user priorities.  
 
The upper portion of Figure 2.5 makes for a more challenging connection to an 
alternate non-market form. At the right most portion of this axis incumbent providers 
are able to pursue their own preference for profit maximisation relatively freely. 
Arguably at the left-hand portion there is ‘more market’ accountability as providers 
effectively become responsive to the actions of other providers and compete to remain 
in the market. This competitive pressure would be expected to act as a counterweight 
to the more cynical or malfeasant routes to profit maximisation (setting inflated, non-
competitive prices and/or poor or partial performance) as incumbent providers with 
poor performance or expensive provision would need to adapt to become more 
efficient or else be forced to exit from the market place (through non-renewal of 
contracts and loss of market share).  
 
Stimulating and maintaining competitive pressures within a quasi-marketised 
arrangement, however, is likely to require considerable ongoing ‘market stewardship’ 
on the part of policy makers, who will likely need to correct as they go in order to 
ensure the maintenance of competitive pressures across providers on an ongoing basis. 
The irony then is that considerable government activity may be required in order to 
amplify the competitiveness of a quasi-market, for example, by facilitating market 
share shift to better performing providers, or by calculating performance tables. In a 
highly competitive market it may also be the case that government efficiency 
preferences will be met.  
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In this way the variation in quasi-markets can be connected back to the wider 
discussion on accountability types whereby the presence of non-market accountability 
levers can be understood as introducing slightly different forms of quasi-market. A 
system which embodies market governance takes on a particular character or 
formulation in accordance with the accompanying accountabilities. This chimes with 
the description offered by Jantz et al., (2015, p. 19) who indicate that “[M]arket 
accountability is not, per se, a displacement of other accountability forms, rather it 
seems to co-exist and intersect with administrative and democratic accountability as 
policymakers oscillate between encouraging competition and freedom in delivery with 
control to cope with the unwanted consequences of market mechanisms”.  
 
It is only by reading the full web of accountabilities at play that we can fully understand 
the pressures and imperatives driving the shape and form of service provision in any 
given context, including more narrowly in the various potential forms of quasi-
marketised service provision. The analytic framework developed here then offers a 
substantive extension and improvement to Gingrich’s forerunner framework as it: 
firstly, functions as an explicit tool for identifying particular quasi-marketised forms; 
secondly, supports analysis to unpick the likely dominance of any stakeholder – be 
that state, user, or provider – in shaping provision; and, thirdly, hints at accountability 
levers that might be used as correctives to recalibrate quasi-market systems in 
situations where perverse behaviours, as a result of a single stakeholder’s dominance, 
are leading to unintended and undesirable outcomes. The utility of the analytic 
framework will be demonstrated by mapping British employment support programmes 
against these axes in the subsequent policy chapter whilst the framework’s 
comparative credentials will be explored in Chapter 8.  
 
2.8 Network accountabilities – the missing dimension 
The obvious accountability elephant in the room within this discussion is the network 
dimension. This network accountability lever would in principle function in such a 
way that provider behaviour is responsive to collaborative norms and shared 
obligations. The literature refers to network governance as capturing a ‘relational’ 
dynamic between service purchasers and providers, as per Williamson’s (1975, 1979) 
work on relational contracting. According to Considine, (2001, p. 30) network 
governance attempts to avoid the potentially predatory environment of marketised 
relations by proposing interdependence as a “binding characteristic”. This form of 
network accountability can then be considered as replacing the vertical hierarchy 
between what might otherwise be principal-agent relations. Considine (2001) 
additionally introduces the notion of network governance as co-operation and the co-
production of results across multiple provider organisations. The survey tools used in 
Considine’s study to detect this form of governance at the frontline capture situations 
where a high value is placed “on trust and maintaining good contacts with clients and 
other service providers, including competitors. Adherents to this approach were 
presumed to be most likely to say ‘when you get good results with clients it’s usually 
a joint effort by yourself, the training person, the employer, etc’” (Considine, 2001, p. 
34). This can then be seen as horizontal network formation, where a marketised 
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dynamic of competition is superseded by a networked logic of co-production as a 
process for assembling complex services.  
 
Notably, network accountability is wholly absent from Gingrich’s typology and does 
not feature anywhere in her discussion of quasi-market variation. This absence may be 
expected on three fronts. Firstly, it is not immediately clear how the utilisation of 
network accountabilities might be squared with her highly partisan account of market 
making endeavours. Secondly, there is also the issue that network governance has 
generally been understood as more hypothetical than real or as an ‘emergent’ public 
sector governance model (Bovaird and Löffler, 2009), including  in the case in British 
welfare-to-work provision (Whitworth and Carter, 2018). Therefore, given that 
Gingrich’s account is highly reliant on real-world case studies there is arguably less 
ability to integrate a consideration of networks. Thirdly, for Gingrich and others who 
have applied her framework the production dimension captures the intersection of 
choice and competition. A network accountability lever – in hypothetical form – does 
away with ‘competition’ and, indeed, is understood to have emerged “partly in 
response to concerns about NPM’s hard-edged competitive outcomes” (English and 
Skellern, 2005, p. 2). The absence of network accountabilities is however problematic 
for the original analytic framework developed in this chapter given that it seeks more 
broadly to comprehensively trace the key dimensions of variation between potential 
quasi-market types. Unlike Gingrich, the device developed here aspires to provide a 
frame by which key varieties of quasi-markets and their hybrids can be considered 
even where these do not exist in practice. To achieve this it is crucial for the 
dimensions not to be restricted in conception to what is currently present but rather to 
probe and frame in such a way that we can trace future potential quasi-market 
possibilities. The ability to identify potential, but as yet, not implemented quasi-market 
forms is expected to be particularly valuable in supporting policymakers to identify 
additional accountability levers which may overcome weaknesses experienced in the 
quasi-market designs of the present. 
 
In response to this absence of network accountabilities, Figure 2.6 outlines a potential 
additional dimension against which public service formulations may be considered. 
The concluding chapter of the thesis returns to more fully consider network 
accountabilities and address the absence of this axis both in the quasi-market 
framework and, as will be seen, though the dearth of networked considerations in the 
specific case of the British welfare-to-work quasi-market.  
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Figure 2.6 Considering horizontal network accountabilities: a hypothesised axis of variation introducing 
collaboration across multiple, interconnected provider organisations 
The relational dynamic between multiple provider parties is anticipated to be 
particularly relevant in situations where citizens experience ‘complex’ and compound 
social challenges which sit across several commissioner domains, for example, in the 
arena of welfare-to-work where childcare challenges, housing insecurity, health issues, 
and unemployment intersect. Following from previous work by this author (Whitworth 
and Carter, 2018) the concluding chapter poses network accountability as a viable 
route to holistically combine streams of support in an ecosystem that ‘wraps around’ 
service users as a potential solution to some of the weaknesses encountered in current 
quasi-marketised governance configurations. 
 
2.9 Conclusions and charting a course to operationalise the analytical 
framework 
This chapter draws on the lens of governance and accountabilities to register the 
alternative modes of coordination underpinning the delivery of public services. This 
focus stems from an acknowledgement that the nature and content of social policies 
are crucially informed by their governance, that the logics of particular governance 
forms and accountability levers will have important implications for service user 
experiences and outcomes. The ascendance of market-inspired modes of governance 
is documented as a particularly dominant and heady trend. While previous studies have 
considered the rise of ‘quasi-markets’ as an undifferentiated and unified set of reform 
processes the discussion here is informed by and extends from the ‘difference thesis,’ 
which suggests that it is more appropriate to fracture the marketisation trend and 
introduce varieties of quasi-marketisation. 
 
The original analytical framework developed across the chapter makes three particular 
academic contributions. Firstly, the chapter advances from Gingrich’s (2011) 
forerunner framework by unpacking aspects of public service allocation and provision 
to more comprehensively outline the underlying dimensions – that is – acknowledging 
a more detailed set of concepts which comprise each of these. The allocation 
dimension captures the form of financing for services (ranging from wholesale public 
funding to fully private provision) and the regulation of provider activity by the state 
(stretching from very light-touch or negligible regulation through to comprehensive 
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scrutiny and service quality control). The production dimension captures three 
underlying axes:  
i) How ‘open’ and competitive the market is, spanning from an open, highly 
competitive and accessible market to a situation where access is constrained or 
limited;  
ii) The specification of provider activity, ranging from a high degree of public 
sector control over provider activity to an increasingly outcomes-led approach, 
where the public sector takes a position of agnosticism on the means of 
securing specified outcomes; and  
iii) The role of service user choice and voice, spanning from a situation where the 
preferences and concerns of participating citizens act as a powerful steering 
mechanism for provider behaviour to a state where service user choice and/or 
voice is constrained to such a degree that is has no traction for service provider 
actions. 
 
This offers a clearer articulation of the differentiators of alternate market varieties and 
the traits that align with particular quasi-market types. Depending on the design of 
particular quasi-markets and their configurations with respect to these dimensions, 
providers and their service delivery activities are expected to be differently responsive 
to the priorities and preferences of either the state, service users or providers 
themselves. This in turn is expected to have implications for the quantity, quality and 
distribution of services and consequently on any social outcomes achieved through 
such provision.  
 
The second contribution flows from visualising these dimensions as continua such that 
the framework can be more attentive to subtle variations in the forms of quasi-market 
under study. The framework moves beyond Gingrich’s clear but unrealistic binary 
distinctions, for example, between fully public or fully private financing, to consider 
a continuous scale of alternative positions where the implementation of any axes is 
blended and partial. Rather than the scalpel sharp distinctions in the grid offered by 
Gingrich, this visualisation of the underlying concepts opens up a tool through which 
to draw out hybridity across multiple quasi-market forms.  
 
Finally, this analytical tool pivots readily between theoretical discussions and applied 
work. As demonstrated in the subsequent policy chapter, it is a powerful tool for 
operationalising the design features of particular marketised forms and systematically 
comparing across these – as illustrated in Chapter 8 which uses the framework to 
compare two quasi-marketised programmes. The tool then is accessible not only to 
ideal types but can be used to map the messiness of quasi-markets in practice and is a 
route to investigate hybridity, where quasi-markets appear to straddle multiple ‘market 
types’ as conceived under Gingrich’s preceding framework.  
 
Given previous difficulties in making systematic comparison across multiple 
marketised formulations it is hoped that this analytical framework can be used as a 
foundational tool for future work which seeks to learn lessons by reading across quasi-
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market forms. Chapter 3 moves next to disucss the recent evolution of welfare-to-work 
policies in the UK context and, within this, utilises this chapter’s original conceptual 
framework to unpack the key employment support programme at the heart of the 
study’s empirical interest: the Work Programme.  
 
 
3 Evolution of the “welfare-to-work” agenda: shifting policy 
goal posts and applying new quasi-market approaches 
3.1 Chapter summary 
In common with other developed economies, since the 1980s the UK has made a 
decisive shift from a ‘passive’ to an ‘active’ welfare system in which eligibility for out 
of work benefits is tied increasingly tightly and explicitly to the stated obligation to 
seek paid work.3 Unemployment is no longer framed as a structural issue of demand 
management but has been reconfigured as a supply-side challenge of improving the 
employability of the unemployed, thus beckoning in activation as the policy 
prescription.  
 
In order to set an understanding of the Work Programme in context this chapter begins 
with a brief discussion of the wider transitions that have taken hold in terms of the 
overarching policy objectives in the field of unemployment protection and 
employment support. The conceptual framework developed in the preceding chapter 
is then used as a tool to systematically unpack the form of quasi-market instigated 
within the Work Programme. This reveals the Work Programme to embody a private 
power market in which the preferences of service providers are dominant. This market 
form promises innovation but introduces particular risks where providers defend 
profits through cost-cutting at the expense of effective or high-quality services. 
Programme designers anticipated these pressures and sought to implement a suite of 
steering tools that retain the perceived innovative, effective and efficient impetus of 
provider-directed quasi-markets whilst ensuring that a complex set of public sector 
objectives are met.  
 
This discussion sets up the rationale and need for the empirical work developed across 
the remainder of the thesis, which questions whether these design tools facilitate 
programme objectives to support more participants into work, faster, for longer and 
whilst reducing gaps in performance outcomes between the easier- and harder-to-help 
(DWP, 2010a). 
 
3.2 Policy trends in unemployment and “worklessness” 
Subsequent to its post-war origins there have been important changes in what Torfing 
(1999, p. 7) describes as the “basic contents” of the modern welfare state. Credence 
has been placed on Bob Jessop’s description of the shifting functioning of the welfare 
state from the traditional post-war ‘Keynesian welfare state’ to that of a 
‘Schumpeterian workfare state’ (Torfing, 1999; Peck and Jones, 1995; Dingeldey, 
2007; Deeming, 2015). The key concerns of the Keynesian welfare state were to 
maintain full employment, primarily through demand-side management (Jessop, 1993) 
and to provide security and protection  from Beveridge’s ‘five giants’ (Deeming, 
                                               
3 Indeed, under Universal Credit in-work benefits are now also subject to conditionality and recipients 
are obliged to seek more and/or better payed employment. 
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2015). Here citizenship captures not only civil and political rights, but social rights as 
well (Marshall, 1950). 
 
For Jessop the crisis of the Fordist mode of production and Keynesian welfare state 
are intimately entwined and he suggests a shift to an emergent Schumpeterian 
workfare state. Peck and Jones (1995) elaborate on the key distinctions between the 
Keynesian welfare state and Schumpeterian workfare state and features of the 
transition between the two modes (as outlined in Figure 3.1). The shift between the 
two models is signalled by three overarching characteristics: firstly, the promotion of 
product, process, organisational, and market innovation; secondly, the enhancement 
of the structural competitiveness of open economies mainly through supply-side 
intervention; and, thirdly, the subordination of social policy to the demands of labour 
market flexibility and structural competitiveness (Jessop, 1993, p. 9, emphasis added). 
What becomes increasingly clear is that the shift in accumulation regimes and modes 
of social regulation is aligned with substantively altered policy understandings and 
prescriptions in relation to (un)employment. 
 
 
Keynesian welfare state 
characteristics 
Crisis Schumpeterian workfare state 
characteristics 
Macroeconomic 
policy 
orientation 
Countercyclical demand 
management. Interventionist 
policies supporting economies 
of scale and productivity 
growth 
Fiscal crisis of the state 
triggered by falling 
profitability, declining tax 
base, and growing welfare 
demands 
Supply-side innovation through 
goals of structural 
competitiveness, economies of 
scope, and continuous, flexible 
innovation 
State discourse Productivity and planning Monetarism Flexibility and 
entrepreneurialism 
Wage relations Collective bargaining. 
Promotion of norms of mass 
consumption 
Crisis of profitability 
triggered by international 
competition. Pressure on 
wage rates 
Flexible wage systems. Income 
polarisation. Heightened 
segmentation 
Social policy Progressive redistribution. 
Based on universalist welfare 
rights and social needs 
Fiscal crisis of the state and 
welfare retrenchment 
Productivist cost-saving 
concerns. Subsumed to goals of 
labour flexibility and business 
needs 
Unemployment 
challenge 
Lack of income   ‘Social exclusion' and limited 
employability 
Policy response 
to 
'unemployment' 
Income protection for male 
breadwinners 
  (Re)insertion into labour market 
Figure 3.1 Shifting functions of the welfare state. Source: extending from Peck and Jones, 1995 
The unemployment policy challenge under the Keynesian welfare state was seen as 
cyclical and to be tackled as a demand side issue. The policy ‘fix’ is the replacement 
of male-breadwinner earnings via (presumed to be temporary) income protection 
measures (Deeming, 2015).  
Contrastingly, under the Schumpeterian workfare state, unemployment is considered 
a structural challenge to be tackled by incentivising and enabling people who are 
unemployed to move (back) into the labour market (Deeming, 2015). This diagnosis 
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of unemployment suggests that it is damaging not simply because of the loss of earned 
income for people who are out of work but because of the way it inflicts a longer term 
‘scar’ through the increased future incidence of unemployment and lower subsequent 
earnings in work (Arulampalam et al., 2001; Gregg, 2001). Unemployment is 
separately acknowledged as being detrimental to health and wellbeing (Clark and 
Oswald, 1994; Dolan et al., 2008; Paul and Moser, 2009; Waddell and Burton, 2006). 
The phenomenon of hysteresis (Blanchard and Summers, 1987) has gained traction, 
whereby longer-term unemployment (and the depreciation of human capital associated 
with this) serves to reduce “the effectiveness of the unemployed as potential fillers of 
vacancies” with the result that the (natural) equilibrium rate of unemployment is 
expected to track upwards (Layard et al., 1991, p. 4; see also Arestis and Sawyer, 
2001). The role of the state consequently moves away from protection and is redefined 
in order to secure labour market participation. The recommended response is a suite 
of policies “where people are helped to sustain their own incomes rather than 
depending on long-term transfers” (Boeri et al., n.d., p. 3). Social policy pivots away 
from the satisfaction of income needs, redefines unemployment as a challenge of 
improving the employability of the unemployed, (McQuaid et al., 2005; Lindsay et al., 
2007) and beckons in ‘activation’.  
 
3.3 The activation turn 
Across the OECD there has been an increased acceptance since the 1990s of the need 
for activation measures to strengthen the link between social protection, labour market 
policies and employment (Escudero, 2015). Activation has been promoted by both the 
OECD (subsequent to the OECD Jobs Study, 1994) and European Commission 
(following the White Paper on “Growth, Competitiveness and Employment,” 1993). 
Promotion of this policy approach emerged from cross-national comparative work 
which assessed relative levels of joblessness and economic performance and how they 
were influenced by labour market institutions and welfare state arrangements (Martin, 
2015; OECD, 2013). This particular assessment suggested that variation in 
unemployment rates across developed economies was related to their alternative 
approaches in response to economic recession, specifically that higher levels and 
persistence of long-term unemployment were associated with weaker and less well co-
ordinated  delivery of employment services and the absence of benefit conditionality 
(OECD, 2013). 
 
Activation policies respond to this assessment and are defined by their intent to help 
people of working age (back) into the labour market (Daguerre and Etherington, 2009). 
At a high level the solution is to re-orient welfare states towards becoming ‘enabling 
states’ (Gilbert, 2002) or from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ welfare systems (Lødemel and 
Trickey, 2001). This involves a shift in formal policy where employment, participation 
and activation have become the leitmotiv (van Berkel and van der Aa, 2005). While 
‘passive’ measures are intended to alleviate temporary economic hardship during 
periods of unemployment, ‘active’ approaches aim instead to remove obstacles to 
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employment, motivate jobseekers to actively seek and accept employment, and/or to 
retain or improve jobseekers’ employability (Weishaupt, 2011; OECD, 2013). 
 
There are a range of reasons why Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) have 
become such a popular policy tool. Not only does activation align with the pursuit of 
non-inflationary growth by increasing labour supply and driving down the non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), it promises to reduce the 
number of income maintenance recipients, thus keeping social spending in check 
(Daguerre and Etherington, 2009). Activation also tallies with additional concerns of 
Western European governments at this time: it addresses the ‘new social risk’ of skills 
obsolescence in a post-industrial era; relatedly, it engenders a flexible and adaptable 
workforce better able to respond to the challenges of globalisation; it drives down the 
dependency ratio in a ‘greying’ Europe; and neatly aligns with the consensus that “paid 
employment is the best way out of poverty” (Daguerre and Etherington, 2009, despite, 
in practice, the persistence of in-work poverty, see Kemp et al., 2004). 
 
3.4 Beneath the banner of activation 
 
Whilst there has been international convergence to activating labour market policies 
across the developed economies (Bonoli, 2010; Lødemel and Trickey, 2001; Peck, 
2001), Barbier (2004) notes that ‘activation’ has become a fashionable policy slogan 
whilst concealing the diversity of associated reforms. ALMPs do not represent a 
homogenous set of policies but, rather, reflect a diverse array of potential approaches 
encompassing varying possible aims, actors, instruments and consequences (Theodore 
and Peck, 2001; Barbier, 2004; Levy, 2004; Bonoli, 2010). In seeking to summarise 
this variability, the literature typically distinguishes between two stylized ideal types 
that are described as “human capital development” and “work first” approaches 
(Theodore and Peck, 2001; Lindsay et al., 2007) and that Levy (2004), with similar 
meaning, describes as ‘thick’ and ‘thin’. Figure 3.2 summarizes the key, and somewhat 
caricatured, qualitative distinctions between these two ideal type activation regimes.  
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 Dimension Thin – ‘Work First’ Thick - ‘Human Capital 
Development’ 
Aims Quick return to labour market Greater focus on employability (i.e. up-
skilling), job quality and in-work 
progression 
Programme targets Job transitions Sustained employment transitions; 
reducing distance to labour market for 
the ‘harder to help’ 
Intervention model Job-search, basic skills training and 
focus on rapid transitions into jobs 
More intensive, longer-term and 
personalised training and supports 
Relationship to labour market Demand-side focus on inserting 
jobseekers into available opportunities 
quickly. Work experience limited, often 
mandatory and typically unpaid where 
exists 
Supply-side focus on up-skilling 
jobseekers to improve their short and 
long-term labour market prospects. 
Work experience likely to be available, 
claimants having greater choice and 
often paid (whether by employers or 
government subsidies) 
Relationship with individuals Emphasis on pushing claimants into 
rapid job transitions largely irrespective 
of quality or suitability 
Greater emphasis on pulling claimants 
into employment via building 
employability and higher quality job 
opportunities (in terms of pay, 
conditions, progression, etc) 
Figure 3.2 key features of activation ideal types. Reproduced from Carter and Whitworth, 2017 
The UK regime is typically identified – even sometimes by government itself (DWP, 
2003) – as a ‘work first’ regime situated as a close fit with the thin, liberal type 
(Lødemel and Trickey, 2001; Torfing, 1999). The enduring work-first orientation for 
UK activation policies is underscored through international longitudinal comparative 
work: the UK’s low levels of overall spend and, within this, its lower spending on 
training – which would be expected to underpin the human capital development 
approach – is particularly striking (Bonoli, 2010, 2013). 
 
3.5 British activation objectives 
A critical reading of the British activation model has argued that its main aim is to 
‘encourage’ the unemployed and inactive to enter the labour market as quickly as 
possible via hassle-based push strategies, potentially by accepting low-paid or 
inappropriate jobs (Dean, 2003). This strategy has been pursued under academic 
guidance that work-first (as opposed to training-first) produces better labour market 
outcomes (Layard, 2004). Under this approach it is argued that “almost any job is 
better than no job” (Layard, 2004, p. 1).  
 
Importantly, to probe beneath this conception of the UK, Weishaupt (2011) provides 
a summary of the range of policy tools at the intersection of labour market strategy, 
employment support, and benefits which may be brought to bear on the ‘subjects’ of 
activation, that is, the detailed policies and programmes subsumed beneath the broad 
brush of activation. Figure 3.3 summarises these ideas and importantly separates out 
more ‘stick-like’ push factors – the negative incentives both financial and non-
financial, which respectively draw on hardship and hassle of unemployment to ‘push’ 
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people into the labour market – from the more ‘carrot like’ elements – the positive 
incentives and supports which may ‘pull’ individuals into work. Importantly, these 
policy tools may not perfectly align with the idealised descriptions of thick and thin 
approaches provided above. Whilst activation sits as an overarching endeavour it 
rarely embodies a pure form of the ideal thick and thin approaches in practice but, 
rather, typically  combines carrot-like and stick-like interventions. Even a ‘thick’ 
regime may use some ‘negative’ elements, such as conditionality. Indeed the presence 
of negative incentives may be core to a justification for ‘thicker’ positive supports. A 
range of policies, programme levers and ambitions are layered in a form of decoupage.  
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Negative Incentives 
(financial) NIF 
Negative Incentives 
(non-financial) NIN 
Positive Incentives 
(financial) PIF 
Positive Incentives 
(non-financial) PIN 
Short duration of 
unemployment benefit 
payments 
Job-search requirements In-work subsidies Job counselling 
Low, means-tested social 
wages 
Broad definition of a 
"suitable" job offer 
Tax credits Training courses (soft 
and occupational skills) 
Unavailability (or 
phasing-out) of "early 
exit options” e.g. early 
retirement or disability 
pensions 
Strict eligibility criteria Benefit top-up for 
participation in public 
work schemes 
Childcare support 
 
Benefit sanctioning when 
in breach of benefit 
conditions 
Self-employment start-up 
subsidies 
Other services (mobility, 
mental health, debt, 
substance abuse) 
Figure 3.3 Available policy tools to activating labour market policy regimes. Reproduced from (Weishaupt, 2011, 
p. 69). Categories of NIF, NIN, PIF and PIN are used subsequently 
In the discussion below, by using Weishaupt’s classification of activation tools in 
Figure 3.3 which separate out the carrots (positive incentives both financial and non-
financial) from the sticks (the slightly oddly labelled “negative incentives”) alongside 
policy documents which explicitly spell out the intent of particular devices it is 
possible to trace the evolving emphasis of recent UK activation policy.  
 
3.6 Carrots, sticks, or a bit of both? Activation trends and the rise of ‘welfare-
to-work’ in the UK 
Commentators have been quick to note that there has always been a whiff of activation 
in the UK system (White, 2000; Trickey and Walker, 2001; Sainsbury, 2014). As a 
phrase ‘welfare-to-work’ has been used by governments since the 1980s to express a 
desire to replace ‘passive’ income replacement support for people who are 
unemployed with ‘active’ employment support measures to help and encourage people 
to enter paid work (Hirsch and Millar, 2004).  Across the past four decades however 
there have been important shifts in the specificities of policy intent and approach 
where, for example, there are subtle but important differences between reducing 
‘unemployment numbers’ (i.e. cutting the ‘claimant count’ of people receiving 
unemployment benefits) and increasing ‘employment rates’, which can be achieved 
through a range of means, including supporting those previously considered ‘inactive’ 
to enter the workforce. The following discussion segments these shifting logics and 
policy proposals according to three key administrative eras (although noting that there 
have been shifts in emphasis even within these, under different ministerial teams, for 
example). 
 
Before entering this discussion, it is pertinent to note that whilst the literature 
frequently uses ‘activation,’ ‘ALMPs,’ and ‘welfare-to-work’ interchangeably, in the 
remainder of the thesis a distinction is made between activation (and ALMPs) and 
‘welfare-to-work’. Throughout, the term ‘activation’ is used to capture the overarching 
governmental ambition to move people away from ‘inactively’ claiming 
unemployment or other social insurance and towards the labour market. More 
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specifically, ‘welfare-to-work’ is used to connote programmatic services and 
interventions directed at people who are unemployed to support/encourage/hassle 
them into employment. Welfare-to-work services have historically been provided in 
the UK context by staff within the Public Employment Service (Jobcentre Plus) and 
provision now increasingly draws in employment advisors from a range of wider 
private, public and voluntary provider organisations.  
 
3.7 Era 1: Tory beginnings (1989 – 1997) 
The Conservative administration of the 1980s and early-mid 1990s can be considered 
a period of nascent activation: “conditionality was emphasised, and measures were 
introduced to encourage people to leave benefit” (Trickey and Walker, 2001, p. 186 
emphasis added). The left hand column of Figure 3.4 sets out the high level 
programmes and policy changes associated with this administrative era. By classifying 
these according to Weishaupt’s frame it can be seen that “negative incentives” (NIN) 
dominate in this period. Legislative changes were used to tighten benefit eligibility 
and strengthen conditionality.  
 
Subsequent readings of this policy arrangement, which sought to reduce the number 
of people claiming unemployment benefit, suggest that a significant number of 
unemployment benefit claimants were diverted onto disability related benefits (Alcock 
et al., 2003; Beatty and Fothergill, 2005). Trickey and Walker (2001, p. 187) note that 
it was in this period where the term “welfare dependency” was introduced into the 
British lexicon and this was used as a tool to build consensus that “expenditure on 
benefits was too high”. Reducing the generosity of out-of-work benefits and bolstering 
benefit conditionality was framed by policy makers as an appropriate response to 
removing an assumed group of ‘voluntary’ claimants from the register (Tonge, 1999). 
These shifts towards a supply side understanding of unemployment are understood to 
be important precursors to the New Labour strategy that followed (Trickey and 
Walker, 2001; Tonge, 1999). 
 
3.8 Era 2: New Labour’s Third Way (1997 – 2010): ‘creeping conditionality’ 
and quasi-markets 
The election of the New Labour government in May 1997 represents something of a 
‘big bang’ moment in welfare-to-work. Blair’s first administration saw the reform of 
the welfare state to be one of its major tasks (Powell, 2000) and a central objective was 
to shift people off the social security rolls and into paid employment with an active 
role for government in this process (Sheldrick, 2000). The approach to achieve this 
was distinct. New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ or “modernised social democracy” sought to 
reconcile liberal economics and social justice in a transformed international economy 
(Driver and Martell, 2000, p. 150; Clasen and Clegg, 2004).  
 
A ‘Third Way’ approach to public policy encompasses a number of distinct features, 
including: 
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• Government redrawing the social contract with rights to welfare matched 
explicitly and tightly by responsibilities, especially regarding paid work 
(White, 2000); 
• The welfare state working proactively to help individuals off social security, 
away from ‘dependency’ and into work. The rise of “employment-centred 
social policy” (Driver and Martell, 2000, p. 152) consolidates the shift from 
‘passive’ to ‘active’ benefits; 
• In the area of welfare-to-work, provision is increasingly delivered in 
partnership with private and voluntary sectors, with government in an enabling 
and steering rather than direct delivery role.



Conservative 1979-1997 
Objective to reduce the number of people 
claiming unemployment benefits; 
Targeting support through means testing 
(Hills, 1998) 
New Labour 1997 – 2010 
Increasing employment rate; Poverty reduction; “Making work 
pay” (Evans and Millar, 2006; Hirsch and Millar, 2004)  
Conservative-led Coalition 2010 – 2015 
“Fairness for taxpayers” – i.e. households claiming out-of-work 
benefits should not have higher income than those in work; 
“Better off in work”; Reducing “worklessness” (McKnight, 2015) 
Early 1980s price-linking social security 
benefits rather than maintaining relativities with 
incomes, eroding the value of out-of-work 
benefits (Hills, 1998; Sutherland et al., 2008). 
NIF 
 
 
1998 Introduction of New Deal for Young People (a programme 
including subsidised jobs for young people who are unemployed). 
Followed by a series of other “New Deals” for Lone parents, long-term 
unemployed people, partners of unemployed people, disabled people 
and people over 50. (Hirsch and Millar, 2004; Sunley et al., 2006). 
Principally PIN but NDYP backed by sanctions for non-participation. 
2011 Work Programme replaces all existing welfare-to-work 
programmes and has ambition to support more people to move into 
work.  PIN 
1986 Introduction of Restart Interviews where 
people unemployed for more than six months 
were required to demonstrate the active steps 
they were taking to find work. (Wilson, 2013). 
NIN 
April 1999 National Minimum Wage becomes law and is followed 
with frequent uprating (Bennett and Millar, 2005). PIF 
 
Announced 2010 and incrementally implemented from 2012 Universal 
Credit replaces six of the main means-tested benefits/tax credits for 
working age people with a single benefit paid to people out of work and 
in low-paid work. UC applies tougher and more extensive conditions 
and sanctions than previous systems extending conditionality to those 
who are in paid work (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). Originally PIF, now 
less clearly so. 
1996 Introduction of ‘Jobseeker’s allowance’ 
replacing income support and unemployment 
benefit (Strickland, 1996). Claimants must agree 
to sign a jobseeker’s agreement as a condition of 
receiving benefit (ibid). NIN 
1998 National Child Care Strategy promises early education places for 
all 3- and 4-year-olds by 2004 and good quality affordable childcare 
provision (Hirsch and Millar, 2004). PIN 
2012 JSA revised sanctions regime extends the severity of sanctions.  
People who are deemed to have repeatedly breached the conditions of 
benefit receipt could forfeit their benefits for up to three years (DWP, 
2013a; McKnight, 2015). NIN 
 
 
 
1999 Working Families Tax Credit, implying significant real increase 
in means-tested support for families with children (Bennett and Millar, 
2005; Brewer et al., 2005). PIF 
2010 onwards Replacement of Incapacity Benefit and related benefits 
by Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), with more stringent 
medical tests, greater conditionality and time limiting of non-means 
tested entitlement for all but the most severely ill or disabled (Scottish 
Parliament, 2013). NIF 
2001 Mandatory Work Focused Interviews introduced for lone parents 
(Whitworth, 2012). PIN/NIN 
 
2008 Replacement of Incapacity Benefit with Employment and 
Support Allowance (ESA) for new claimants brings compelled work 
preparation to those placed in the work-related activity group.  NIN 
Figure 3.4 Three welfare-to-work eras and the nature of key activating policy tools

New Labour’s approach to welfare-to-work was also premised on a particular 
understanding of the unemployment problem. As indicated by Lister (in Powell, 2000, 
p. 46), New Labour “is concerned with the ‘supply side’ of employability rather than 
the demand side of unemployment” which is rejected as ‘old Left’ and not feasible in 
today’s global economy (Blair and Schroeder, 1998). Connecting the workless with 
labour markets – indeed, with society (Finn, 2000) – is therefore the policy problem 
to overcome. 
 
The ‘New Deals’ – by providing a mixture of training measures, socially useful work 
experience and targeted subsidies to private employers – were presented as the flagship 
welfare-to-work policy mechanism to reattach those without work to the labour 
market. This was coupled with a fiscal strategy to ‘make work pay’ via policy 
measures such as the National Minimum Wage, Working and Family tax credits 
(Brewer and Shephard, 2004; Bennett and Millar, 2005) and additional support for 
those in work through the National Childcare Strategy (Whitworth and Griggs, 2013). 
These enhanced supports were used to ethically justify the more stringent 
conditionality placed on the receipt of out-of-work benefits.  
 
In turn, over the course of the late 1990s and 2000s welfare-to-work policymaking has 
been characterised by a ‘creeping conditionality’ (Dwyer, 2004). The ‘ratcheting up’ 
of work-related behavioural requirements means that conditionality was, by the end of 
the New Labour era, radically wider, deeper and more quickly applied than in 1997 
(Griggs and Bennett, 2009). Work-related obligations have been stretched to 
encompass traditionally inactive groups – such as lone parents and disabled people – 
with the size of the group who ‘cannot work’ diminishing over time (Dwyer, 2004; 
Griggs and Bennett, 2009).  
 
The publication of the Blair-commissioned Freud Report in 2007 forms a further 
critical juncture in the evolution of welfare-to-work policy under New Labour 
(Rafferty and Wiggan, 2011) and the subsequent reinvigoration of this policy area 
under the Coalition government. Grover (2007) suggests that the report dovetails 
neatly with New Labour’s fixation on an individualistic supply-side conceptualisation 
of the unemployment problem and resultant policy focus on enhanced conditionality 
and ‘market-making’ amongst service providers. Freud’s (2007) report is an important 
galvanizing set-piece as it braids together the policy ‘ends’ of welfare-to-work with a 
set of recommendations which position large-scale constructed quasi-marketised 
arrangements as the key implementation ‘means’.  
 
At the heart of the report is a recommendation for restructuring and outsourcing the 
provision of welfare-to-work services by splitting provision such that Jobcentre Plus 
(the UK’s PES) provides “streamlined, mass market provision” (Freud, 2007, p. 10) 
for claimants in the first year in which they are workless and considered to be able to 
work and relatively close to the labour market. Freud then proposes outsourcing and 
competition for “the hardest to help” (2007, p. 10). The report suggests a significantly 
expanded role for contracted return-to-work providers from the private and voluntary 
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sectors with contestability through competition in delivery. Beneath the overarching 
proposal for greater outsourcing Freud also makes particular recommendations for 
how this external provision ought to be arranged: 
• Personalised support A non-prescriptive or ‘black box’ approach to 
commissioning means that providers have the freedom to innovate and provide 
tailored help to each individual;  
• Holistic single platform Merging all welfare-to-work provision into a single 
platform with a ‘universal’ programme for all unemployed people;  
• Value for money and payment-by-results An outcome focussed approach 
where spending on support services is justified through the subsequent welfare 
spending that could be ‘saved’. A central suggestion is that the majority of 
payment to providers should be made once they have successfully supported a 
move into employment; 
• Complex supply chains Large regional contract areas with the Prime contract 
holders responsible for “marshalling an appropriate blend of subcontractors” 
with specialist voluntary sector organisations seen as crucial in providing 
expertise for supporting the hardest to help (Freud, 2007, p. 7). 
 
Freud suggests that this reformed approach to welfare-to-work provision ought to sit 
within a wider activation landscape shaped according to enhanced conditionality and 
a rationalised benefit system. Asserting both that unemployment is now frictional 
rather than structural and a paternalistic belief that ‘work is good for you’ in all 
circumstances, Freud declares that enhanced conditionality and sanctions are needed 
to tackle the alleged behavioural causes of worklessness and the existence of a 
‘dependency culture’, despite compelling evidence to the contrary (DWP, 2010b; 
Macdonald et al., 2014). Freud also supports the introduction of a single benefit for 
working age people that will provide a safety net and ‘incentivise’ the transition to 
work – later to become Universal Credit – the radical transformation/heavy millstone 
around the neck of the UK benefits system. 
 
The logic which underpins Freud’s paper is informed by perceived benefits asserted 
to stem from the use of quasi-marketised services. Freud (2007) strongly advocated 
for provider-directed market arrangements, suggesting that the involvement of private 
sector and voluntary sector providers, competition, outcome-based payments and 
‘black box’ delivery models would unlock innovation and lead to higher levels of 
performance compared to forerunner schemes. The report underscored the importance 
of provider discretion, suggesting that flexibilities will enable providers to “focus on 
the most efficient, and work-focused, interventions – in particular around intensive 
adviser support” (Freud, 2007, p. 44). Freud also advocated the use of largescale 
provider contracts in the belief that “[T]he large scale of the enterprises, and their 
management capabilities, are more likely to provide the conditions in which 
innovation can take place and quality be assured” (2007, p. 62) (2007: 62). 
 
Importantly, the DWP’s (2008) ‘Commissioning Strategy’ largely replayed Freud’s 
recommendations and set out four key principles for the  commissioning of future 
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welfare-to-work programmes: 1) Prime providers; 2) payment-by-results; 3) minimum 
service prescription; and 4) larger, longer contracts. These principles – particularly the 
outcome-focused payment model – were subsequently absorbed in New Labour’s 
Flexible New Deal (Wiggan, 2015). This scheme, however, would just months later 
be hastily scrapped and, within its Work Programme successor, rapidly be seen as a  
tentative step towards Freud’s recommendations. 
 
3.9 Era 3: Conservative rocket boosters (2010 – 2018): enter the Work 
Programme 
 
The UK has since the late 1990s seen remarkable cross-party agreement in approach 
– both in terms of the overarching objectives of policy (the activation ends) and 
through the quasi-marketised approach to service coordination (the activation means). 
This consensus has been aided by the transfer of key policy actors such as Lord Freud 
from Labour to the Conservatives in 2009 (the former banker was recruited and 
ennobled by the Conservatives and was subsequently made Minister for Welfare 
Reform). Hence, the arrival of a Conservative dominated Coalition government in the 
2010 general election after 13 years of Labour government, and roll-out of its flagship 
Work Programme welfare-to-work scheme4 “does nothing to break out of the policy 
paradigm established by Labour; it simply takes it further and faster” (Lister and 
Bennett, 2010, p. 102). 
 
3.9.1 Introducing the Work Programme 
Although reflecting continuation from the Flexible New Deal in terms of underlying 
principles, the Work Programme, introduced in June 2011, is in comparative 
perspective a genuine revolution – if not large-scale experiment – in employment 
support policy, most notably in terms of the extent of sub-contracting and payments 
weighted to job outcomes as well as the ‘black box’ model of delivery. 
 
The Work Programme replaced virtually all contracted welfare-to-work programmes 
run by the DWP in England, Scotland and Wales. It offers support to people who are 
long-term unemployed or who are understood as at risk of becoming so and aims to 
help them get, and keep, jobs. It is a monolith in terms both of its size and its breadth. 
The Work Programme is expected to cost between £3 billion and £5 billion and could 
help up to 3.3 million people (NAO, 2012). The Work Programme closed for referrals 
in 2017 and at the time of writing is finishing delivery for participants on the 
programme.  
 
Delivery of the Work Programme takes place through contracts between the DWP and 
large-scale, mainly private sector Prime providers which can both deliver services 
themselves and/or sub-contract to organisations within large and (sometimes) complex 
supply chains sitting underneath each Prime. The Work Programme is structured 
                                               
4 New Labour’s Flexible New Deal scheme was swiftly cancelled following the election. 
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geographically into 18 large ‘regional’5 Contract Package Areas (CPAs) with two or 
three Primes in each CPA to whom claimants are randomly allocated from Jobcentre 
Plus if they have not found work within an initial period of Jobcentre Plus provision, 
the duration of which depends largely on the type of out-of-work benefit received and 
the Work Programme ‘claimant group’ into which they are therefore placed. Unlike 
the Flexible New Deal, which contained mandatory service components, a ‘black box’ 
delivery model operates in the Work Programme so that providers have almost 
complete flexibility over their interventions. This flexibility is argued to be required 
since, unlike the various group-specific New Deals, Work Programme is ‘universal’ 
and therefore has to cater for the needs of a wide range of unemployed programme 
participants within a single employment scheme. The majority of Work Programme 
participants are in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) which is the mainstream 
unemployment benefit claimed by people actively looking for work. Participants may 
also be claiming Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) or other incapacity 
related benefits where they have a health condition or disability recognised by DWP 
and affecting their ability to work. 
 
Marketised accountabilities dominate and an aggressive payment-by-results model is 
the central tool through which DWP seeks to steer provider activity and performance. 
Providers are paid primarily – and since April 2014 exclusively – for the results they 
achieve in supporting people into sustained employment so what the provider earns is 
tied to how well they perform in terms of aggregate job outcomes. All payments are 
made on an individual, i.e. a per participant basis. There are three core components to 
the payment structure: 
Attachment payment The attachment payment is a form of ‘start fee’ paid 
when participants join the programme. Each year the value of the attachment 
fee is reduced and by the start of the fourth year no attachment payment is 
made;  
Job Outcome payment There is no payment made when a participant enters 
work. Instead, job outcome fees are claimed by providers once a participant 
has been in work for either a continuous or cumulative period of employment 
of either three or six months dependent upon the payment group. To be eligible 
for payment work must be for at least 16-hours per week; 
 
Sustainment outcome payment Sustainment payments are made every four 
weeks following a job outcome payment for keeping a participant in 
employment for up to 26 months. 
DWP, 2012; NAO, 2012 
In its size, breadth and extent of marketisation the Work Programme is a vanguard of 
radical experimentation in welfare-to-work quasi-markets within comparative 
                                               
5 The North East; Scotland; and Wales are examples of the scale of single CPAs.  
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perspective (Finn, 2011a; Mulheirn, 2011; this author in Carter and Whitworth, 2015). 
But as van Berkel et al., (2012b, p. 273) note, much of this research “pays little 
attention to the issue of diversity in the design and functioning of markets”.  
There is then a gap and a need for a systematic consideration of the particular 
formulations or varieties of quasi-market and their links to user experiences and 
programme performance. It is to the task of opening up and systematically examining 
the specific market form constituted in the Work Programme that this chapter now 
turns. Utilising the rich analytical framework developed in the previous chapter 
provides a considerably more detailed conceptual lens than has been available 
previously in considering the practical implementation of the marketised form.  
  
3.9.2 The particularities of the quasi-market configuration embodied by the Work 
Programme: the allocation dimension 
 
The assessment of the flavour of quasi-market embodied by the Work Programme 
begins by investigating the allocation dimension. Against the formal financing 
component the Work Programme is collectively funded – as in previous UK 
employment support programmes – and is therefore positioned at the left-hand side of 
the upper axis in Figure 3.5. In principle, the Work Programme has implemented an 
innovative funding arrangement that draws from both the fixed Departmental 
Expenditure Limit and the Annually Managed Expenditure from which future benefit 
payments are made. This enables upwards flexibility in the financial envelope 
available to the Work Programme in the event of stellar programme performance. In 
practice this was never operationalised as performance never reached these levels, and 
in any case would not shift the arrangement away from collectively financed provision.   
 
 
Figure 3.5 Visualising the allocation dimension for the Work Programme quasi-market 
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Turning to the regulation of service quality, there are two key programme components 
that relate to access and quality of provision. Firstly, in terms of entry to the 
programme, participants are referred to the Work Programme if they have not found 
work within a variable initial period of mainstream Jobcentre Plus provision. Timing 
of referral depends on participants’ circumstances (such as age and benefit type). For 
the majority of those referred to the programme, participation is mandatory and failure 
to engage can result in benefit sanctions being applied (WPSC, 2013). Referral for 
mandatory participation is triggered automatically by Jobcentre Plus management 
information systems. Where claimants have the option to volunteer Jobcentre Plus 
work coaches refer by discretion. All claimants due to join the programme are then 
randomly referred to one of 2 – 3 Prime providers within their regional CPA. 
 
Primes are then responsible for engaging with all participants and conducting 
attachment activity within 15 working days of the participant being referred by 
Jobcentre Plus (DWP, 2011a). In practice this entails an initial meeting and preparation 
of an action plan, after which the attachment fee is paid. Around 98% of referrals 
successfully achieve programme attachment, although some groups experience a 
lower conversion rate: only around 9 in 10 prison leavers are successfully attached for 
example.6 
 
It is not clear whether DWP has taken any steps to ensure universal programme access 
for all those referred. The overwhelming majority of participants are (at least) 
connected to a Work Programme provider. At this level then, the procedural 
accountability of Jobcentre Plus underscores due process in ‘access’ to the programme. 
 
Secondly, subsequent to formal attachment service access and quality are intended to 
be held up by ‘minimum service guarantees’ (MSGs), which are designed and 
published by Prime providers themselves. These service guarantees vary from 
provider-to-provider. There is no common floor standard specified by the DWP and 
many guarantees are vague, non-measurable and hence in practice, unenforceable. 
There are also questions as to how clearly these minimum expectations have been 
communicated to programme participants and there are concerns as to whether people 
participating in the Work Programme are aware of these service obligations 
(Whitworth, 2013).  As argued by this author (Carter and Whitworth, 2015) and 
elsewhere (Finn, 2012; NAO, 2012) the well-known weaknesses in the MSGs undercut 
their effectiveness both for upholding service user experiences and commissioner 
value for money.  
 
Consequently, the lower axis of Figure 3.5 conveys the limited extent of Work 
Programme design features geared to the assurance of service quality and access. The 
programme marker sits at the provider-directed, light touch end of the service 
regulation spectrum. This contrasts with previous (New Deals) and parallel (Work 
Choice) programmes – discussed in Chapter 8 – which enforce a higher degree of 
                                               
6 Author calculation based on publicly available data accessed through DWP Stat-Xplore. 
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clarity over contractual service minima and which are therefore more congruent with 
state-directed standards and more robust quality assurance.  
 
3.9.3 The particularities of the quasi-market configuration embodied by the Work 
Programme: production dimension 
 
Turning to the production dimension, on the first component of market access the 
Work Programme was procured through a ‘Prime Contractor’ model which limits the 
direct contractual relationship between DWP to a relatively small number of large top 
tier ‘Prime’ providers who are then responsible for managing supply chains of 
provision (Armstrong et al., 2010; DWP, 2010a). The programme is structured 
geographically into 18 large regional CPAs with two or three Primes operating across 
each CPA.  
Under the Work Programme particular forms and sizes of provider have a stronghold 
over provision as Prime contractors, largely due to financial stipulations set out by the 
DWP during commissioning. There were tight requirements for bidding as the DWP 
sought to ensure that Prime contracts were held by organisations capable of financing 
upfront investment in services and shouldering the financial pressures of back-ended 
outcomes payments. The DWP stipulated that potential Work Programme Prime 
organisations had to demonstrate an annual turnover of at least £20 million and be 
accepted onto the Framework of Employment Related Support Services (ERSS) 
(Wiggan, 2015a). This created a pool of large multinational ‘preferred suppliers’ 
exclusively entitled to bid for Work Programme contracts (Gash et al., 2013) and 
resulted in many organisations being unable to compete. Prime providers were 
required to include supply chains in their bids – that is a set of allied (usually smaller 
and more specialist) subcontractors – whom the Prime manages to deliver the contract 
(Lane et al., 2013). However, there is no stipulation for the use of subcontractors post-
tender, and much discussion in the early years of delivery centred on whether smaller 
– particularly voluntary sector – organisations had been used as ‘bid candy’ when they 
subsequently failed to see the referral volumes that their Primes may have promised 
pre-bidding (Damm, 2014; Rees et al., 2013a). Some stakeholders have raised 
concerns about the creation of “mono-cultures” or “hyper-primes” with apprehension 
about the potential implications for service users from the squeezing out of specialist 
provision (Fuertes et al., 2014, p. 80; see also Damm, 2012). 
 
The Work Programme is therefore positioned close to the ‘closed’ end of the market 
access dimension (upper portion of Figure 3.6) since tendering requirements 
significantly reduced competition for contracts and situated large existing private 
sector providers (and those on the ERSS framework) in a dominant position to tender 
for any future contracts that might become available as a result of market exit. 
Furthermore, assessment from the OECD (2014) suggests that ongoing competition 
between providers is unlikely to have been a major driver of performance. 
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Figure 3.6 Visualising the production dimension for the Work Programme quasi-market 
The Work Programme embraces fully the principle of payment-by-results and is – in 
both international and historic comparative perspective – a pioneer and radical 
experimenter in the heavy extent to which payment to providers is predicated on the 
achievement of outcomes. Its use of an extended period over which payments are made 
for ‘sustained’ employment is particularly novel and untested. The Work Programme 
fully embodies the ‘black box’ delivery model whereby Primes have almost complete 
discretion over the nature and extent of their intervention and where provider payments 
are based almost entirely on job outcome results rather than inputs (Rees et al., 2014). 
The extreme outcomes-orientation of funding can be seen by comparing the payment 
configuration to the immediate predecessor – Flexible New Deal  – where the ratio 
between the initial joining fee, a successful transition into work and a sustained job 
outcome was roughly 40:30:30 (Vegeris et al., 2011, p. 13). In the Work Programme 
the ratio is in contrast closer to 10:25:65 (authors’ calculations cited in Rees et al., 
2014) although it varies somewhat across the nine claimant groups. Importantly, the 
fixed attachment fee reduces to nil across the early years of the programme so since 
2014 the Work Programme has unusually been operating under ‘pure’ payment-by-
results: no portion of provider payment is guaranteed, even for participants with 
complex and/or multiple barriers to employment. Correspondingly, Work Programme 
is positioned at the extreme right-hand position on this payment structure axis. 
 
On the final dimension relating to the function of choice, it is notable that user choice 
within the market between providers has been almost non-existent as a feature in UK 
welfare-to-work provision (Wiggan, 2015a). The majority of Work Programme 
participants are ‘mandated’ to engage as a condition for their ongoing receipt of 
unemployment benefits, albeit with a significant minority of people with long term 
health conditions afforded the option of voluntary participation. Participants are 
randomly allocated, without choice, to a Prime provider (and to clarify, this random 
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allocation is not part of a Randomised Control Trial: DWP commissioned no 
quantitative impact evaluation of the Work Programme). User choice/voice is exerting 
very limited, if any, influence on the shape of service provision such that Wiggan 
(2015a) astutely clarifies that the ‘customer’ in the Work Programme market is the 
DWP as opposed to programme participants. Though the Department seeks to animate 
ongoing competition by using ‘market share shift’ to reallocate a portion of the 
caseload to better performing providers, an OECD review suggests that this has in 
practice been a weak tool for instigating competition and ‘choosing’ efficiency 
(OECD, 2014). In the Work Programme ‘choice’ is thus very much limited to the 
selection of winning Prime providers made by civil servants at the procurement stage, 
placing Work Programme towards the far right of this dimension  in the lower axis of 
Figure 3.6. 
 
3.10 Work Programme as a private power market and anticipated challenges 
for this quasi-market form 
 
Against these dimensions of quasi-market variation the Work Programme clearly sits 
as the embodiment of the provider-directed market. As discussed in the preceding 
conceptual chapter, for each axis in Figure 3.6 a position closer to the extreme right-
hand side on the production dimension reflects a stronger provider position, be that 
through minimal competition (upper axis), minimal state control (middle axis), or 
minimal responsiveness to user preferences (lower axis). 
 
Since the Work Programme is collectively financed (as shown on the upper axis of the 
allocation dimension in Figure 3.5) it may initially be expected that the scheme would 
tally with Gingrich’s Pork Barrel market. Figure 2.2 in the preceding chapter identifies 
this form at the intersection of producer dominance and collective financing. However, 
the development of the previous chapter’s more nuanced analytical framework 
facilitates a more subtle reading. 
 
Although the Work Programme is collectively financed the quasi-market functions in 
a situation of strong financial constraints. Tighter than expected cost-pressures are 
exerted on Primes due to a combination of unrealistically high performance 
assumptions and, as a consequence, highly challenging average unit costs given the 
extent of outcomes payments, a more difficult than expected macroeconomic 
environment which affected job outcome (and hence payment) levels, the strong 
prevalence – and apparent success of – discounting practices at the bidding stage and 
lower than expected caseloads within some payment groups (Inclusion, 2011; Rees et 
al., 2013b).  
In short, margins for the overwhelmingly large private sector Primes (39/42 contracts) 
were squeezed from the start: Primes are strongly motivated to retain these margins 
and providers’ behavioural responses to drive down the cost of provision were acute 
from the outset. These financial pressures are coupled with weak protections for 
service access and quality (lower axis of Figure 3.5) meaning that the Work 
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Programme appears closer to a private power market, where “tighter fiscal constraints 
push producers to pursue profits through user fees [not possible in the Work 
Programme] or reduced quality” (Gingrich, 2011, p. 17 emphasis added).  
Under producer-driven markets the firms which receive public funding are the clear 
winners. There is some ambiguity as to the implications of private power markets for 
the state. In crude terms Gingrich suggests that the state ‘wins’ as costs are cut. 
Importantly, however, cost cutting may be pursued in ways which work against other 
policy objectives – including value-for-money or longer-term savings – and, indeed, 
against the preferences of service users. Individual service users are particularly 
vulnerable under this form of quasi-market as the quality and performance of services 
may decline in response to cost-cutting by providers and participants will have little 
scope through which to exert their preference for quality through either market (exit) 
or democratic (voice) means.  
 
The particular quasi-market variety of the Work Programme as a private power market 
then sets up a specific constellation of risks. Hart et al. (1997) contend that where there 
are incomplete contracts (which is almost inevitably the case in complex public 
services) and producers have great control then (private) providers demonstrate an 
ability to pursue cost-cutting innovations (i.e. improve crude efficiency) but that they 
are also more likely to do so at the expense of quality. The lens of Transaction Cost 
Economics (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975) also points to such risks since providing 
an agent with incentives to achieve a specific outcome is likely to result in the shirking 
of other — mandated but unrewarded — outcomes such as quality (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1991; Hill, 2013). As a result, such market forms “promise innovation but 
face the risk of rent-seeking and uncontrolled cost-cutting at the expense of efficient 
or high-quality production” (Gingrich, 2011, p. 18). 
 
In the field of welfare-to-work a considerable body of international evidence tells of 
such risks in practice (Struyven and Steurs, 2005; Bredgaard and Larsen, 2007; Finn, 
2010a, 2010b; Considine et al., 2011; de Graaf and Sirovátka, 2012). The particular 
cost-cutting endeavours of outsourced providers even has its own nomenclature – 
‘creaming and parking’ – since a perennial problem within marketised frameworks is 
the difficulty in incentivising providers to support all claimants effectively given their 
differing support costs and varied likelihoods of realising employment outcomes. In 
the case of the Work Programme specifically, an ample body of evidence (Newton et 
al., 2012; PAC, 2012, 2013; WPSC, 2011, 2013), including from this author (Rees et 
al., 2014; Carter and Whitworth, 2015), points strongly to endemic problems of 
creaming and parking designed into the scheme. 
 
3.11 Work Programme design as a moderator of gaming? 
 
Within public services dominated by marketised accountabilities – such as the Work 
Programme – it is expected that opportunism or ‘gaming’ will be a particular design 
challenge, and the DWP equally expected as such. The expanded use of outcomes-
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based contracts in public services has intensified concerns about their potential 
unintended effects (Koning and Heinrich, 2013). Studies which have focused on 
provider behaviour in quasi-marketised employment support systems have identified 
this behaviour as taking four distinct forms: ‘cherry picking’; ‘creaming’; ‘parking’; 
and ‘churning’ (Carter, Forthcoming; Finn, 2000, 2009, 2010a; Koning and Heinrich, 
2013; Peck and Theodore, 2000; van Berkel and Borghi, 2007; van Berkel and van der 
Aa, 2005). These processes can be summarised as follows: 
• ‘Cherry picking’ refers to the recruitment of easier to support individuals from 
within a wider pool of those potentially eligible i.e. behaving selectively pre-
referral in situations where there is a rationing of programme places (this is 
also referred to as ‘cream skimming’); 
• By the process of ‘creaming’ the literature refers to providers prioritising 
participants who are closer to the labour market (subsequent to programme 
entry) as well as targeting services on them in the expectation that they are 
more likely to trigger an outcome payment and that services required to 
facilitate this will be relatively low-cost;  
• ‘Parking’ is the inverse process experienced by those participants who are 
understood to be ‘harder-to-support’ (Considine et al., 2011). These 
participants are deemed to be less likely to achieve an outcome payment and/or 
the support costs to achieve this are understood to be higher and they are 
therefore de-prioritised, receiving the minimum possible service (Rees et al., 
2014); 
• ‘Churning’ or ‘cycling’ is a dominant concern in work-first programmes which 
do not attend to the quality and duration of jobs (Finn, 2009). It refers to the 
repeated movement of individuals between low-paid, low-skilled jobs and 
unemployment and may also capture repeated participation on welfare-to-work 
programmes where this is punctuated by unstable periods in work (Sunley et 
al., 2006). 
 
The international literature also makes clear that the specificities of programme design 
and payment structures can play a key role in either facilitating or buttressing against 
such risks and provider behaviours (Considine, 2000; Considine et al., 2011; Finn, 
2009, 2011a, 2012; Struyven and Steurs, 2005; van Berkel and van der Aa, 2005). 
Crucially, the institutional setting and wider set of accountabilities informing 
stakeholder behaviours will interact with the potential for unintended practices such 
as creaming and parking (Koning and Heinrich, 2013). The implication is that through 
careful contractual specification and regulation it may be possible to overcome, or at 
least mitigate, these behaviours and ensure that providers act in support of the full suite 
of programmatic objectives. The challenge then is for policymakers – through design 
savvy – to configure and implement a suite of steering tools that retain the perceived 
innovative and efficient impetus of provider-directed quasi-markets whilst ensuring 
that a complex set of public sector objectives are met.  
Beneath the headline objective of moving people who are long-term unemployed into 
employment, and the rhetorical simplicity of payment-by-results, the Work 
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Programme has a more subtle set of underpinning ‘critical success factors’ (DWP, 
2010a; NAO, 2012). Notably these ambitions are framed as a direct response to 
perceived weaknesses of preceding welfare-to-work programmes. Specifically, for 
DWP as the service commissioners the intention in the Work Programme is to support 
more participants into work, faster, for longer and whilst reducing gaps in 
performance outcomes between the easier- and harder-to-help. Figure 3.7 sets out the 
DWP’s array of policy objectives and the bold set of design promises aligned to the 
pursuit of each of these. 
Work Programme critical 
objectives, defined in 
invitation to tender 
How objective relates to criticism of 
preceding programmes and/or anticipated 
opportunism in outsourced delivery under 
payment-by-results 
Key programme design feature to address criticism An "innovative" tool? Or examples 
available of where used previously? 
Move more people into 
work ("increase off flow 
rates…" (DWP, 2010a, p. 3)). 
Private providers seriously underperformed 
against contractual targets on preceding 
schemes (NAO, 2012). 
The payment-by-results regime rewards providers for 
achieving sustainable outcomes and the 'black box' gives 
them greater freedom to develop more effective services.  
 
Work Programme is backed by contractual minimum 
performance levels. Market share shift is intended to instil 
ongoing competition between providers and further 
incentivise high performance. Furthermore, providers are 
able to work with participants for up to two years - longer 
than previous schemes (NAO, 2012). 
"Payment-by-results has been used in 
Australia, the Netherlands, the United States, 
and the United Kingdom, but nowhere has the 
proportion based on outcomes been as large…" 
(NAO, 2012, p. 18).  
 
Minimum performance levels, the black box, 
market-share shift and a two year intervention 
window are all new to the programme. 
Move participants into work 
sooner ("decrease average 
time on benefit" (DWP, 
2010a, p. 3)). 
Previous schemes paid for processes and 
activities, which are not necessarily strongly 
associated with improved employment 
outcomes (Freud, 2007). 
Black box and outcomes-oriented payment structure to 
incentivise providers to implement efficient ‘work-first’ 
interventions. 
As above, noting that the 'black box' is a tool 
which is new to the Programme  
Move participants into work 
for longer ("increase average 
time in employment … longer 
sustained jobs" (DWP, 2010a, 
p. 3)). 
Employment outcomes resulting from 
previous 'work first' interventions resulted in 
short, unsustainable job placements, with 
programme participants quickly returning to 
claim out-of-work benefits (NAO, 2012). 
Payment-by-results regime rewards providers for achieving 
sustainable outcomes. Providers are paid for sustaining 
claimants in employment over a longer period (up to two 
years) (DWP, 2012; NAO, 2012). 
New: in previous schemes providers were only 
paid for up to six months of sustained 
employment (NAO, 2012). 
Narrow gap between 
employment rates for 
disadvantaged groups and 
everyone else (DWP, 2010a, 
p. 4). 
Disadvantaged claimants were overlooked by 
providers in favour of those easier-to-help 
(Finn, 2012; NAO, 2012). 
Differential pricing within the payment model seeks to 
reflect the varying level of support that people with different 
needs require (DWP, 2012; NAO, 2012). 
Differential payments have been used within 
previous schemes, e.g. Employment Zones 
partially adopted this approach. Nevertheless, 
differential payment is seen as an innovative 
tool in recent international perspectives (Finn, 
2009). 
Decrease numbers of 
workless households  (DWP, 
2010a, p. 4). 
Unclear, but potentially related to perceived 
inability of previous schemes to support 
people who are most disadvantaged and 
distant from the labour market 
No specific design features or incentives are designed to 
meet this target.  
NA 
Figure 3.7 Work Programme objectives and associated incentive design instruments

Within the designers’ response to the criticisms of previous quasi-marketised schemes 
there are then three bold design elements which add subtlety to the potentially blunt 
schematic of ‘payment for outcomes’ – differential payments; the geographical scale 
and structure of Prime contracts; and sustainment payments. These can be seen as 
design specifics which overlay the provider-directed market without fundamentally 
disrupting the private power market formulation. These are tools which aim to steer 
within the world of provider dominance in order to moderate pressures for creaming, 
parking and churning so as to facilitate the achievement of the programme’s public 
sector objectives (which are about more than crude efficiency). Here the Work 
Programme design uses further marketised accountability tools to correct for 
anticipated provider behaviours which run counter to programmatic objectives. The 
first of these, and the lever which has been most widely critiqued in select committees 
and academia is the differential payment system.  
3.11.1 Work Programme design innovations: Differential payment groups 
 
The Work Programme seeks to mitigate creaming and parking through minimum 
service guarantees (MSGs) for providers and, particularly, via the use of nine separate 
payment groups with differential payments across these groups (Figure 3.8; Carter and 
Whitworth, 2015). As described above, weaknesses in the substance, awareness and 
enforceability of the MSGs mean that in practice there is a strong reliance on the 
effectiveness of the payment groups and the differential pricing structure to defend 
against creaming and parking (Carter and Whitworth, 2015; Finn, 2011b). The 
intention with this pricing structure is that providers are incentivised to work 
meaningfully with all unemployed participants irrespective of the level of their support 
needs/costs because the outcome payments attached to claimants are designed to vary 
in line with these support needs/costs (Carter and Whitworth, 2015). 
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Claimant 
Group 
number 
Description Time of referral Basis for 
referral 
Max 
Payment 
Year 1 
starters (£) 
% of Work 
Programme 
population  
1 Jobseeker’s 
Allowance aged 
18 to 24  
From 9 months 
JSA 
Mandatory 3,810 20.09 
2 Jobseeker’s 
Allowance aged 
25 and over  
From 12 months 
JSA 
Mandatory 4,395 44.94 
3 Jobseeker’s 
Allowance early 
entrant 
From 3 months 
JSA 
Mandatory or 
voluntary 
depending on 
prognosis 
6,600 24.65 
4 Jobseeker’s 
Allowance ex-
Incapacity 
Benefit  
From 3 months 
JSA 
Mandatory 6,600 0.71 
5 Employment 
and Support 
Allowance 
volunteer  
At any time from 
WCA 
Voluntary 3,700 1.76 
6 New 
Employment 
and Support 
Allowance 
claimant  
Mandatory when 
expected to be fit 
for work in 3-6 
months; 
voluntary from 
WCA 
Mandatory or 
voluntary 
depending on 
prognosis 
6,500 5.92 
7 Employment 
and Support 
Allowance ex-
Incapacity 
Benefit  
Mandatory when 
expected to be fit 
for work in 3-6 
months; 
voluntary from 
WCA 
Mandatory or 
voluntary 
depending on 
prognosis 
13,720 1.03 
8 Incapacity 
Benefit and 
Income Support 
(England only) 
At any time Voluntary 3,285 0.23 
9 Jobseeker’s 
Allowance 
prison leavers  
On release  Mandatory 5,500 0.67 
Figure 3.8 Work Programme Payment Groups and payment levels. Reproduction of previous work published in 
Carter and Whitworth, 2015 
3.11.2 Work Programme design innovations: Large, regional contracting areas with 
specified minimum performance levels and market share shift 
 
The next design departure relates to the geographical scale and structure of the 
provider market. The Work Programme Prime provider model divides Great Britain 
into 18 CPAs. The CPAs are geographically large: all of Scotland sits as a single CPA, 
for example. These CPAs represent the scale at which the competitive procurement 
for Prime providers took place with two or three Prime providers contracted to operate 
within each CPA, resulting in a total of 40 contracts (4x3 + 14x2) (OECD, 2014). 
Unlike the differential payment system, the logic associated with the scale of contracts 
is not clearly articulated in public-facing documents. DWP’s own pamphlet on the 
Work Programme (2012) which seeks to explain the design and delivery arrangements 
and which describes the innovative aspects of the scheme, for example, offers no 
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discussion as to how or why the geographical scale of contracts was deemed most 
appropriate. Freud’s report suggests that the large geographic extent of these contracts 
was intended to offer the large financial scale “appropriate to attract major players 
from around the world” who would have sufficient scale to arrange private finance and 
tap into investment from the banking community (2007, p. 63). This large regional 
geography was designed with an eye to attracting capitalised providers in the belief 
that it is this which will introduce high quality contract management and drive up 
aggregate programme performance, rather than because CPAs are the relevant, 
internally coherent and meaningful economic geography of Britain. Fewer, larger 
contracts also minimise DWP’s contract and performance management needs and 
costs.  
 
The scale of the CPAs is nonetheless an important programme facet since it is at this 
scale that two major design features intended to stimulate high performance operate. 
The first of these is the use of contractual ‘Minimum Performance Levels’. Here DWP 
published estimates of the non-intervention rate – that is the expected ratio of job 
outcomes to participant starts – that would be expected for each of the main participant 
groups if they had not joined the programme. Primes are required to deliver results at 
least 10 percent higher than the ‘non-intervention level’ or risk losing their contracts 
(DWP, 2012). The second innovation is referred to as ‘market share shift’ and is 
intended to foster ongoing competition between Primes. Under this approach a higher 
proportion of new referrals are directed to the better performing Prime in each CPA. 
 
3.11.3 Work Programme design innovations: Sustainment payments for longer-term 
employment  
 
The third of the major incentive-adjusting design innovations in the Work Programme 
relates to the emphasis on sustained employment outcomes within the payment 
mechanism. Both in terms of a more stretching initial job outcome payment (which is 
only made following 3 or 6 months of cumulative employment, not job entry) and its 
heavy payment weighting to lengthy sustainment payments (up to 2-years beyond 
work entry), the Work Programme has more stretching ‘outcomes’ than forerunner 
schemes. 
 
A schematic for the payment structure illustrating the tail of sustainment payments is 
reproduced in Figure 3.9 whilst Figure 3.10 provides detail on the sustainment 
payments for each of the payment groups. DWP’s intention via these sustainment 
payments is to incentivise ongoing in-work support and help employment last, a 
perennial problem in the UK labour market and welfare-to-work context (Oakley, 
2015). 
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Figure 3.9 Illustration of Work Programme payment model, reproduced from DWP, 2010b, p. 11 
Payme
nt 
Group 
Description Duration 
of 
sustained 
employme
nt 
required 
to qualify 
for job 
outcome 
(weeks) 
Attach 
fee, year 1 
maximum 
(£) 
Job 
Outcome 
Fee, year 
1 
maximum 
(£) 
Sustainm
ent fee, 
paid at 
four week 
intervals 
(£) 
Maximu
m 
available 
number 
of 
sustainme
nt 
payments 
Maximu
m fee 
available 
for year 1 
participa
nts 
achieving 
sustained 
employme
nt (£) 
1 JSA 18-24 26 400 1,200 170 13 3,810 
2 JSA 25+ 26 400 1,200 215 13 4,395 
3 JSA Early 
Access 
13 400 1,200 250 20 6,600 
4 JSA ex-IB 13 400 1,200 250 20 6,600 
5 ESA 
volunteers 
13 400 1,000 115 20 3,700 
6 New ESA 
claimants 
13 600 1,200 235 20 6,500 
7 ESA ex-IB 13 600 3,500 370 26 13,720 
8 IB/IS 
(England 
only) 
13 400 1,000 145 13 3,285 
9 JSA prison 
leavers 
13 300 1,200 200 20 5,500 
Figure 3.10 The payment tail for the Work Programme: Duration of sustained employment required to trigger job 
outcome payments and maximum extent of sustainment payments 
3.12 Are these bold design promises kept? 
The overarching question which animates this thesis is then whether the Work 
Programme’s crafted design structure is sufficient and appropriate in steering the 
private power market to the achievement of the full gamut of government policy 
objectives as DWP intended and have defended (as outlined in Figure 3.7). 
Specifically, the thesis empirically appraises key facets of the success (or otherwise) 
of the Work Programme in balancing the cost-cutting proclivities within a private 
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power market via the design savvy of a configured set of additional financial incentives 
and competitive stimuli. 
The empirical work in Chapters 5 – 8 centres on these particular design ‘innovations’ 
which mark a strident departure from previous UK and international approaches to 
steering incentives in quasi-marketised systems. Reviews of international welfare-to-
work practice suggest that nowhere have these approaches been used in such extreme 
forms or within such lightly regulated outcomes-based private power markets (Finn, 
2012; NAO, 2012). 
Chapter 5 assesses critically the differential payment structure and considers the 
success of this design feature in narrowing the gap in job outcomes between 
disadvantaged groups and everyone else. The research question flowing from this then 
is: Has the Work Programme’s differential payment structure calibrated provider 
incentives within the private power market such that all programme participants 
have the same likelihood of entering and sustaining paid work, regardless of their 
characteristics and circumstances? 
Chapter 6 investigates the geography of incentives and performance in the Work 
Programme, assessing potential tensions between the spatially extensive CPAs and 
local labour market contexts. The research question here asks Is the geographical 
container of regional Contract Package Areas an appropriate spatial scale at which 
to uphold minimum performance levels and incentivise competition between Prime 
providers? 
Chapter 7 considers the use of sustainment payments and the structure of financial 
incentives which extend well beyond an initial period of employment. The research 
question asks What are the employment and earning trajectories of Work 
Programme participants? Has the use of sustainment payments broken the low-pay 
no-pay cycle? 
Chapter 8 offers a more synoptic reflection on the Work Programme’s private power 
market. The research questions whether the neglect of participants with health 
conditions and disabilities is inevitable, asking Does the variety of quasi-market 
matter for people with disabilities and health conditions?  
In summary, therefore, the focus of the thesis is both narrower and broader than the 
Work Programme itself. It is narrower in the sense that the research does not seek to 
offer a full evaluation of the scheme (although the empirical work represents in various 
ways contributions that are original, novel and significant compared to existing 
analysis of the programme) but rather looks to assess – using a range of robust 
multivariate quantitative analyses – the very specific design promises made within the 
private power market.  
 
And yet the empirical findings also take on a much broader application. In 
international perspective the UK is generally understood as a committed marketiser in 
welfare-to-work (Wiggan, 2015a, p. 119) and the scope and experimentation involved 
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in Work Programme’s marketising efforts position it at the bleeding edge of reform 
experiences. Relatedly, welfare-to-work can be seen as something of an uncharted 
pioneer in its extensive use of outsourcing and payment-by-results which is now 
increasingly being adopted within other policy spheres (Albertson et al., 2018; NAO, 
2015), and Work Programme is at the vanguard of this internationally. The conceptual 
framework, in conjunction with the empirical scrutiny advanced in the thesis, offers 
policymakers a powerful lens through which to consider the linked conceptual-
empirical implications of variation in quasi-market types. The work offers critical 
reflections on the design fixes available to policymakers internationally, who seek to 
better balance the competing priorities of government, service users, and providers 
both within and beyond the field of welfare-to-work services. 
 


4 Data and Methods 
4.1 Chapter summary 
This chapter outlines the data and methods underpinning the four empirical chapters. 
The research uses a series of quantitative research methods to investigate the 
patterning of employment and earning outcomes experienced by Work Programme 
participants. Each of the four empirical chapters uses a different form of quantitative 
analysis tailored specifically to respond to the questions described above, which arise 
from the core Work Programme design features and their anticipated implications for 
the employment outcomes of programme participants.  
 
The sophisticated quantitative analyses presented throughout the thesis are enabled by 
the author’s rare in-house access to key DWP administrative datasets. These data, 
rarely accessible to non-DWP researchers, are ideally placed to provide rich new 
insights to the research’s analytical and empirical interests. Across various linkable 
administrative dataset these data contain a host of individual-level data on socio-
demographic characteristics of programme participants, geographical identifiers about 
where they live, and capture key details on employment outcomes and earnings. The 
data benefit from being comprehensive (i.e. all benefit recipients and Work 
Programme participants nationally are included); extensively validated; geocoded; 
rich in their inclusion of rare key outcomes of interest including official Work 
Programme outcomes as well as earning profiles; and contain a wide array of relevant 
explanatory variables.  
 
4.2 Introduction to the research approach 
The overarching question which guides this thesis is whether the Work Programme’s 
designed accountability levers are sufficient and appropriate in steering the private 
power market to achieve the full suite of government policy objectives (as outlined in 
Figure 3.7). Beneath this overarching question the empirical chapters below consider 
specific aspects of the Work Programme’s design and whether these accountability 
devices unlock the programmatic ambition: to support more participants into work, 
faster, for longer and whilst reducing gaps in performance outcomes between the 
easier- and harder-to-help. The policy’s critical objectives are themselves framed by, 
and detectable through, the achievement of employment outcomes. The research scope 
is therefore centred on the individual and geographical patterning of performance (that 
is employment and earnings outcomes) across different programme participants, 
geographical spaces, and time horizons.  
Trying to tackle this research intent through a qualitative approach would be 
problematic. Such qualitative investigatory methods are prone to criticism of the 
‘picking and choosing’ of cases and would not be sufficient in identifying systematic 
patterning in the achievement or non-achievement of employment outcomes for 
particular programme participants. This study’s specific set of research questions lends 
itself to a research method where the distribution of employment outcomes can be 
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detected with confidence and which is therefore robust in defence against issues of 
sampling strategy or limitations on the researcher’s access to programme participants 
(sample size or selection bias). A large-scale quantitative approach is more adept in 
offering this comprehensive and systematic perspective where suitable data can be 
found, and in such circumstances enables strong inferences to be drawn from the data 
as they can be subjected to statistical analysis (although, as noted above, this research 
is unusual in having access to comprehensive administrative rather than survey data). 
The quantitative approach adopted here is richer in its ability – given the appropriate 
data – to detect and quantify large scale patterns as well as to discuss their statistical 
significance, generalisability and systemic implications against programmatic 
objectives.  
As outlined above in Section 3.12, each of the empirical chapters centre on a particular 
Work Programme design ‘innovation’ where the approach adopted by the DWP marks 
a strident departure from previous UK and international approaches to steering 
provider behaviour in quasi-marketised systems: 
Chapter 5 assesses critically the differential payment structure and considers the 
success of this design feature in narrowing the gap in job outcomes between 
disadvantaged and less disadvantaged participants. The chapter asks: Has the Work 
Programme’s differential payment structure calibrated provider incentives within the 
private power market such that all programme participants have the same likelihood 
of entering and sustaining paid work, regardless of their characteristics and 
circumstances? 
 
The 'promise' of the differential payment structure is that it will compensate providers 
for the additional support costs associated with those participants who are 'harder to 
help' or further from the labour market. The analysis investigates the patterning of job 
outcomes subsequent to the application of the differential payment schedule and uses 
logistic regression to assess whether variation in employment outcomes is associated 
with participants’ characteristics and previous labour market experiences. 
 
Chapter 6 investigates the geography of incentives and performance in the Work 
Programme, assessing potential tensions between the spatially extensive CPAs and the 
much smaller local labour market contexts in which Work Programme participants 
exist. This chapter asks: Is the geographical container of regional Contract Package 
Areas an appropriate spatial scale at which to uphold minimum performance levels 
and incentivise competition between providers? 
 
The analysis investigates variation in Work Programme performance between 
different geographic areas and at different geographic scales. In doing so these 
analyses respond to the frequent neglect of spatial issues and impacts within welfare-
to-work analyses. Where previous studies have investigated spatial aspects of 
employment programmes they have found that work-first schemes entrench pre-
existing spatial inequalities (Sunley et al., 2006) and this would be contrary to Work 
Programme objectives. The analysis therefore assesses whether there is spatial 
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variation in programme performance and if there is a relationship between local labour 
market context (considered at a range of geographic scales) and programme 
performance. This is investigated using descriptive statistics, mapping, and regression 
based approaches to deliver a spatialised ‘contextual value added’ performance metric 
for Prime contractors. 
 
Chapter 7 explores the Work Programme’s use of sustainment payments as a design 
tool to overcome fractured and low-paid employment experiences. The research asks: 
What are the employment and earning trajectories of Work Programme participants? 
Has the use of sustainment payments broken the low-pay no-pay cycle?  
 
Employment sustainment is both a key challenge in the UK labour market (Oakley, 
2015; Shildrick, 2012; Shildrick et al., 2012) and a key objective – as illustrated 
through the designed heavy weighting and lengthiness of sustainment payments – for 
the Work Programme. Despite this policy need and programmatic emphasis on 
sustainment, however, much current analysis continues to focus crudely on binary 
indicators of employment outcomes that conceal as much as they reveal. By using 
innovative sequence analysis and optimal matching of participants’ employment 
sustainment and earnings trajectories the analysis for the first time in the UK context 
(and indeed internationally) facilitates an unprecedentedly rich longitudinal 
investigation of participants' (un)employment and earnings rhythms which are not 
visible within the official programme job outcome metric.  
 
Chapter 8 takes a more synoptic approach and looks to innovatively compare the 
employment and earnings outcomes achieved by matched programme participants in 
two parallel employment schemes which embody different forms of quasi-market 
configuration. In doing so Chapter 8 uses considered statistical approaches to take 
advantage of this natural experiment opportunity. The chapter explores indicatively 
for the first time in the UK context whether there are any apparent links between 
alternative quasi-market configurations and the employment and earnings outcomes 
across matched cohorts. The chapter asks: Does the variety of quasi-market matter for 
people with disabilities and health conditions? 
 
The analysis compares employment and earnings outcomes for people participating in 
one of two government employment support programmes: Work Programme and 
Work Choice (where the smaller Work Choice programme adopts a hybridised and 
softer form of provider-directed quasi-market for its cohort of participants whose 
participation is based on long-term health conditions and disabilities). The analysis 
implements a novel quasi-experimental design using propensity score matching to 
identify variation in outcomes which is attributable to programme participation whilst 
controlling for variation which might be associated with participant characteristics. 
The natural experiment is then supplemented with sequence analysis to investigate 
variation in the employment trajectories of matched participants in the two schemes. 
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The remainder of this chapter is structured across three core sections. The first portion 
provides an overview of the data used and offers a brief discussion of the underlying 
datasets. The second section describes the methods adopted within each of the 
empirical chapters. Chapters 7 and 8 implement more unusual and more technically 
demanding analytical approaches (sequence analysis and propensity score matching) 
and greater attention is therefore paid to outlining these methods rather than dwelling 
on more widely used regression based approaches. The final section offers reflections 
on research considerations and positionality. 
 
4.3 Introduction to underlying datasets – an exciting in-house opportunity 
Although there are publicly available datasets on the Work Programme (first 
accessible online through DWP’s Tabtool and subsequently through Stat-Xplore) the 
aggregated and limited cross-tabulations available through these platforms do not 
produce data with sufficient granularity to support the proposed analysis. De-
anonymised individual-level participant information is not available in the public 
domain nor is it made available to researchers through data archiving centres.  
 
A networking event between the University of Sheffield and members of the DWP 
labour market analysis directorate in 2012 opened up a constructive dialogue between 
University researchers and senior civil servants. A series of conversations identified 
shared areas of research interest. Civil servants with responsibility for this domain 
were interested in the proposed analysis but were uncomfortable passing any 
individual-level datasets outside the Department’s secure operating system. DWP has 
a legal and ethical responsibility to make sure the Work and Pensions Longitudinal 
Study (WPLS) is used appropriately (DWP, 2005). To facilitate data access an 
arrangement was made for Dr Adam Whitworth (primary supervisor) and Eleanor 
Carter to access the DWP under ‘secondment’ arrangements (detailed in a 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Department and the University). In 2014 
the University researchers were inducted as pseudo-staff members, were given DWP 
laptops and staff passes and were supported to complete compulsory data handling 
awareness training courses. 
 
This facilitated rare in-house access to a suite of DWP administrative data and enabled 
embedded in-house working in DWP offices throughout the duration of the PhD 
research. A 2-hour introduction to the datasets was the maximum extent of pre-analysis 
support formally provided by the Department. No detailed analysis plans were agreed 
and whilst there was on-going interest in the research and its emerging findings from 
DWP policy and analysts colleagues (for example, with internal seminars and slide 
packs requested and delivered) there was very limited formal ongoing oversight by 
DWP. There was minimal support from local DWP analysts, despite the complexity 
of the IT systems, software and multiple complex datasets involved. This meant that 
considerable work was required by the researcher to access and manipulate the 
underlying datasets which are stored remotely and are accessed via Base SAS software 
environment. A new programming language (SAS) had to be learned in order to clean 
and prepare the data, alongside a raft of more technically complex software interfaces 
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to enable various databases and servers across the UK to interact in order to access 
various differently located datasets. The subsequent analysis was conducted in Stata 
10 (the most up-to-date version available on DWP systems). 
 
In terms of the administrative data used, the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study 
(WPLS) is described by the DWP as its core and comprehensive analytical dataset. 
WPLS links all Benefit and Programme information held by DWP with employment 
records from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). It provides “a single 
client view, with history, allowing client group and across client group longitudinal 
analysis” (McIvor, n.d., p. 3). It has comprehensive coverage of all DWP clients 
receiving benefits or participating in programmes at 6th April 1999 or starting after 
that date. 
 
Prior to analysis it was anticipated that the WPLS would serve as the dataset to 
underpin the research. In practice the WPLS is not a single dataset but rather represents 
a series of different underlying administrative datasets which can be connected through 
the use of individual claimant or programme participant identifiers. By connecting 
across multiple datasets it is possible to investigate longitudinal, spell-based 
information on individuals’ work and benefit histories.  
 
Figure 4.1 outlines the various contributing datasets used in the research which are 
then described in further detail below. 
 
Dataset Data source Key items 
National Benefits 
Database 
DWP Details of historical and current benefit claims 
Work 
Programme 
Analytical 
Database 
DWP Work Programme participants and programme 
Management Information (e.g. referral and attachment 
dates, achievement of job outcomes) 
Labour Market 
System 
DWP Socio-Demographic information on individuals who 
engage with Jobcentre Plus 
P45/46 
Employment data 
HMRC via DWP Employment spells prior to programme participation 
RTI HMRC via DWP Month-to-month earning information 
Official Labour 
Market Statistics 
NOMIS Local authority claimant rates 
Standardised 
Index of Multiple 
Deprivation 
Centre for Regional 
Economic and 
Social Research 
Relative deprivation at small area level 
Figure 4.1 Contributing datasets used in the analysis 
4.3.1 National Benefits Database (NBD) 
This dataset contains information on claims made to key DWP benefits at an individual 
level. It contains clean, quality assured information on the claim characteristics, 
including amongst other variables: the start date; end date; and type of claim or benefit 
received (including all benefit types claimed by those eligible for the Work 
Programme: Employment Support Allowance; Jobseekers Allowance; Incapacity 
Benefit; and Income Support). An individual claimant identifier (encrypted National 
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Insurance Number ‘NINO’) is both unique and linkable to other DWP datasets. The 
data structure is one row per claim, so an individual who has claimed different types 
of benefit, at different time points, will have records held in multiple rows. NBD has 
100% coverage and captures all claims for benefits made in Great Britain since 1999. 
It contains over 34 million separate benefit claims. Given that it is based on financial 
benefit payments it is comprehensive, validated extensively, and exceptionally high 
quality. 
 
The NBD aggregates data from the underlying DWP payments systems and is not 
‘live’. It offers a cleaned snapshot and has lags in completeness. Analysts suggest that 
data is lagged by around 4 months and this is considered in the timing of the analysis. 
This data is used to build variables which capture benefit claim durations, for 2-year 
and 5-year periods prior to Work Programme participation. Generally dates are 
accurately recorded but there are occasionally small lags in the dates recording spell 
end. This is corrected for by re-scaling any claim durations which extend beyond the 
2-year or 5-year tracking windows. 
 
4.3.2 Work Programme Analytical Database (WPAD) 
This dataset contains information on all Work Programme participants and outcomes. 
Within the DWP it is the best single source of information on those participating in 
the scheme and is used to produce official programme performance statistics. Key 
variables include referral date, attachment date, job outcome date and sustainment 
payment dates. 
 
Core information is sourced from the Provider Referrals and Payments system (PRaP) 
which is used to exchange information and payments between DWP and Prime 
providers in a secure environment. Given its core purpose is to validate claims and 
make payments to Primes WPAD is understandably comprehensive, validated 
extensively and exceptionally high quality. WPAD now holds information on 1.95 
million Work Programme participants. 
 
The data is held as one-row per participant and ORCID is used as a unique anonymised 
participant identifier which can be used to connect participant details to other datasets. 
There are a very small number (<1%) duplicate ORCID records (i.e. a single 
participant with multiple records) and this was corrected for in the cleaning process 
where only the most complete and/or most recent record was retained. Only a limited 
number of socio-demographic variables are also included in WPAD (age, sex, and 
specific identifiers of disadvantage collected prior to programme participation, 
Appendix 2 provides a full description of available and derived variables). 
 
4.3.3 Labour Market System (LMS) meetings, opportunities, and ‘client’ 
characteristics 
The Labour Market System (LMS) is the key IT system used by the Public 
Employment Service on the front line in Jobcentre Plus offices across the country in 
their interactions with people claiming benefits. It is used to manage and input a range 
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of ‘customer’ information, including: socio-demographic characteristics; the booking 
and administering of appointments; and referring customers to ‘opportunities,’ that is, 
external employment support services beyond Jobcentre Plus. The dataset has 100 per 
cent coverage of individual level data for people who are eligible for and referred to 
‘opportunities,’ such as the Work Programme.  
 
Data on socio-demographic characteristics from the Jobcentre Plus LMS contains a 
number of missing values as advisers do not routinely fill in all of the fields during 
client interviews and claimants are not compelled to disclose all information. Amongst 
variables of interest to this research (and, more broadly, to the DWP itself) missing 
information is problematic for variables identifying low qualification levels.  
 
4.3.4 P45/6 Employment data 
The P45/6 datasets contain employment information provided by HMRC data systems. 
This dataset is used to produce variables conveying employment histories (spells and 
duration) across 2-years and 5-years prior to programme entry which previous studies 
have suggested are key variables for assessing employment support programmes 
(Bryson et al., 2002). Not only are employment histories understood to be important 
predictors of employment outcomes in their own right, Bryson et al., (2002, p. 13) 
suggest that they can also help capture “otherwise unobservable characteristics, such 
as motivation,” which might also influence programme outcomes.  
 
In most circumstances, employers are obliged to notify HMRC when an employee 
starts or ends a spell of employment and this data is collected via P45 and P46 forms 
respectively. This employment spell information is then passed to DWP and can be 
connected to other administrative data using encrypted NINOs. The dataset holds over 
143 million separate linked employment records. 
 
Importantly, the data do not cover all employees and there are a number of documented 
issues with the comprehensiveness and quality of this data. In terms of coverage, there 
is no requirement to supply information if the individual is below PAYE tax thresholds 
and is not going to be claiming new tax credits through the employer. Some 
employment spells, such as those corresponding to self-employment and where 
individual earning levels are lower than the PAYE threshold, are therefore not 
recorded. However, some employers do send in all details regardless and HMRC put 
them on the system in these circumstances. Despite the limitations in coverage this is 
by far the most comprehensive dataset on employment and earnings available to 
analyses of this sort at present, although the slowly growing availability of HMRC’s 
Real Time earnings data (see below) is gradually superseding this dataset. 
 
There are also issues with unreliable dates: “Where HMRC do not know the date on 
which an employment spell started, they assign a start date of the 6th April in the year 
that they become aware of the employment spell” (DWP, 2013b, p. 7). A similar 
process occurs when there is uncertainty over the date on which an employment spell 
ended. The recording of end dates is known to be particularly problematic in this 
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dataset. Details on the actions taken to overcome the limitations of the employment 
data are outlined in Appendix 1. 
 
At the time of conducting the analysis the time lag between a person starting a job and 
DWP being notified of the record through HMRC data transfers was not clear to 
analysts. A best estimate suggested that the majority of records were received within 
6-months. As a result, WPAD gives a much more timely, cleaner and more reliable 
indication of the achievement of Work Programme ‘job outcomes’. This P45/6 dataset 
is therefore only used to construct employment histories prior to programme 
participation. 
 
4.3.5 Additional datasets capturing employment and earnings – Real Time 
Information sample 
The author was also granted access to additional HMRC Real Time Information (RTI) 
data containing granular information on earnings and employment which were newly 
available to the Labour Market Analysis team. This data was available for a large sub-
sample (those referred to the programme between April 2013 and October 2014) of 
Work Programme and Work Choice participants. 
 
These datasets provide unique academic access to a set of RTI earnings on the month-
to-month income from employment for a sample of participants. These are enormously 
rich data that are gradually growing in availability and importance within UK 
government analysis and policy making. No published Work Programme analysis has 
ever utilised these rich RTI earnings data prior to this research project. 
 
The RTI has been collected by HMRC’s new system for collecting Pay as You Earn 
information7 which provides immediate, regular data on employee earnings (Tarr and 
Finn, 2012). The information is collected directly from employers who since 2014 
have been required to provide HMRC with income details immediately after each 
payment they make to employees. HMRC developed the new RTI collection system 
in order to respond to the changing employment landscape, particularly given the 
greater frequency with which employees change jobs and the increased likelihood of 
people having concurrent jobs (i.e. holding multiple jobs at the same time) (HMRC, 
2014).  
 
DWP is a key user of the RTI information as it is a cornerstone of the Universal Credit 
system. Since DWP is now receiving scans of RTI it has been possible for analysts to 
match this month-to-month earnings information to a subset of Work Programme and 
Work Choice participant records, and it is these matched records which the thesis 
utilises. The dataset contains a record of gross earnings received by each participant 
within each month. The first month record is the month of programme attachment. The 
                                               
7 Pay-as-you-earn tax (PAYE) is a withholding tax on income payments to employees where income 
tax, national insurance contributions and other deductions are made from payments to employees and 
pensioners. 
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data then provides gross earning information in pounds for each of 15 consecutive 
months following attachment to the programme. The RTI dataset contains the 
encrypted NINO for each case, enabling connection to other administrative data. 
 
RTI is one of – if not the – most exciting administrative dataset in the UK for both 
analytical and policy purposes. RTI remains strongly guarded and minimally shared 
by HMRC, yet this project’s unique academic access highlights its rich potential. The 
quality and granularity of this data in particular represents a key advance in relation to 
the patchy p45/46 data which has historically been used. Within DWP it is underused 
beyond routine analysis of Universal Credit and the analysis offered in Chapters 7 and 
8 is at the forefront of innovative exploratory research using this data source.  
 
While this RTI data is understood to be the best quality and most detailed available 
information in relation to the earnings trajectories of welfare-to-work programme 
participants ever available for the UK there remain three limitations to the data. Firstly, 
the RTI data collects information from employers each time they pay an employee as 
part of payroll arrangements. Self-employed individuals are presently not included 
within this data collection exercise and so self-employed individuals are necessarily 
excluded from the earnings analysis. It is possible for Work Programme (and Work 
Choice) participants to trigger Job Outcome payments for providers by moving into 
self-employment and hence it is important to note that some programme participants 
may have triggered job outcomes while being absent from the RTI data. For a 
participant to be without earnings information within the RTI is therefore not a 
definitive indicator of a failure to enter employment.  
 
Secondly, the available data provides a monthly earnings figure (£) but does not 
provide information on the number of hours (or days) worked within the same period. 
While it is possible to source information on hours worked from the RTI extract, data 
on ‘hours’ is understood to be considerably less robust than the total earnings data and 
is generally not used within DWP. This means that a participant who has monthly 
earnings that look to be equivalent to working full time at national minimum wage 
may in fact be earning at a considerably higher hourly rate but be in employment for 
a short number of hours/days. In most cases this is unlikely but it remains possible.  
 
Relatedly, it is not possible to identify within each month at what point employment 
started, ceased, or whether there was a break in employment within the month. Hence, 
periods of short employment instability – i.e. spells of employment punctuated by 
unemployment – can only be detected if the period of unemployment extends beyond 
a full calendar month. This means that shorter periods of unemployment (occurring 
within a calendar month) will not be reported and therefore the degree of instability 
detected is likely to be an underestimate of the true extent of ‘revolving door’ 
employment experienced amongst participants, even if considerable progress is made 
from previous data on this issue of ‘churn’.  
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4.3.6 Additional external datasets to capture local economic context 
In addition to the administrative datasets, variables relating to the local labour market 
context and other local contextual information were prepared externally and merged 
onto the administrative data using a look up table connecting programme participant 
postcodes to higher geographies (Lower Layer Super Output Area and Local 
Authority). Previous research suggests that local labour market conditions are an 
important predictor for the performance of welfare-to-work programmes (Turok and 
Webster, 1998; Sunley et al., 2006; Peck, 1998; Peck and Theodore, 2000) but local 
economic indicators are not routinely connected to the administrative data within DWP 
analyses.  
 
Firstly, a local authority level indicator “Local authority JSA claimant rate” is 
introduced. Notably, JSA claimant rates have fluctuated considerably across the Work 
Programme implementation period and some authority areas moved out of the 
economic downturn more quickly than others. The Institute for Fiscal studies note that 
2011 was a particularly challenging year for the UK economy (Emmerson et al., 2012) 
but macro-economic conditions were more buoyant by 2014/15 (Emmerson et al., 
2016). There are also important and long-standing regional and sub-regional variations 
in labour market conditions (Martin et al., 2016). In order to capture this variation a 
bespoke local authority JSA rate is calculated for each participant. This is calculated 
as the mean of the home authority JSA claimant rate for the month of programme 
attachment and subsequent 11 months. Thus the figure is tailored both spatially (it 
relates to the home local authority of the programme participant) and temporally (it 
relates to the economic conditions for the year following their attachment to the 
programme). Other studies of employment support programmes have similarly used 
‘local authority’ as a spatial container for local labour market conditions (Sunley et al., 
2006; Davies and Raikes, 2014). Challenges with this definition of labour markets are 
discussed more fully in Chapter 6.  
 
Detail on the degree of deprivation in a participant’s neighbourhood is also introduced 
as a potential contextual variable. Although it is notoriously difficult to isolate area 
effects from compositional effects (Griggs et al., 2008) several studies have shown 
that living in a deprived neighbourhood may create additional social and economic 
challenges for residents (Atkinson and Kintrea, 2001; Buck, 2001; Green and Owen, 
2006; van Ham et al., 2012) and the analysis therefore seeks to account for this in 
understanding variations in Work Programme performance. In the UK, each of the 
four constituent countries measure deprivation using their own distinct index of 
multiple deprivation (IMD) designed to facilitate targeting of policies within that 
particular country. Payne and Abel (2012) have undertaken an exercise to produce a 
Great Britain-wide standardised set of indicators (described fully in Abel et al., 2016). 
The underlying data was sourced through the CRESR research team at Sheffield 
Hallam University who kindly provided the underlying figures for Lower Layer Super 
Output Areas (and in Scotland the equivalent, but slightly smaller, Data Zones).  
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4.4 Bringing the datasets together 
The datasets are combined as illustrated in Figure 4.2 and a full description of the 
underlying variables including cleaning processes and the treatment of missing data is 
outlined in the Appendix. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Connections across multiple administrative and externally held datasets 
The result is that this thesis, unlike any previous independent analysis of the Work 
Programme, uses the richest possible set of explanatory variables and official 
programme outcome information sourced from administrative data.  
 
The cleaning and merging of these datasets results in a master file containing 
1,563,874 Work Programme participants. This equates to 99.64 percent of the official 
attachments within the period June 2011 to June 2014 inclusive. The final analysis was 
conducted in late 2016-17. Using the June 2014 cut-off date for programme referrals 
ensures that all participants included in the analysis have received the maximum 2-
year extent of programme support and have had the full opportunity to achieve job 
outcomes. 
 
Each of the empirical chapters uses a different quantitative method and draws on a 
slightly different portion of the administrative data in order to respond appropriately 
to the research question at hand and maximise the data used in its analyses. This is 
briefly summarised in Figure 4.3. The following section of the chapter discusses the 
methods used across the empirical chapters. 
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Chapter Data used N Method 
5 Full Work Programme 
participant dataset 
1,563,874 Binary logistic regression with dependent variable as 
achievement of Work Programme job outcome 
6 Full Work Programme 
participant dataset but with 
cases removed where home 
postcode does not nest within 
CPA 
1,515,473  Visualisation of job outcome rates at different 
geographies; bivariate regression for local authority 
performance and binary logistic regression for job 
outcomes. Note 0.3% of cases from Chapter 5 are 
removed as most recent home postcode does not nest 
within allocated contract – i.e. participants have 
moved out of the contractual provision area 
7 Work Programme RTI sample 449,589   Sequence analysis and optimal matching using month-
to-month labour market status 
8 Work Programme RTI sample 
and comparable dataset for 
Work Choice participants 
WP 
449,589 
and WC 
28,018 
Quasi-experimental impact evaluation using 
propensity score matching. Additional sequence 
analysis to explore variation in employment and 
earnings trajectories across matched Work Choice and 
Work Programme cohorts 
Figure 4.3 Data sources, sample size and methods used in each of the empirical chapters 
4.5 Investigating the promise of differential payments: methods used in 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 investigates whether the differential payment structure has calibrated 
provider incentives within the private power market such that all programme 
participants have the same likelihood of entering and sustaining paid work, regardless 
of their characteristics and circumstances. 
 
In order to assess whether the Work Programme’s differential payment system has 
supported its stated objective to overcome the ‘gap’ in employment outcomes between 
‘easier-’ and ‘harder-to-help’ participants the analysis outlines a range of 
characteristics and circumstances which previous research has shown to be associated 
with employment outcomes (or reduced employment outcomes). The combined 
administrative datasets provide a range of variables which function as explanatory 
variables, that is the variables capture characteristics and experiences which would be 
expected to predict transitions into sustained employment – including age, long-term 
health conditions and disabilities, caring responsibilities, and previous employment. 
Previous research (Bryson et al., 2002; Dorsett, 2004; Rees et al., 2014; Carter and 
Whitworth, 2015) was supplemented by model testing to identify the most 
parsimonious set of variables (set out in Figure 5.7). 
 
The key outcome variable used in Chapters 5 and 6 is the achievement of the official 
programme ‘job outcome’, which is defined as six-months of sustained (or cumulative) 
employment for the JSA 18 – 24 and JSA 25 plus payment groups, and as three months 
of sustained employment for all other payment groups. Although Work Programme 
providers are also able to receive sustainment payments (considered more fully in 
Chapter 7) the job outcome is the most sizeable single payment point and is the core 
metric around which contractualised performance levels are framed. As argued 
previously in Carter and Whitworth, 2015, job outcome payments therefore make for 
a sensible basis on which to assess any gap in employment outcomes experienced 
between participants. The Work Programme administrative dataset contains a record 
of the job outcome for each participant and in the analysis this is operationalised as a 
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binary variable where ‘1’ indicates that a Work Programme defined job outcome was 
achieved (and paid for) and ‘0’ denotes that a job outcome has not been achieved by 
that particular participant. 
 
The dates of job outcomes are not used, in part because of concerns over disparities 
between ‘achievement’ and authentication but principally because according to the 
Work Programme’s own logic some participants may require a longer duration of pre-
employment support before being ready to enter work (the justification for the two-
year programme support period). The ‘gap’ to be closed is articulated as one of 
employment outcomes and these may indeed be expected to take varied amounts of 
time to achieve, thus time to job outcomes is not key to the programme logic or these 
analyses.  
 
Descriptive statistics are used initially to convey the degree to which the successful 
achievement of job outcomes varies according to key participant characteristics. The 
analysis then uses multivariate logistic regression to estimate Work Programme 
participants’ predicted probability of transition into sustained work, given their 
characteristics. Informed by the employability literature and model testing the 
explanatory variables are grouped into six overarching themes: benefit history; health 
and disability characteristics; other individual-level characteristics; household context 
and local area context. 
 
Logistic regression is the appropriate approach due to the binary nature of the job 
outcome variable: it is either achieved and paid for by DWP (1) or not (0). Other forms 
of model specification for binary outcomes are available (e.g. probit) but logistic 
regression is the most widely used approach and previous research suggests that the 
functional form of the model does not make a great deal of difference to model 
performance (Bryson and Kasparova, 2003). In previous work using similar data to 
predict binary outcomes logit models have proved marginally preferable (Bryson and 
Kasparova, 2003). Informed by the employability literature and model testing, the set 
of variables included in the final model are shown in Figure 5.7. 
 
The multivariate binary logistic regression models estimate, for the full available 
sample of 1,563,874 programme participants, the predicted probability of achieving a 
job outcome within the Work Programme, given their characteristics. 
 
4.6 Investigating the geography of incentives and performance: methods 
used in Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 investigates variation in Work Programme performance between different 
geographic areas and at different geographic scales. The key outcome variable used in 
this Chapter is the Work Programme’s own job outcome metric. The chapter questions 
Work Programme’s contractual obsession with large regional CPAs. In this chapter 
job outcome rates – that is the proportion of attached programme participants who 
ultimately achieve a successful job outcome – are explored at a range of geographical 
scales and for alternate Prime provider contracts. Spatial variation in job outcome rates 
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is then studied using descriptive statistics and mapping using ArcMap software. 
Bivariate regression analysis is used to assess the relationship between Local Authority 
job outcome rates and indicators of local labour market context.  
 
The final stage of the empirical work extends from the individual-level binary logistic 
regression model advanced in Chapter 5 which is used as the basis for the development 
of a spatialised ‘contextual value added’ approach to performance. This provides a 
preliminary estimate of Prime contract performance which is sensitive to context. 
 
4.7 Exploring the employment and earning trajectories of Work Programme 
participants: methods used in Chapter 7 
 
Given the prevalence of the ‘low-pay no-pay’ cycle experienced by those leaving 
working- age-benefits and on the lower rungs of the UK employment ladder (Goulden, 
2010; Shildrick et al., 2012; Thompson, 2015) it is crucial to investigate Work 
Programme participants’ transitions into (and, potentially, back out of) employment 
using a method which is sensitive longitudinally to experiences which do not follow 
stable, linear employment trajectories.  
 
Complex, and often circular movements through multiple employment statuses and 
earning levels cannot be easily conveyed through conventional – even if complex 
multivariate – statistical approaches which typically summarise outcomes at a point in 
time (for example, the unemployment rate), over a specified period (e.g. amount of 
time spent in employment in the previous year), or the likely time taken for a particular 
event to occur (e.g. hazard-rate models for job entry) (Halpin, 2012, 2017; Dorsett and 
Lucchino, 2014).  
 
In order to capture the full richness of participants’ employment and earnings 
experiences Chapter 7 adopts an innovative longitudinal classificatory statistical 
technique – sequence analysis with Optimal Matching and cluster analysis – in order 
to assess in subtle detail the nature of different types of longitudinal employment 
dynamics in order to compare individual’s experiences and uncover key patterns.  
 
Relatively underutilised, the method of sequence analysis refers to “the holistic 
treatment of lifecourse trajectories by calculating similarities or distances between 
pairs of trajectories, viewed as whole units” (Halpin, 2012, p. 1). This explorative data-
driven method was developed initially by biologists seeking to find similar patterns 
within DNA and is understood to have been first introduced to the social sciences by 
Abbott and Forrest (1986). Increasingly the approach has been applied across a range 
of social science contexts and the method has been used particularly fruitfully in labour 
market research where Optimal Matching has been applied to life courses and career 
patterns (Halpin and Cban, 1998; Pollock et al., 2002) and to the exploration of youth 
transitions into the labour market (Brzinsky-Fay, 2007; Dorsett and Lucchino, 2014; 
McVicar and Anyadike‐Danes, 2002; Quintini and Manfredi, 2009; Scherer, 2001). 
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A clear advantage of the sequence analysis method over more conventional analyses 
is that it enables one to compare individual unemployment-earning trajectories 
longitudinally and classify them into one of several transition pathways. By doing so, 
it unlocks a summary and comparison of the entire longitudinal employment and 
earning trajectory experienced by each Work Programme participant following their 
attachment to the programme – including the nature of each month’s labour market 
status and the ordering of spells within the wider transition pattern –rather than a more 
typical approach that may focus instead on a significantly informationally reduced 
binary summary outcomes of those full, rich longitudinal trajectories.  
There are three key steps within the implementation of sequence analysis (Quintini 
and Manfredi, 2009):  
1)  Construction and coding of individual trajectories, with decisions made 
as to how to identify distinct events and/or phases;  
2)  Distance between trajectories is measured using Optimal Matching 
techniques to produce a measure of dissimilarity between each pair of 
sequences;  
3)  The most similar trajectories are grouped together by applying cluster 
analysis to the derived measures of dissimilarity. 
Since sequence analysis through Optimal Matching is a relatively unusual technique 
in the social sciences a more detailed discussion of each of these steps is outlined 
below. 
 
4.7.1 Construction and coding of earnings trajectories for the sequence analysis 
Unemployment-to-earnings transitions for Work Programme participants are 
investigated by developing a typology of participant earnings histories, where these 
earnings trajectories are referred to as ‘sequences’. The ‘sequence’ for each Work 
Programme participant is a period of 15 consecutive months following their month of 
attachment to the programme (month 0), where each month is an ‘element’ which can 
take a certain earnings status or value (Figure 4.4). 
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Figure 4.4 Earnings trajectories as a sequence of distinct elements 
Previous studies have developed employment trajectories with four (for example, 
Quintini and Manfredi, 2009) or five (Brzinsky-Fay, 2007) distinct monthly labour 
market status types. In a review of the application of sequence analysis in the social 
sciences Abbott and Tsay (2000) note that a number of works have accepted 
organisationally determined or advised codes. For example, Carpenter (2006 cited in 
Abbott and Tsay, 2000) uses official job titles and other studies are heavily influenced 
by ILO classification of employment status to enable international comparisons. Since 
any coding and separation of earnings levels is to some degree arbitrary the coding 
adopted in this chapter is informed by boundaries, distinctions and hierarchies that are 
prioritised by policymakers in DWP.  
One key boundary is the ‘Conditionality Earnings threshold’ under Universal Credit 
which is effectively the earnings level at which recipients will escape the 
conditionality regime in this revised benefit system. Although this is individually 
tailored in practice this will commonly be calculated by multiplying the National 
Minimum Wage (NMW) by the number of hours people are expected to work, 
normally 35 hours per week (Simmons, 2011). A monthly record of earning above this 
level (35 hours per week at NMW) is then used to identify a ‘higher earning month’.  
Another key policy threshold for DWP is the ‘sixteen hour rule’ where individuals 
remain eligible for key out of work benefits such as JSA and ESA if they work for 
fewer than 16 hours a week (DWP, 2011b). This then serves to demarcate a ‘low 
earning’ element, where individuals have received some income from employment in 
a month but where earnings fall below the level of 16 hours per week at NMW.  
In order for the element categories to be exhaustive and non-overlapping a code for 
‘zero earning’ monthly elements and a ‘middle earning’ element are added alongside 
a classification of elements for individuals who do not have RTI records. Figure 4.5 
shows the final resulting codes utilised in the sequence analysis that represent the 
status options in each monthly element of participants’ trajectories. 
Element Definition 
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Z No earnings recorded for this month in RTI 
L 
‘Low earning month’ earnings are equivalent to earning less than 16hr per week 
at NMW 
M 
‘Middle earning month’ earnings are equivalent to earning more than 16hr per 
week at NMW but less than 35hr per week at NMW 
H 
‘Higher earning month’ earnings are equivalent to earning more than 35hr per 
week at NMW 
U No RTI data available  
Figure 4.5 Definition of element types used in sequence analysis 
For the purpose of comparing trajectories which started at different time points (from 
April 2013 – September 2014), and where hourly earnings levels for those participants 
who do enter work are likely to be at or close to NMW, a process of standardisation 
was necessary. This ensures that those referred later within the timeframe are not 
assumed to be on a ‘higher earning’ trajectory through the artefact of slight incremental 
increases in NMW over time. The boundaries for each ‘element’ are adjusted in 
relation to the prevailing rate of NMW for each month. 
The element codes are therefore justified through their policy relevance. However, it 
is pertinent to note that in the only available study investigating the impact of variation 
in coding, particularly in terms of the level of detail, the results were remarkably stable 
across different degrees of subtlety (Abbott and Tsay, 2000). An inevitable limitation 
with this approach is that the allocation of a single status to each month neglects 
information in terms of other activities that may be undertaken in parallel, for example, 
individuals who are ‘without earnings’ in any given month may be undertaking a 
variety of activities in support of future work transitions. Similarly those with earnings 
may be undertaking in-work training, which might facilitate future earnings increases, 
but which again would not be attributed as an activity taking place within the 
trajectory. However, this is a descriptive rather than explanatory exercise at this stage.  
Temporality is a common challenge in applying sequence analysis to social science 
data, particularly where sequences are of different lengths. In this study, since each 
trajectory is the same length the sequences are simply aligned by vertical stacking 
rather than using a ‘padding’ of unknown earning status to align according calendar 
month.8 The result of the coding is that each participant has a series of 16 (status at 
month of attachment and 15 consecutive months) month-to-month distinct, non-
overlapping earning ‘elements’ forming a sequence. The next stage is to compare the 
                                               
8 This means that Christmas will effectively fall at different time points within each of the sequences, 
but overcomes the issue of length differences in the sequences which can result in high dissimilarity 
values for sequences which might otherwise look similar in composition. 
 107 
holistic similarity and difference of these longitudinal sequences to one another across 
all Work Programme participants analysed.  
 
4.7.2 Measuring the distance between earning trajectories in the sequence analysis 
The process of Optimal Matching is used to construct a measure of dissimilarity 
between each pair of participant sequences (Halpin, 2012). The Optimal Matching 
algorithm derives a measure of dissimilarity between two sequences as a function of 
the number and type of operations on the elements that are necessary to transform one 
sequence into an exact replica of the other. Quintini and Manfredi (2009, p. 17) note 
that the distance is “roughly speaking, the number of steps one must perform in order 
to make both sequences equal”. This process is referred to as ‘alignment’ and is 
achieved when the two sequences ‘read’ the same from left to right – i.e. each of the 
sequences contain the same elements which occur in the same order. Such an 
alignment can be achieved by substituting one element type for another, as shown in 
the left hand portion of Figure 4.6, where to convert sequence B to sequence A, L is 
substituted with Z; Z is substituted with M and M is replaced with H. The use of 
substitutions only (referred to as the Hamming distance by Halpin (2012)) retains the 
timing across sequences and measures dissimilarity as the number of elements that 
need to be altered. 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Optimal Matching operations 
In the right hand portion of Figure 4.6, insertion and deletion functions (referred to as 
indel) are used to align the common portion of the two sequences such that sequence 
B is converted to sequence A. The use of indel in the algorithm serves to emphasise 
the presence of common subsections and the ordering of elements. Importantly, 
however, “as elements are deleted or inserted, any relationship of contemporaneity 
across sequences may be broken” (Dorsett and Lucchino, 2012, p. 5). Because this 
potential ‘time warping’ effect may not be appropriate when the exact timing of 
turning points or transitions is of key interest, some studies, for example (Dorsett and 
Lucchino, 2014) use only the Hamming distance.  
Between these two extremes – the use of only substitution or only indel functions – 
alternative measures of dissimilarity can be constructed using both types of operation 
in combination by assigning each operation a specified ‘cost’. The relative ‘cost’ 
applied to different operations will have implications for how each pair of sequences 
is brought into alignment and costs effectively determine how dissimilarity is defined 
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in the context under study. The decision regarding the quantification of these costs is 
left to the researcher and must be theoretically justified (Brzinsky-Fay, 2007). A 
number of the most recent studies of youth transitions from school to the labour market 
– which represent the most similar application of Optimal Matching to the present 
study – opt to weight substitution costs at twice the value of indel costs (Brzinsky-Fay, 
2007; Quintini and Manfredi, 2009).  
Setting the cost of substitution to twice that of indel can be seen as something of a 
‘default’ and this convention (in Quintini and Manfredi’s (2009) terms) makes 
intuitive sense since a substitution in operational terms can be understood as a 
combination of one deletion and one insertion so that both sequences have the same 
activity in the corresponding element cell. This cost framework requires no a-priori 
economic assumptions (Quintini and Manfredi, 2009) and does not preference indels 
over substitutions or vice versa. For the present study, the exact timing of transitions 
to work is not the focus of interest. Rather, the analysis seeks to identify similar 
unemployment-to-earnings experiences and so indels should be enabled. This study 
adopts the conventional 1:2 weighting approach. Where studies operating with a 1:2 
indel-to-substitution ratio have tested different variants of substitution and indel costs 
for sensitivity (Brzinsky-Fay, 2007), results have showed only slight differences.  
4.7.2.1 Selecting socioeconomic proximity costs  
In defining costs it is also possible to define the socioeconomic proximity of different 
elements through the costs tied to different pairs of substitutions. Brzinsky-Fay et al. 
(2006) suggest that in general, substitution costs should decline as elements become 
more similar. This principle is implemented by Anyadike-Danes and McVicar (2005) 
who consider self-employment to be ‘closer’ to employment in socioeconomic terms 
than to inactivity and so a substitution of self-employment to employment is given a 
lower cost to that of a shift from inactivity to employment. Informed by the policy 
rationale for the Work Programme it is appropriate to design a set of socioeconomic 
costings to reflect the implicit hierarchy across labour market element types. This cost 
matrix is designed such that a substitution from nil earnings to low-level earnings is 
valued at twice that of the exchange between different positive earnings levels.  
 
The socioeconomic cost matrix is shown in Figure 4.7 and offers a reflection of policy 
preferences: high earning is ‘best’ but any earning is ‘better’ than nil earnings. 
Moreover, this weighting structure also responds to the suggestion that socioeconomic 
weightings should reflect the data structure such that less frequent events (e.g. 
transitions from non-earning to earning elements) receive higher cost values than more 
frequent events (Brzinsky-Fay et al., 2006). 
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Figure 4.7 Weighting socioeconomic proximity. The ‘distance’ from no earnings (Z) to any earning level is given 
a higher cost than transitions between the earning states 
Although the weighting structure adopted is well justified it is also reassuring to note 
that where alternate cost structures have been investigated “any reasonable set of 
costs” seems able to distinguish between distinct trajectory types “quite simply 
because these distinctions are there in the data” (Anyadike-Danes and McVicar, 2005, 
p. 515).  
4.7.2.2 Running the Optimal Matching algorithm  
With the costs set the Optimal Matching algorithm then serves to align the sequences, 
count the number of indels and substitutions required, weight the operations in terms 
of their respective costs, and add them up – “which heuristically defines the 
Levenshtein distance” (Brzinsky-Fay et al., 2006, p. 449).  
 
The final challenge is to resolve the process of alignment to arrive at a single value for 
the distance or dissimilarity between two sequences, when in practice there are several 
possible ways of bringing alignment. The conventional approach is to select the 
alignment with the minimum distance between the two sequences and this is found via 
the Needleman-Wunsch algorithm (Brzinsky-Fay et al., 2006). To conduct Optimal 
Matching across the earning trajectories the Stata command ‘sqom full’ within the SQ-
Ados (Brzinsky-Fay et al., 2006) is used. This command requests that every possible 
comparison between all participant sequences be calculated, identifies the minimum 
distance and produces a distance matrix on which cluster analysis can then be 
conducted.  
 
Running the Optimal Matching ‘full’ command is a highly computationally intensive 
process and is restricted in terms of the number of sequences that can be compared by 
Stata's limitation on matrix size (personal correspondence with Halpin). While 
alternative sequence analysis programmes are available (for example, Halpin, 2017) 
these rely on C plugins which were not compatible with security systems in place at 
DWP. This meant that the analysis was restricted to a comparison across a random 
sample of 20,000 Work Programme participants who feature in the RTI dataset.  
 110 
 
4.7.3 Grouping similar trajectories together  
The key output from the Optimal Matching process is a distance matrix: a symmetric 
matrix where both rows (i) and columns (j) represent the individual trajectories in the 
sample and each cell aij contains the distance between the sequence of individual i and 
of individual j. Once this matrix has been produced, cluster analysis is the most 
common first-stage analytic strategy used to group similar sequences together (Abbott 
and Tsay, 2000). The objective is to assess whether the sequences can be summarised 
meaningfully where clusters of sequences are brought together in such a way that the 
resultant clusters maximise the similarity of sequences within each cluster and 
maximise the differences or dissimilarities between different clusters whilst producing 
a reasonable number of clusters. Importantly, Everitt et al., (2001, p. 4) note that in 
general a classification “should largely be judged on its usefulness, rather than in terms 
of whether it is ‘true’ or ‘false’”. 
Selecting the clustering algorithm and the number of clusters requires careful 
consideration. Several of the most recent applications of sequence analysis in the social 
sciences have applied Ward’s hierarchical method (Köppe, 2017; Quintini and 
Manfredi, 2009; Brzinsky-Fay, 2007) which groups sequences in such a way as to 
minimise the variance within each cluster. Alternative hierarchical clustering methods 
were tested but Ward’s linkage provided the most viable cluster solutions. This 
algorithm was run for k target groups ranging from 2 to 15.  
Judgment and discretion must be applied by the researcher in the selection of the 
appropriate number of clusters since whilst statistical analyses can aid cluster selection 
there is no formal statistical method for identifying definitively the ‘best’ solution. 
Cluster analysis stopping rules have been developed to support this task and the 
commonly applied Caliński-Harabasz pseudo-F index (Caliński and Harabasz, 1974) 
is produced for each solution. The final choice for the number of clusters was guided 
principally by comparison of statistical indices of fit and also by the desire to explain 
key patterns in the data with sufficient granularity.  
The final step of the analysis involves the production of sequence index plots for each 
of the clusters in order to convey visually the complexity of the data analysis and 
longitudinal patterns seen. This representation plots entire individual earning 
trajectories horizontally, that is each trajectory can be ‘read’ left-to-right as a 
representation of the monthly activity status experienced by programme participants.  
4.8 Comparing employment and earnings outcomes for participants in Work 
Programme and Work Choice: methods used in Chapter 8 
Chapter 8 of the thesis explores whether the configuration of the quasi-market affects 
programme outcomes via the creative use of quasi-experimental statistical techniques 
to exploit the partial overlap of cohorts between the Work Programme and a smaller 
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parallel scheme – Work Choice – which is focussed exclusively on those with health 
conditions and disabilities. 
On paper, the referral processes for Work Programme and Work Choice offer distinct 
pathways and are targeted at groups with different characteristics and complexities in 
terms of their likely progression into the labour market. Given that individuals with 
different characteristics would be expected to respond differently to a single policy 
intervention, the heterogeneity across the participant populations would rule out a 
simplistic approach to estimating the relative programme effect by comparing the 
mean employment outcomes of Work Programme participants with those of Work 
Choice participants.  
In practice ambiguities and tensions in the referral processes for the two programmes 
mean that participants in each scheme are much more similar in terms of their 
disability-related employment challenges than when the programmes were initially 
conceived. Many Work Programme participants were/are facing multiple and complex 
barriers to employment, including significant disability-related support needs (Newton 
et al., 2012; Purvis et al., 2013). Many Work Choice participants were in receipt of the 
‘mainstream’ JSA benefit rather than the disability-specific ESA, which programme 
designers had expected to dominate. The official Work Choice evaluation team were 
asked to introduce an additional research theme to compare the participants referred 
and support offered to people with disabilities through Work Choice with that offered 
via the Work Programme and this work identified “a number of situations where 
disabled people with complex support needs, who might have been suitable for Work 
Choice support, were being referred to the Work Programme” (Purvis et al., 2013, p. 
145).  
Those providers delivering interventions within both programmes suggested that some 
Work Programme participants “were as much in need of intensive [disability-related] 
support as some of the disabled people being referred to their Work Choice provision” 
(Purvis et al., 2013, p. 149). And that there were cases where individuals were referred 
to the Work Programme but who providers considered would be more suitable for 
Work Choice provision (Purvis et al., 2013). Swift referrals to Work Programme were 
understood to follow some Work Capability Assessments (particularly for those with 
mental health conditions) or through limited access to Disability Employment 
Advisors (DEAs, who are the referral agents for Work Choice) (Purvis et al., 2013). 
In parallel, there has been slippage in the degree to which Work Choice participation 
has been targeted at those with the most profound disability-related employment 
support needs. Suitable candidates for Work Choice are defined in guidance 
documents as those who: “experience complex work-related support needs arising 
primarily from disability” and who “following Module One, expect to be able to work 
for a minimum of 16 hours per week” (DWP, 2010d, p. 2). The programme evaluation 
suggests that there is a tension between selecting those with the most complex needs 
and identifying participants who are likely to enter employment within 6-months. 
Coupled with caps on the number of referrals DEAs are able to make and the rejection 
 112 
of some participants who providers felt to be unsuitable the programme has ultimately 
reduced access for people with the highest disability-related support needs.  
The degree to which each of these programmes has experienced stretch and tension in 
relation to referral routes and eligibility criteria leads to a situation where there is 
marked overlap in terms of the characteristics expressed by participants attending each 
of the schemes. The high degree to which Work Programme participants express 
significant disability-related employment support needs means that in practice there is 
a group of people who are claiming out of work benefits, have disability-related 
barriers to entering the labour market, but who could have been referred to either 
scheme. It is this partial overlap of characteristics, at the intersection of the two 
programmes that unlocks the potential for well-considered quasi-experimental 
analysis of the sort presented in Chapter 8.  
A further concern when devising an approach to provide a comparison of the ‘effect’ 
across the two programmes is the potential lack of comparability in terms of a 
standardised outcome metric. Although both programmes position ‘job outcomes’ as 
the key unit of success these are defined differently across and within the programmes. 
Nevertheless, for both Work Choice and Work Programme the overarching objective 
is to secure stable employment for participants that endures for the long-term and this 
objective occurs in a wider policy context which aspires to shift the UK to a “higher 
wage, lower welfare economy” (Oakley, 2015, p. 4). Hence paid employment, which 
is both more stable and higher paying is the desirable, universal policy outcome. Both 
the number of months with earnings, (where a greater number of months with recorded 
earnings is the more preferable outcome); and earnings value, (where greater income 
levels are seen as superior), serve as appropriate metrics to capture programme ‘effect’ 
in a comparable manner across the two schemes.  
4.8.1 Identifying the counterfactual through propensity score matching 
 
Hence, although there is likely to be an overlap in participant characteristics between 
the two schemes – in the absence of genuine experimental work – the key challenge is 
to identify and implement a rigorous non-experimental evaluation method to compare 
experiences across Work Programme and Work Choice.  
 
In seeking to do so the thesis steps into the realm of the classic ‘evaluation problem’. 
As with all experiments, there is the issue that in order to truly know the effect of 
participation in one programme (e.g. Work Choice) compared to the other (Work 
Programme) we must compare the observed outcome with the outcome that would 
have happened had that person participated in the alternate programme. However, only 
one outcome is observed in practice. Bryson et al. (2002, p. 3) concisely summarise 
this essential difficulty of programme evaluation as ‘one of missing data’: “all 
approaches to evaluation attempt to provide an estimate of the counterfactual and use 
this to identify the programme effect”.  
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When considering the parallel implementation of these two distinct programmes as 
akin to a quasi-experiment, with Work Choice participation serving as the ‘treatment’ 
there are two immediate concerns: that of constructing a synthetic ‘counterfactual’ 
(from a broad Work Programme ‘control’ group) and identifying an appropriate 
‘outcome’ metric on which to compare intervention effects. Turning to counterfactual 
construction, there was no ‘random assignment’ of participants between the two 
programmes which would have offered the gold standard evaluation methodology. 
There is no clear, sharp assignment rule distinguishing participants from the ‘control’ 
group so a regression discontinuity design is not viable. The approach is therefore 
reliant on the partial – but messy – over of programme participant eligibility and 
referral. 
Propensity Score Matching offers a key method in this regard as it uses information 
from a pool of non-participants (i.e. those attached to the Work Programme) to identify 
what would have happened to the treatment group (here Work Choice) in the absence 
of the intervention. As Heinrich et al. note, “[B]y comparing how outcomes differ for 
participants relative to observationally similar nonparticipants, it is possible to 
estimate the effects of the intervention” (Heinrich et al., 2010, p. 3).  
 
This method has been used widely in the evaluation of British active labour market 
policies (Bryson et al., 2002), has an intuitive appeal arising from the way it mimics 
random assignment through the construction of a control group post hoc (ibid), and 
offers key advantages over conventional regression based approaches (discussed 
further below). Since the method is highly specific and is less commonly used in the 
social sciences than standard regression analyses the next section briefly summarises 
its key intentions and operation. The discussion of the method is structured across four 
key sections: describing the basic mechanics of the approach; outlining assumptions; 
considering the benefits of matching compared to other approaches and outlining the 
data requirements and administrative data available to the present study. 
 
4.8.1.1 Basic mechanics of the approach  
Propensity score matching begins from the acknowledgement that, in the absence of 
random assignment, the allocation of participants to treatment is typically not random: 
people receiving and not-receiving an intervention may differ not only in their 
treatment status but also in other characteristics that affect both participation and the 
outcome of interest (Heinrich et al., 2010). To overcome this potential bias, the 
approach matches individuals exposed to the treatment to individuals not exposed to 
the intervention but who are otherwise ‘similar’ across a set of modelled characteristics 
and goes on to estimate the mean intervention impact as the difference in outcomes 
between the two matched groups (Bryson et al., 2002; Heinrich et al., 2010; Pattie et 
al., 2015). 
 
Matching each treatment group individual with an untreated individual who is similar 
in terms of a single variable (e.g. age), or even two variables (e.g. age-sex), is fairly 
intuitive. But as the definition of ‘similarity’ is expands to include multiple covariates 
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the idea of ‘closeness’ becomes more complex both to understand and to capture. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) made an important contribution in overcoming this 
‘problem of dimensionality’ in demonstrating that matching on a single index 
reflecting the probability of participation could achieve estimates consistent with 
simultaneous matching on all covariates. This index is referred to as the propensity 
score such that “the probability of participation summarizes all the relevant 
information contained in the X variables” (Heinrich et al., 2010, p. 21).  
The estimation of propensity scores then forms the foundation for the remainder of the 
method, which is described as a four-step process and is discussed more fully in 
Chapter 8:  
1) Estimating programme participation and construction of propensity scores;  
2) Choosing a matching algorithm and performing the match;  
3) Assessing the performance of the match through the balance of characteristics 
across the treatment and matched comparison groups and fulfilment of 
common support assumptions;  
4) Estimating the impact of the intervention with the matched sample (and 
calculation of standard errors).  
 
4.8.1.2 Assumptions with Propensity Score Matching  
In common with all non-experimental evaluation techniques, propensity score 
matching depends on a series of assumptions about the nature of the process by which 
individuals participate in a programme, achieve outcomes, and the data available to 
the researcher. A series of core assumptions are discussed below in turn alongside a 
consideration of the plausibility of these positions in relation to the present study, 
noting that with fewer and more credible assumptions “the more likely it is that 
estimated effects will approximate real programme effects” (Bryson et al., 2002, p. 7).  
 
Conditional Independence Assumption  
“...there is a set X of covariates, observable to the researcher, such that after 
controlling for these covariates, the potential outcomes are independent of the 
treatment status...”  
Heinrich et al., 2010, p. 16 
To be credible in suggesting that any measured difference in outcome between 
treatment and control groups is attributable to the programme the researcher must be 
confident that all variables affecting both participation and outcome are observed and 
available as explanatory variables. Inevitably, as with any study, there are limits to the 
observed data accessible to this research, where explanatory variables are drawn from 
administrative datasets and have not been commissioned specifically to facilitate the 
matching.  
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In propensity score matching it is assumed that any selection on the basis of 
unobservable characteristics is trivial and that these ‘unobservables’ are not correlated 
with outcomes. The research here faces issues in relation to unobservable attitudinal 
and behavioural characteristics, such as motivation, confidence, and application, 
which are notoriously difficult to capture. As a voluntary programme, it is likely that 
motivation and cooperation play a part in the process of referral and attachment to the 
Work Choice programme and are also likely to be correlated with employment 
outcomes. Some Work Programme participants matched will similarly have 
participated voluntarily, but not all. This is not considered to be a prohibitive flaw in 
the approach however as previous persuasive studies have proceeded on the basis of 
administrative datasets which similarly lack explanatory variables directly relating to 
motivation and confidence (e.g. Dorsett, 2004). Additionally, Bryson et al., (2002, p. 
5) suggest that the “judicious use of observable characteristics can go some way 
towards minimising the bias associated with unobservables”. Observable features 
which are highly correlated with motivation, in this example, the proportion of time 
spent in employment in the period preceding programme participation, are capable of 
capturing (and hence controlling for) some of the motivation effect.  
 
Administrator discretion may systematically bias impact estimates. If a service is 
targeted at those who are closer/further from the labour market then this may bias 
estimates of programme effects up/down. Though there is a rationing of Work Choice 
places and DEAs have discretion it is not clear whether referrals are systematically 
made for ‘easier’ or ‘harder-to-help’ individuals. As a result, it is not possible to 
conclude whether advisor influence is likely to be contributing systematically to the 
under- or over- statement of programme effect. Since the direction of bias is not clear, 
there is no mandate for adjustment.  
 
The variables used in the analysis are outlined in chapter 8. Overall, although the 
available observed variables may not perfectly and comprehensively account for the 
differences between the treated and untreated groups any remaining selection on 
unobservables is considered relatively trivial. The selection bias has been accounted 
for to such a degree that the matching process is analogous to creating an experimental 
dataset, such that, after controlling for observed characteristics, treatment assignment 
is “as good as random” (Heinrich et al., 2010, p. 16).  
Common Support or ‘overlap’ condition  
“…persons with the same X values have a positive probability of being both 
participants and non-participants”  
Heckman et al., 1999; in Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005, p. 4  
 
Common support means that the propensity scores of the matched treatment and 
control groups should fall over the same range. Where they do not then this suggests 
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that those cases are not well matched. In this study this is not a cause for significant 
concern as only 53 cases are affected. 
 
The most usual approach for dealing with any common support problem is to identify 
and exclude those participants who are poorly matched – i.e. who lack ‘common 
support’ – and then omit them from the estimation of the treatment effect (Bryson et 
al., 2002). This means that for treated individuals for whom there is no support in the 
control pool population these individuals are dropped from the analysis. Consequently 
the estimation of the treatment effect is redefined as “the mean treatment effect for 
those treated falling within the common support” (Bryson et al., 2002, p. 12). The 
processes of dropping cases to meet the common support assumption can result in the 
loss of a substantial portion of the treated population (Bryson et al., 2002). In situations 
where a sizeable proportion of the treatment group is dropped this may have 
implications for the policy relevance of results. In these analyses only 53 cases lacked 
common support and these cases were dropped from the analysis. This is less than 
0.01% of Work Choice cases and hence is not a cause for concern. 
Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption  
As with most other impact evaluation methods, propensity score matching assumes 
that there is no “interference between units” (Rubin, 1986, p. 961) and this is identified 
as the “stable unit treatment value assumption” by Rubin (1980, p. 591). This means 
the method assumes that the impact of the programme on one participant does not 
depend on who else, or on how many others, are in the programme or what treatment 
the other participants receive (Bryson et al., 2002; Rubin, 1986).  
 
As with most other impact evaluation methods, propensity score matching assumes 
that there is no “interference between units” (Rubin, 1986, p. 961) and this is identified 
as the “stable unit treatment value assumption” by Rubin (1980, p. 591). This means 
the method assumes that the impact of the programme on one participant does not 
depend on who else, or on how many others, are in the programme or what treatment 
the other participants receive (Bryson et al., 2002; Rubin, 1986). This assumption 
seems reasonable in the context of the current analysis since programme designers and 
those overseeing policy implementation equally make the same assumption. Within 
both Work Choice and Work Programme prices and targets have not been flexed in 
response to changes in referral volumes or with adjustments to the profile of 
participants over time. The entire welfare-to-work landscape in the UK operates on the 
assumption that interventions are scalable and that there is fidelity of service regardless 
of cohort size and composition.  
 
Relatedly, the method ignores the impact that the intervention may have on the 
outcomes and behaviour of non-participants. Here again the assumption mirrors that 
of all UK activating labour market interventions which tend to operate on legacy 
assumptions flowing from Layard’s work (1991) which suggests that substitution 
effects do not really exist (Bryson et al., 2002, p. 5). Because this assumption pervades 
the wider policy landscape it seems reasonable to also maintain the assumption here.  
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4.8.2 Benefits of Propensity Score Matching compared to other available methods  
Matching offers important advantages when compared to conventional regression-
based approaches. As noted, the common support problem ensures that programme 
effects are not extrapolated beyond the common support area. An additional advantage 
of matching over conventional regression is that matching is non-parametric and so is 
not dependent on any functional form assumptions or specifications.  
 
One additional impact evaluation method would be to combine matching with 
difference-in-difference (a before-to-after trend analysis of outcomes) but, as noted by 
Dorsett (2004), this requires observations both before and after participation and is not 
possible in this analysis because of the structure of the available data. In any case, 
participants within both the Work Programme and Work Choice principally become 
eligible for the schemes through their experience of long-term unemployment so the 
‘trend’ in employment and earning outcomes before programme enrolment is both 
similar and incorporated into the matching covariates. Other potential methods, such 
as those using an instrumental variable to introduce an element of randomness, were 
also considered. A fundamental limitation with the instrumental variables approach is 
that it requires at least one independent variable that determines programme 
participation but which is wholly independent of programme outcomes. In this study, 
as in many others (Bryson et al., 2002), it has not been possible to isolate a variable 
capable of performing this role.  
 
4.8.3 Propensity Score Matching in Summary  
The limitations associated with alternative methods and the specific features of the 
interventions under consideration here, particularly in terms of the fuzzy and 
ambiguous referral routes, leave propensity score matching as the most appropriate 
method for investigating the relative employment effects of Work Choice and Work 
Programme. Although there are a number of assumptions bound up with propensity 
score matching, the maintenance of these is both viable and evidenced empirically in 
Chapter 8. 
 
4.9 Research considerations and positionality 
Whilst the chapter thus far has focused on the more technical aspects of the research’s 
data and methods, this final section discusses wider considerations around the broader 
motivations and positionality of the researcher within the study. 
 
In selecting the research design, Creswell (2009) and others (Creswell and Plano 
Clark, 2011; deMarrais and Lapan, 2004; Shannon-Baker, 2016) suggest that although 
philosophical and epistemological ideas remain largely hidden in research (Slife and 
Williams, 1995) they still influence the practice of research and need to be identified. 
It can be challenging for an early career researcher to identify and espouse their own 
philosophical ‘worldview,’ particularly when research handbooks and methods text 
books tend to simplify and categorise these into a series of discrete text boxes: what if 
I identify with multiple statements across these? Do I even have a coherent worldview?  
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This author’s views are shaped by frustrations over remnants of the “paradigm wars” 
between quantitative and qualitative methodologies (Schutz et al., 2004) and 
galvanised by those calling for a more democratic approach (Riccucci, 2010) who 
promote our ability to embrace, utilise, and learn from the multiple research traditions 
active in human geography and social policy. Nevertheless, the underlying 
epistemology that this research most comfortably aligns with is the form of 
postpositivism described by Riccucci, (2010) which suggests that all observation is 
imperfect or fallible and subject to inaccuracies: “research can strive to reach reality, 
but that goal can never be realized. Postpositivists accept the existence of error and 
consider research results or findings as probable until falsified” (Riccucci, 2010, p. 
305). The research approach is necessarily informed by the author’s background and 
training in quantitative research methods, particularly the use of regression-based 
analysis.  
 
The study aspires not only to deliver conceptual and empirical advances in our 
scholarly understanding of UK and wider international welfare-to-work but also to be 
relevant for the future decision-making of policymakers. 
 
Guides for those striving to produce research used by policymakers emphasise the 
need for researchers to produce ‘high-quality’ and ‘trustworthy’ studies (deMarrais 
and Lapan, 2004). What is perhaps less well discussed is the balance that applied 
academic research strikes between extending critical analysis beyond the insights that 
will be achieved through in-house or commissioned research, (which has been 
specified by the government department from which the policy originates and which 
rarely, if ever, questions the underlying logics, justifications or approaches embodied 
within any particular programme or policy) whilst anchoring the research within a 
frame that will be both intellectually-accessible and politically-palatable (i.e. neutral) 
to policymakers.  
 
The desire to walk this tightrope of pragmatism however flows more from the author’s 
ambitions and preoccupations as a researcher rather than from any pressure or scrutiny 
applied by the DWP to the analysis or reporting of findings. Once inside DWP with a 
completed set of data awareness training there was no formal reporting in terms of 
detailed analysis plans and no oversight or management by DWP of the research. 
Findings were shared with policymakers on an ad-hoc basis. Discussions with DWP 
colleagues on the research findings were driven principally through conversations 
between the researcher and policy leads responsible for the design of future 
employment support programmes, particularly in relation to the payment mechanism.  
 
This flexibility of data access and high degree of researcher discretion sits in contrast 
to preliminary expectations which would have suggested that a relatively 
inexperienced researcher, situated within a large central government department which 
has well-known collective nervousness around data sharing and external scrutiny, may 
be likely to experience (and potentially succumb to) pressures to report findings which 
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are more lenient toward the policy ambition and programme design. This was not the 
experience and hence the responsibility for research framing, implementation of data 
preparation, analytical approach and interpretation (and any limitations or 
shortcomings) reside entirely with the researcher. The ability to publish findings was 
secured through the Memorandum of Understanding between the DWP and the 
University of Sheffield and there is no pre-specified approach for securing sign-off on 
academic publication by the DWP.  
 
Having outlined the data, methodological and wider research foundations of the 
project, the thesis turns now to the discussion of its empirical findings, beginning in 
Chapter 5 with interrogation of the ability of Work Programme’s differential payment 
system to support its stated desire to narrow performance gaps between ‘easier to help’ 
and ‘harder to help’ participants. 
5 Equality through inequality: pursuing differentiated 
universalism through the Work Programme payment 
structure 
5.1 Chapter summary 
The Work Programme’s configuration as an exemplar of the private power market 
leaves particular vulnerabilities and risks in relation to the degree to which politically 
and administratively specified programme objectives are subaltern to provider roles 
and interests. A perennial fear in fully outsourced ‘black box’ welfare-to-work models 
with payments based overwhelmingly on job outcome results is providers’ incentives 
to ‘cream’ and ‘park’ claimants. The DWP has sought to mitigate such provider 
behaviours through Work Programme design, particularly via the use of claimant 
groups and differential pricing. The empirical work across this chapter considers 
whether this design approach has succeeded. 
This chapter considers the implications of the Work Programme quasi-market design 
particularities for the degree to which the programme is capable of delivering against 
its stated ambition to “narrow the gap” between employment rates for “disadvantaged 
groups and everyone else” (DWP, 2010a, p. 4). To do so the analysis investigates the 
patterning of job outcomes subsequent to the application of the differential payment 
schedule and uses logistic regression to assess whether variation in employment 
outcomes is associated with participants’ characteristics and previous labour market 
experiences. 
 
5.2 Reconciling Work Programme objectives: the four E’s of the differentiated 
universalism tightrope  
 
The Work Programme quasi-market has been constructed in such a way that provider 
flexibilities and discretion are dominant. As discussed in Chapter 3, guided by the 
influence of Freud (2007) the Work Programme operates as a private power market, 
key elements of which include: direct contracting with few, large Prime providers over 
geographically extensive contract areas; strong provider discretion through ‘black 
box’ commissioning with no mandatory service components; steering through 
marketised forms with pricing in the form of ‘payment-by-results’ as the principal 
means through which to incentivise behaviour; and light-touch protections for 
programme participants where minimum service guarantees (MSGs) are (often 
vaguely) defined by providers themselves and there is minimal scrutiny of service 
activity or provision quality. 
 
This private power market configuration has been pursued in DWP’s belief that such 
an approach will effectively unlock both service innovation and cost efficiencies, 
leading to better performance alongside enhanced value-for-money. Yet this provider-
directed formulation leaves open significant vulnerabilities and risks in relation to the 
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degree to which politically and administratively specified programme imperatives are 
subaltern to the providers’ powerful independent roles and pursuit of profit. In such 
contexts where there are incomplete contracts and service producers have more 
control, Hart et al., (1997) argue that private providers may demonstrate an ability to 
pursue cost-cutting (and hence profit enhancing) innovations but may do so without 
necessarily responding to the desires of the state or users of services. As discussed 
below, creaming and parking become endemic risks and concerns.  
 
It is within this quasi-market context that policymakers have outlined the central 
objectives for the Work Programme. The Department’s Outline Business Case, as 
reported in NAO (2014), sets out the key aims: 
“The Work Programme aims to increase employment, and reduce the time that people 
spend on benefits. In particular it aims to improve support for those who are harder-
to-help. The Department expected to achieve these aims for a lower cost per referral 
than previous welfare-to-work initiatives.” 
NAO, 2014 
 
Chapter 3 (specifically Figure 3.7) sets out these specific policy objectives and the 
bold set of design promises aligned to the pursuit of each of these. The programmatic 
aims can therefore be considered as ‘the four Es’: efficiency; efficacy; economy; and 
equality. 
 
Efficiency The first intention for the programme is to “move more participants 
into work” (DWP, 2010a; NAO, 2014, p. 2). This ‘efficiency’ argument is framed 
in terms of commissioner spending, where the ambition is to purchase a greater 
number of employment outcomes at the same (or lower) cost than previous 
schemes. This ambition for efficiency can be captured through the outcome to cost 
ratio. Good programme delivery against this measure would equate to a reduced 
average unit cost, i.e. in the present the spend on an individual is reduced. 
 
Efficacy The second ambition can be framed in terms of efficacy since the 
programme commits to move participants into sustained employment, explicitly 
pursuing an increase in the average time in employment for participants, 
compared to previous programmes (DWP, 2010a). Here it is helpful to consider 
programme efficacy as a rectangular space where the horizontal axis is the 
duration of employment and the vertical axis is the proportion of participants who 
have entered employment (and their hours per week in that employment). The 
intention then is to drive up the overall (shaded) area of the rectangle through 
improved job outcome rates, the speed with which participants enter employment 
and the degree to which this is then sustained in the medium term. 
 
Economy A key rationale for the scaling of employment support provision in the 
Work Programme is that HM Treasury will make net financial gains from Work 
Programme. This is expected to arise primarily from a direct reduction in DWP 
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spending on out-of-work benefits and through increased income tax and national 
insurance contributions for HMRC via sustained employment transitions. 
Through this lens ‘good’ programme performance relates to a reduction in future 
benefit spending and net savings to the Treasury. 
 
Equality The Work Programme sets out an explicit intention to ensure that those 
participants who are ‘harder to help’ receive appropriate and effective support. 
The fourth programmatic aim is for “less ‘parking’ of harder-to-help groups” 
which is to be assessed through a reduction in the gap between employment rates 
for disadvantaged groups compared to other participants (NAO, 2014, p. 2) 
 
Although this suite of objectives has been presented uncritically in previous analysis 
(CESI, 2013; Finn, 2011a; NAO, 2012, 2014) there are multiple important tensions 
and contradictions across the achievement of these collective objectives (Rees et al., 
2014). International evidence suggests that the essential challenge faced by current 
activation policies is the “tightrope walk” (Heidenreich and Graziano, 2014, p. 3) 
between cost-effectiveness and equitable, universal support. A particular challenge, 
and the core analytical focus of this empirical chapter, is therefore the degree to which 
the Work Programme has been capable of reconciling the tensions wrought through 
the programme’s ambitions to simultaneously deliver ‘efficiency’ – that is the 
achievement of the maximum number of employment outcomes for any given spend 
– and equality – i.e. to “narrow the gap ... in employment rates for disadvantaged 
groups and everyone else” (DWP, 2010a, p. 4). 
 
The simultaneous achievement of these aims presents a fundamental allocative 
challenge, particularly given the heterogeneity of support needs within Work 
Programme’s large and diverse programme cohort. The challenge is to find the ‘sweet 
spot’ of type, intensity and cost of effectively tailored personalised support across its 
diverse set of participants. Importantly, the programme’s commitment to the pursuit 
of equality is a particular form of equality. The Work Programme’s objective is framed 
explicitly as equality in the space of outcomes for participants, rather than equality in 
the conventional ‘procedural’ sense of standardized ‘equal’ services and supports 
across all participants. The intent is to secure equal potential for achieving employment 
for each participant, irrespective of their starting point. 
 
Given the inevitable and substantial heterogeneity in participant characteristics within 
such a large and by design deliberately diverse cohort of unemployed participants, 
each individual is likely to require qualitatively and quantitatively distinct supports in 
the quest for their sustained employment outcomes. Taken with the parallel 
programmatic commitment to efficiency, the pursuit of outcomes equality cannot be 
pursued by giving each participant access either to the maximum possible support 
(which for many participants would in large part be unnecessary) or equal (i.e. 
identical) supports, given their differing types and intensities of support needs.  
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Rather, in seeking to reconcile tensions across the efficiency and equality dimensions 
the concept of ‘differentiated universalism’ enables a clearer unpacking of the policy 
challenge. The objective, as articulated previously by this author (Rees et al., 2014, p. 
226 emphasis in original), is “to treat different claimants differently dependent upon 
their distance to the labour market and barriers to work, in order that all claimants 
receive the amount and type of support so as to equalize opportunities to move into 
employment”.  This policy objective is tautologous to Lister’s concept of 
‘differentiated universalism’ (1997). Although Lister’s term was developed as an 
attempt to combine the core of universal citizenship with a policy of difference (Lister, 
1997, 1998; van Ewijk, 2009) here it helpfully captures the simultaneous programme 
ambitions of working ‘efficiently’ across a highly diverse cohort of unemployed 
participants and seeking equality of employment outcomes whilst – indeed through – 
responding to difference. 
 
Differentiated universalism therefore acts as the lodestar by which to steer between 
efficiency and equity. This is “allocative efficiency” in van Berkel and van der Aa’s  
(2005, p. 338) terms, where tailored lighter touch or more substantial and longer 
lasting individualized supports respond to participant needs, ambitions and 
characteristics. This difference in support must be calibrated such that each participant 
is equal in the domain of outcomes – that is, so each has an equal probability of 
achieving sustained employment, the key payable outcome for the programme. It is 
this inequality in service treatment that is required to give equity in support, which is 
then understood as the facilitator of both equality and equity in the space of 
employment outcomes. 
 
Within the Work Programme’s private power market the task for programme designers 
then is to construct accountability tools such that they coax providers to the pursuit of 
differentiated universalism, utilising the flexibilities afforded to providers. 
Importantly, the objective is for equality ‘up’ – i.e. bringing the employment prospects 
for those furthest from the labour market up to the level of the most immediately 
employable members of the cohort – not equality ‘down’, which would clearly run 
counter to the ambition of programme efficacy. And as discussed in Chapter 3 (above) 
it is the differentiated payment system of the market accountability lever that is the 
key accountability approach to achieve this, both in Work Programme’s design on 
paper and, given weaknesses in other accountability dimensions, even more so in 
practice. 
 
It is worth being explicit here in terms of what this achievement of differentiated 
universalism would mean in statistical terms since this is the barometer for assessing 
the degree to which programme design has been capable of responding to and 
reconciling tensions across the policy objectives in this chapter’s empirical analyses: 
differentiated universalism requires for each participant that the likelihood of 
achieving a successful job outcome is brought upwards to the same level, regardless 
of their initial position in relation to the labour market.  
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5.3 A troubling pursuit? International experience in relation to the attainment 
of differentiated universalism in quasi-marketised welfare-to-work 
systems 
 
With the programmatic goal of differentiated universalism now set it is pertinent to 
reflect briefly on evidence relating to the ease with which this objective may be 
accomplished. Although this specific concept has been newly introduced to the 
welfare-to-work field by the author (Rees et al., 2014), its principles are not new to 
this policy field and its challenges have been widely discussed in a burgeoning 
international literature. 
 
Under these particular quasi-marketised configurations it is expected, and increasingly 
detected, that economically ‘rational’ providers will respond to financial pressures and 
incentives by ‘creaming’ off easier to serve participants whilst ‘parking’ harder to 
support individuals. By the process of ‘creaming’ the literature refers to providers 
‘skimming off’ participants who are closer to the labour market and targeting services 
on them in the expectation that they are more likely to trigger an outcome payment 
(and that services required to facilitate this will be relatively low-cost). Conversely, 
‘parking’, is experienced by those participants who are deemed to be unlikely and/or 
relatively expensive to generate an outcome payment and who are therefore de-
prioritised, receiving the minimum possible service (Rees et al., 2014). Processes of 
creaming and parking are understood to be most likely in situations where profit-
motivated providers dominate provision, where there are tight performance targets and 
cost pressures, where client needs are diverse and where there are light-touch 
minimum standards and monitoring: all of which are present in the Work Programme 
(Carter and Whitworth, 2015; Rees et al., 2014).  
 
International evidence highlights the extent of creaming and parking in practice 
(Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008; de Graaf and Sirovátka, 2012; Finn, 2012; van Berkel 
et al., 2012b). Assessments within countries at the leading edge of outsourced, quasi-
marketised welfare-to-work services each provide evidence where providers have 
enacted processes of creaming and parking despite designs intended to limit such 
behaviours (Finn, 2011b, 2011a). The US (Finn, 2011a; Heckman et al., 2002; 
McConnell et al., 2003), Australia (Dockery and Stromback, 2001; Finn, 2011b; 
OECD, 2001; Struyven and Steurs, 2005) and the Netherlands (van Berkel and van der 
Aa, 2005) provide pertinent experience of such practices. In Australia, which has a 
long pedigree in outsourced employment support provision, the process of parking has 
proved to be a particular challenge, leading an OECD evaluation to conclude that “few 
providers appeared to be offering effective services to address the underlying barriers 
to employment” of the hardest to place (OECD, 2001, p. 19).  
 
The accomplishment of the differentiated universalism puzzle is therefore an ongoing, 
considerable and potentially intractable policy challenge of international employment 
support programmes. Work Programme’s combination of open recognition of the 
challenge, commitment to overcome it, and particular private power market 
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configuration at such scale and variability of cohort renders it a leading case study in 
the attempt to square the differentiated universalism circle. 
 
These risks of creaming and parking ‘matter’ both for service users and commissioners 
because such processes clearly cut against the achievement of differentiated 
universalism: the achievement of outcomes is not equalised across participants 
regardless of their characteristics. For commissioners this has important financial 
implications. As this author has evidenced and argued previously (Carter and 
Whitworth, 2015), creaming and parking effectively translates to overpayment by 
government for any given employment outcomes secured. Payment models on paper 
are pegged off averages of full cohort distributions when in practice providers – if they 
cream and park – are targeting only a self-selected ‘easier’ slice of the participant 
population who have both increased likelihoods of job starts and/or cheaper support 
needs, thus simultaneously eroding the achievement of value for money and equality 
of outcomes. As this author has separately evidenced elsewhere, for service users who 
are denied meaningful support there are serious psychological implications since 
unemployment, when coupled with lack of meaningful support or progression and low 
perceptions of control over future life course, is associated with statistically significant 
reductions in well-being whilst on programme (Carter and Whitworth, 2017). 
 
In seeking to militate against practices of creaming and parking the international 
literature makes clear that the specificities of programme design and payment 
structures can play a key role in either facilitating or buttressing against such provider 
behaviours (Considine, 2000; Considine et al., 2011; Finn, 2011a, 2012; Struyven and 
Steurs, 2005; van Berkel and van der Aa, 2005). In outsourced programmes there is a 
clear trade-off to be made between promoting innovation in the services adopted by 
providers and the extent of specification and monitoring of processes to assess whether 
or not services are being provided as desired (Dockery and Stromback, 2001; Finn, 
2011a). Clearly the provider discretion at play within the Work Programme’s black 
box is considerable: within this unconstrained realm where government absconds from 
specifying services there is considerable scope both for innovation but also for 
neglectful (and undetectably so) practices. The challenge then for Work Programme is 
to design away expected provider cost-cutting through negative aspects of creaming 
and parking in a context where – within its logic of the private power market – the mix 
of available accountability tools is deliberately weighted heavily towards market 
levers, providers are granted considerable discretion, and cohorts are highly diverse.  
 
5.4 Why would the Work Programme be any different? Expectations of 
programme design for the pursuit of differentiated universalism 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, to facilitate differentiated universalism within this 
programmatic context Work Programme policy designers have developed what, at 
least superficially, appears to be a complex and nuanced payment-by-results structure 
with distinct payment groups and differential payment levels across these. The DWP 
offers minimum service guarantees and differential pricing as two formal mechanisms 
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to defend against creaming and parking (Carter and Whitworth, 2015). In practice, 
weaknesses in the substance, consistency and potential enforceability of providers’ 
minimum service guarantees render these a relatively weak and unreliable protection 
(Finn, 2012; NAO, 2014). There is therefore a reliance within the Work Programme 
on the effectiveness of the market accountability lever via payment groups and the 
differential pricing structure to defend against creaming and parking and facilitate 
differentiated universalism. It is necessary to first understand the payment group 
structure to position this chapter’s later empirical analyses.  
 
The differential payment structure across nine payment groups is shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
Claimant 
Group number 
Description Max Payment 
Year 1 starters (£) 
% of Work 
Programme 
population  
1 Jobseeker’s Allowance aged 18 
to 24  
3,810 20.09 
2 Jobseeker’s Allowance aged 25 
and over  
4,395 44.94 
3 Jobseeker’s Allowance early 
entrant 
6,600 24.65 
4 Jobseeker’s Allowance ex-
Incapacity Benefit  
6,600 0.71 
5 Employment and Support 
Allowance volunteer  
3,700 1.76 
6 New Employment and Support 
Allowance claimant  
6,500 5.92 
7 Employment and Support 
Allowance ex-Incapacity 
Benefit  
13,720 1.03 
8 Incapacity Benefit and Income 
Support (England only) 
3,285 0.23 
9 Jobseeker’s Allowance prison 
leavers  
5,500 0.67 
Figure 5.1 Work Programme Payment Groups and payment levels. Reproduction of previous work published in 
Carter and Whitworth, 2015 
The differential payment model is seen as an innovative marketised steering tool in 
recent international perspectives (Finn, 2010a), yet the payment groups and 
differential payment model adopted within the Work Programme are widely 
considered to be crude and rather simplistic (WPSC, 2013, 2015, 2011). Nonetheless, 
the approach has been consistently defended by Ministers and senior civil servants. 
Chris Grayling, then Minister for Employment within the DWP explained, “‘we 
needed to find something that was simple to administer that was likely to be reasonably 
reflective’” and that “‘was simple, easy to understand, where there was no scope for 
debate and discussion... There will be variations within each [payment] group, that is 
inevitable but we think as a broad average it gives the providers a sensible basis to 
work with’” (Graying in WPSC, 2011, p. 28 emphasis added). Robert Devereux, then 
Permanent Secretary for the DWP, augments this sentiment, suggesting that the Work 
Programme payment groups and differential pricing structure “begins to move us 
towards trying to reflect some of the average difficulty [of moving participants into 
sustained employment]. Everything we have done here takes us a really long way 
forward compared to where we were” (PAC, 2012, p. 26). 
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Commentators and the academic community have been considerably more sceptical 
in terms of the likely capacity for the payment scheme to mitigate risks around 
creaming and parking. It has been repeatedly acknowledged that the current 
segmentation and payment structure based on benefit type is an overly crude basis on 
which to proxy distance to the labour market and, as a consequence, on which to 
calibrate groups and differential payment levels (Lane et al., 2013; WPSC, 2013, 
2011). As outlined previously, there is growing and consistent evidence from within 
DWP’s official evaluation (Lane et al., 2013; Meager et al., 2014; Newton et al., 2012), 
from parliamentary select committees (PAC, 2012, 2013, WPSC, 2013, 2011), and 
from this author’s academic research (Carter and Whitworth, 2015; Rees et al., 2013a, 
2014) that the differential payment regime is not holding up empirically in its ambition 
to guard against creaming and parking processes. The first phase of the DWP 
commissioned qualitative programme evaluation is as frank as any government 
commissioned evaluation is ever likely to be: “the available evidence to date suggests 
that providers are engaging in creaming and parking, despite the differential payments 
regime” (Newton et al., 2012, p. 124, emphasis added).  
  
There is therefore considerable doubt as to whether the Work Programme – through 
its differential payment model – has been capable of facilitating differentiated 
universalism and the equalization of job outcome probabilities. Whilst these almost 
universally qualitative studies have provided strong evidence of the limitations of the 
payment system in this regard, the present chapter goes further than any previous study 
in its quantitative exploration of the limitations of the payment system. Previous rich 
qualitative research is highly valuable in its insights but is inevitably limited in its 
systematic comprehensiveness and generalizability and – rightly or wrongly – has 
proven unable to persuade UK policy makers of key programme design issues in this 
area. 
 
The author’s unique academic access to the DWP’s data enables the most detailed and 
comprehensive ever quantitative investigation of the Work Programme’s differential 
payment system using DWP’s own authoritative datasets. The full achievement of 
differentiated universalism can only be detected by considering at the level of 
individual participants whether the likelihood of achieving a successful job outcome 
has been equalised, regardless of participant characteristics and contexts. To detect 
this the analysis requires, for each individual participant, a suitable and standardised 
indicator of employment outcomes and a suitable set of covariates on which basis we 
might expect participant distance to sustained outcomes to vary. Both are possible 
within the DWP data accessible to this research: 
• A Standardised indicator of employment outcome. The analysis in this chapter 
uses the programme’s official binary ‘job outcome’ metric. The empirical work 
draws on a comprehensive linked administrative dataset containing 1,563,874 
Work Programme participants who were referred to the programme between June 
2011 and June 2014 and who therefore at the time of analysis had each experienced 
the maximum 2-year extent of Work Programme provision, and who had therefore 
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had sufficient time in which to achieve an official 'job outcome’. This outcomes 
data is sourced from the DWP payment system.  
• A rich set of independent variables. Informed by the employability literature 
(Bryson and Kasparova, 2003; Dorsett, 2004; Goulden, 2010; Matty, 2013; Payne 
and Payne, 2000) suggested covariates include, for example, the duration and 
stability of any previous employment experience, age, the presence of caring 
responsibilities, long-term health conditions, qualification levels.9 The set of 
independent variables utilised in the analysis is the richest possible array of 
covariates available within the administrative datasets and is achieved through a 
complex process of cleaning and linkage across several of DWP’s administrative 
datasets.  
 
5.5 Findings: Differential payments but still differential outcomes across 
payment groups 
To get an immediate sense of the nature and scale of the differential achievement of 
outcomes within the Work Programme, Figure 5.2 simply plots the job outcome rates 
for each of the DWP defined payment groups.  
 
It is pertinent to begin by considering what we would expect to see in terms of the 
patterning of programme outcomes had the Work Programme achieved ‘differentiated 
universalism’. Success on this objective would be the equalisation of job outcome 
likelihoods through well calibrated variation in supports and, as a result, the 
consequent elimination of variation in outcome performance. As this author has argued 
previously, “If the differentiated payment system is effectively calibrating providers’ 
incentives between the Work Programme’s claimant groups in terms of some idea of 
the ‘average claimant’ within each of these groups, then one would, on average, expect 
the job outcome rates to be relatively evenly balanced between the various payment 
groups” (Rees et al., 2014, p. 229, emphasis in original).  
 
                                               
9 Such characteristics have been identified in previous qualitative research as the basis on which Primes 
and other providers, under economically rational behaviour, have developed profiling tools through 
which to ‘triage’ their caseloads to identify those ‘rated ‘green’, focusing energies and resources on 
those easiest and most likely to move into work, whilst parking claimants rated ‘red’ who are considered 
to need more time and resource to support back into work’ (Rees et al., 2014: 228). 
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Figure 5.2 Different job outcome rates between Work Programme payment groups 
Figure 5.2 contrasts with this expectation, however, showing considerable imbalances 
in job outcome rates across the payment groups. Two groups are performing markedly 
better than the cohort average job outcome rate (indicated by the horizontal line at 
32.6%) while a number of payment groups are doing notably less well. Strikingly, 
there is a gap of 37 percentage points in the job outcome rate between the best and 
worst performing payment groups (JSA 18 – 25 and ESA ex-IB, respectively). 
 
The divergence in job outcome rate between payment groups 3, 4 (and 6) is particularly 
notable, given that the maximum payment to providers for the achievement of 
sustained job outcomes for each participant within these three groups was pegged at 
the same level (in year one of implementation, Figure 5.1). Furthermore, the payment 
group associated with the highest potential per-participant outcome fees (payment 
group 7, ESA ex-IB) is the group with the lowest job outcome rate. Under the DWP’s 
logic of outcome payments being scaled to the average difficulty of participants in 
each group, these analyses flag real questions around the ability of the Work 
Programme’s payment mechanism to deliver the objective of differentiated 
universalism. 
 
Figure 5.3 plots the job outcome rate for each payment group for each month’s cohort 
of participants and by monthly attachment date. Such trend analysis for final job 
outcomes across monthly cohorts has not been possible previously because of the 
aggregation methods used in the presentation of publicly available statistics through 
Stat-Xplore. 
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Figure 5.3 Divergent job outcome rates between Work Programme payment groups across the implementation 
period. Source: DWP Administrative data. Note Payment group 8 is not plotted due to insufficient population size 
in month-to-month cohorts for the production of percentage figures 
Here again the difference in job outcome rates across the payment groups dominates 
the graph. Not only does the gulf in outcome rates across different payment groups 
persist over time but it actually worsens: better performing groups show some degree 
of improvement in job outcome rate from early 2012 whilst the worst performing 
groups show no indication of performance improvement across the implementation 
period. It should be noted that the eligibility for participation in the Work Programme 
through payment group 6 (a key health and disability cohort that has been subject to 
continued scrutiny during Work Programme due to its persistent poor performance) 
has been widened over time such that the group has tended to become more 
challenging to support. The performance of payment group 6 did improve in the final 
period of programme implementation, after this analysis period, under concerted 
attention from DWP performance managers following sustained media and select 
committee critique of poor performance (DWP, 2017a). 
 
The large and systemic gaps in the job outcome rate between the payment groups 
(Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3) indicate that the payment structure – which is the key 
accountability mechanism through which to calibrate provider incentives – does not 
seem to be successfully equalising the prospects of sustained employment for the 
average participant within each group. Indeed, even in relation to the relatively modest 
ambition for the payment groups to function “‘as a sensible basis to work with’” 
(Graying in WPSC, 2011, p. 28) in capturing “‘some of the average difficulty’” (PAC, 
2012, p. 26, emphasis added) the payment groups are floundering. Overlaying this 
failure to reflect even the average difficulty of participants within each payment group 
is the more substantial issue (as will be seen from the modelling work below) that a 
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participant’s payment group membership is a weak predictor of job outcome 
likelihood.  
 
This brings us to a more fundamental consideration of the extreme and undue 
coarseness of the Work Programme payment groups, which principally use age and 
the type of benefit received as a proxy for the level of participants’ perceived support 
needs (PAC, 2012, 2013, WPSC, 2013, 2011). It is therefore crucial to consider Work 
Programme’s ability to deliver differentiated universalism within as well as across the 
DWP defined payment groups. This research’s unique access to DWP’s individual-
level participant data brings the opportunity for the first time to investigate 
comprehensively within payment group variation in order to explore the hypothesis 
that this is where the bulk of the variation lies, though missed entirely by the Work 
Programme differential payment design. 
 
An initial and particularly obvious route to consider the existence of within group 
variation in the achievement of job outcomes is to look inside payment group 3 – the 
JSA early access group – which comprises diverse participants routed to the 
programme through three distinct referral pathways: mandatory entry of 18-year-olds 
not in education, employment or training (‘NEETs’); mandatory entry of JSA 
‘repeaters’ (those receiving JSA for 22 of the previous 24 months); and voluntary early 
entry for pre-identified ‘vulnerable’ JSA claimants (DWP, 2013).  
 
Each of these groups have distinctive characteristics and it is not clear why each sub 
group would be expected to have an identical job outcome likelihood (on average), 
which is the implication of rolling the three together within the same payment group 
and fee structure. Figure 5.4 sets out the job outcome rate for each of these sub-groups 
within payment group 3. There is indeed considerable variation in job outcome rate 
within this single payment group, yet all participants carry the same financial rewards 
to providers. 
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Figure 5.4 Variation in job outcome rates for sub-groups within payment group 3. Source: DWP administrative 
data 
5.6 Moving beyond official ‘payment groups’ 
Moving beyond payment group 3, there are a number of other characteristics that cut 
across all payment groups and against which there is a gradient in the achievement of 
job outcomes. Much of the previous research which has raised concerns about the 
Work Programme’s ability to ‘work for all user groups’ (Davies and Raikes, 2014; 
Riley et al., 2014) has focused on the low performance of particular payment groups, 
with specific concern framed around the performance of payment group 6 for ESA 
claimants where payment group membership is attained by demonstration of a 
disability or long-term health condition through DWP’s  Work Capability Assessment. 
Disability emerges as a particularly striking characteristic against which the Work 
Programme is failing to deliver equitable employment outcomes (Quirke, 2015; Rees 
et al., 2014; Riley et al., 2014). 
 
In practice, however, disability and longstanding health conditions are experienced by 
participants across all payment groups far beyond DWP’s core confines of the Work 
Capability Assessment for the purposes of determining eligibility to ESA and, hence, 
far beyond payment group 6. There are a substantial proportion of participants within 
each of the nine payment groups who self-identify as having a disability (Figure 5.5, 
upper right pane). A quarter (25.7%) of participants within the JSA 25 plus payment 
group (payment group 2) report themselves as having a disability or long-term health 
condition for instance. As  seen in the upper left pane of Figure 5.5, those who identify 
themselves as having a disability have a job outcome rate around half that of those 
who do not. This echoes previous qualitative analysis which notes some degree of 
provider surprise in terms of the substantial mental and physical health concerns of 
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participants in ‘easier to help’ JSA payment groups (Rees et al., 2014). Even within 
the better performing JSA payment groups those participants with a self-reported 
disability exhibit a job outcome rate that sits well below the aggregate programme 
average (as seen in the lower pane of Figure 5.5). 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Participants with disabilities and/or health conditions within the Work Programme payment groups: 
Source: DWP administrative data 
5.7 Concealed characteristics: extending the analysis of differentiated 
universalism beyond payment groups 
In this context, therefore, it is crucial to move beyond the types of aggregate-level and 
between-payment-group analyses that dominate the current evidence base around 
Work Programme and instead to develop more detailed individual-level and within-
payment-group analyses.  
 
The ability of previous research to investigate those individual characteristics that are 
effectively concealed within the DWP payment groups has however been severely 
constrained in two key ways by the form of the publicly available programme data. 
Firstly, outcome breakdowns are only available in aggregated form over relatively few 
characteristics beyond the official payment groups: age band, disability indicator, 
ethnicity, gender, lone parent status, and broad classes of medical condition. Secondly, 
the tabulation tools in Stat-Xplore only permit a limited number of cross-tabulations 
to be performed simultaneously such that more subtle multivariate analyses are 
precluded.  
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Figure 5.6 instead uses the DWP administrative data to neatly summarise the 
patterning of job outcomes across those characteristics that are publicly available 
whilst also serving as a marker for the maximum, but limited, extent of analysis 
currently viable through the publicly available aggregate data.  
 
 
Figure 5.6 Variation in job outcome rate across observable participant characteristics in publicly available data. 
Source: DWP administrative data 
5.8 Getting personal 
In exploring issues related to differentiated universalism the availability of DWP 
administrative data to the present study remedies the limitations of publicly available 
data on two fronts. Firstly, via the complex cleaning and linkage of different DWP 
administrative datasets it has been possible at the level of the individual to connect the 
outcomes data with a considerably larger and broader array of ‘employability’ related 
explanatory variables than ever previously studied. Secondly, the granularity of the 
data enables far richer multivariate analyses at the necessary individual level. Access 
to these administrative datasets, alongside the patience and capacity to link them 
together, therefore unlocks for the first time the most powerful and appropriate 
analytical foundations to assess the achievement of differentiated universalism within 
Work Programme according to the DWP’s own data.  
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The multivariate binary logistic regression models are estimated for the full available 
sample of 1,563,874 programme participants. Model testing identified the variables 
shown in Figure 5.7 as the most parsimonious. 
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Benefit history in period prior to 
Work Programme 
Health and disability Demographics 
Benefit type and history Self-reported disability Age 
JSA only (ref) Yes (1) No (0) 18-24 (ref) 
JSA ex-IB Primary health condition 25-34 
Contribution-based ESA Participants without any diagnosis 
code (ref) 
35-44 
Income-related ESA Mental health (excluding depression, 
anxiety, and stress, which are 
reported separately) 
45-54 
ESA ex-IB Depression 55-59 
IB/IS Anxiety 60+ 
Number of days claiming ESA 
within period 2-years prior to 
Work Programme attachment 
Stress Disadvantage due to drug use, 
alcoholism or ex-offender status 
(Ratio) Circulatory or respiratory None (ref) 
Has spent any time claiming 
Incapacity Benefit in period 5-
years prior to Work Programme 
attachment 
Musculoskeletal (excluding back 
pain) 
Ex-offender 
Yes (1) No (0) Back pain Misuser of drugs 
Number of distinct spells claiming 
ESA (or equivalent) in period 5-
years prior to Work Programme 
attachment 
Injury Ex-offender and misuser of drugs 
(Ratio) Pain (excluding back pain) Misuser of alcohol  
Alcoholism Ex-offender and misuser of alcohol  
Drug abuse Misuser of drugs and alcohol  
Epilepsy Ex-offender and misuser of drugs 
and alcohol 
Employment history in 5 years 
prior to Work Programme 
attachment 
Arthritis Qualification level 
Number of days in employment Other ICD class No record available (0) 
(Ratio) Cumulative impact of disability on 
every-day tasks 
Low qualification (1) 
Any period in employment Incremental score where higher value 
is greater number of challenges 
English language challenges 
Yes (1) No (0) 
 
None (0) 
Distinct employment spells 
 
Written or oral English language 
difficulties (1) 
(Ratio) Household characteristics Homeless  
Gender Yes (1) No (0)  
Male (1) Female (0)  Ethnicity 
Local context Has dependent children * White British or Irish (ref) 
Local authority JSA claimant rate Yes (1) No (0) Other white 
(Ratio) Woman with youngest child aged 
under 5 
Mixed 
Index of Multiple Deprivation 
deciles 
Yes (1) No (0) Indian 
Reference is 10% least deprived 
LSOAs 
Lone parent aged under 21 Pakistan 
 
Yes (1) No (0) Bangladesh  
Lone parent aged over 21  Other Asian ethnicity  
Yes (1) No (0) Black Caribbean   
Black African   
Other black   
Chinese   
Other ethnicity   
Prefer not to say   
Refugee or other humanitarian 
protection   
Yes (1) No (0) 
Figure 5.7 Explanatory variables used in logistic regression analysis 
The explanatory variables shown across Figure 5.8 to Figure 5.12 were included within 
a single logistic regression model but are presented below within separate figures 
simply for ease of visualisation and discussion. These explanatory variables have been 
grouped into five blocks covering: benefit history; health and disability; socio-
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demographics; employment and household characteristics; and local context. These 
are described in turn below, but to clarify: their effects were estimated together within 
a single model. 
 
In reading the regression output it is pertinent to recall what it would mean in statistical 
terms if differentiated universalism had been achieved in practice. Importantly, the 
analysis here has been conducted on real programme participant and outcomes data, 
that is, any job outcomes achieved or unachieved by participants have been delivered 
within the Work Programme’s differential payment system. If the differential payment 
system had been successful in ensuring that ‘all programme participants have the 
same likelihood of entering and sustaining paid work, regardless of their 
characteristics and circumstances’ then the odds ratios associated with each 
explanatory characteristic should all be equal to, or very close to, one.  
 
To clarify interpretation, an odds ratio of 1 for categorical variables means that the 
odds of one group achieving the outcome of interest is the same as the odds of outcome 
achievement for the reference category. Each of the Figures from 5.8 to 5.12 are 
bifurcated with a vertical line where the odds ratio is equal to 1 to aide with 
interpretation. If job outcome likelihoods are equal regardless of characteristics then 
theoretically these indicators should no longer function as statistically significant 
explanatory variables. In practice the very large sample size available to this study 
means that even marginal variations according to characteristics are likely to emerge 
as ‘statistically significant’ (indeed all of the independent variables included in the 
model and set out in the figures below are statistically significant predictors of job 
outcomes, where p < 0.001) hence, it is arguably more appropriate to focus on the 
substantive size of effects (as informed by Ziliak and McCloskey, 2008). 
 
5.8.1 Benefit history in period prior to Work Programme 
The first block of variables relates to benefit claiming history. Those who are referred 
to the programme whilst claiming disability-related ESA are significantly less likely 
to trigger a job outcome than those claiming mainstream JSA unemployment benefits, 
ceteris paribus. This negative effect is larger for those who are in receipt of income-
related ESA than contribution-based. Participants who formerly claimed Incapacity 
Benefit and who have been transferred to ESA are less than half as likely to achieve a 
job outcome, compared to those in receipt of JSA, controlling for other factors. An 
increased duration of time claiming ESA is associated with increased distance from 
the labour market, since each additional day a participant has been in receipt of ESA 
over the 2-year period preceding attachment decreases their likelihood of entering 
stable employment, all else equal. Similarly, having spent any time claiming 
incapacity-related benefit in the five-years prior to programme participation and 
additional spells of ESA or IB receipt are each associated with a reduced likelihood of 
achieving sustained employment. 
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Figure 5.8 Predicting the achievement of job outcomes through administrative data: benefit history. Source: DWP 
administrative data 
5.8.2 Health and disability 
The next set of explanatory variables relate to health and disability-related 
characteristics. These are known to have been important factors in structuring access 
to Work Programme support services (WPSC, 2013) and have been an area of concern 
in relation to poor performance during the programme (Quirke, 2015; Riley et al., 
2014; WPSC, 2013).  
 
The administrative data contain information related to ‘self-reported disability’ where 
this has been disclosed by a participant to their Jobcentre Plus work coach prior to 
attending the Work Programme. The data also includes departmental records of 
primary health conditions according to the International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD) – the standard diagnostic tool for epidemiology and health management. The 
medical conditions recorded within claim forms are related to evidence submitted by 
participants at the outset of their claims and through the ‘Work Capability Assessment’ 
and therefore are only generally available for those claiming ESA.  
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Figure 5.9 Predicting the achievement of job outcomes through administrative data: health and disability 
characteristics. Source: DWP administrative data 
Importantly these two sets of information – self-reported disabilities and, for ESA 
claimants, ICD records – do not neatly connect and relate to one another. Close to one-
hundred percent of participants in payment groups where eligibility results from the 
receipt of disability-related benefits (i.e. ESA or IB) (payment groups 5, 6, 7 and 8) 
have an ICD record. A substantial proportion of payment group 9 participants also 
have a formal ICD record. For the JSA-related payment groups, in large part the DWP 
does not have a formal record of ICD even where participants self-identify as having 
a disability. Overall nearly 60 percent (59.56 %) of participants who report as having 
a health condition or disability do not have an ICD record. Because of the lack of 
coherence across these disability-related variables, both self-reported and ICD records 
are included as independent variables and retain significance when included alongside 
one another.  
 
Controlling for other factors (including official ICD codes) those participants who self-
report as having a disability are around three-quarters as likely (OR = 0.76) to trigger 
a job outcome as those who do not identify themselves as disabled. Most of the ICD 
code categories are associated with quite considerable effect sizes compared to those 
without a diagnosis record and each (aside from injury) serves to reduce the likelihood 
of an individual achieving a job outcome, ceteris paribus. A large proportion of the 
ICD code categories have an odds ratio of between .7 and .8 meaning that participants 
with these conditions have odds of achieving sustained employment between 20% and 
30% less than those without an ICD marker, all else equal. Those with a mental health 
condition which is not captured within the separate groups for depression, anxiety, 
stress and addictions are less likely than other ICD groups to enter sustainable 
employment, holding other factors constant. This suggests that the Work Programme 
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may be working particularly poorly in terms of effective support for those with more 
severe and less common mental health conditions such as schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorder. 
 
The cumulative disability variable has been constructed by summing the number of 
daily activities which are adversely impacted by the presence of an individual’s health 
condition or disability: a score of zero reflects no impact on day-to-day tasks whilst a 
score of ten reflects a maximum that all ten daily tasks and usual activities are 
negatively impacted by a person’s disability. This measure is treated as a continuous 
variable and each additional ‘challenge’ is associated with a reduced likelihood of 
achieving sustained employment, ceteris paribus. 
 
The effect sizes of both self-reported disability and the ICD codes is notable as it 
suggests that the formal ICD records of primary disability held by DWP do not 
sufficiently capture any ‘disability effect’ on a participant’s employment prospects. 
The size of the population reporting a disability within the JSA groups (25.6 % of 
those in JSA-related payment groups report themselves has having a disability) and 
the sizeable effect of self-reported disability (as noted, OR = 0.76) highlights the 
failings of DWP data to capture relevant information on these participants’ health 
conditions. Improved information on participants’ health conditions and disabilities 
across benefit types – not just for those undertaking the Work Capability Assessment 
for the purposes of ESA eligibility – is likely to be particularly important in ensuring 
that participants are appropriately served both within Jobcentre Plus and beyond. 
 
5.8.3 Demographics 
Key demographic factors are the focus of Figure 5.10. Controlling for other factors in 
the model, being in the 60 plus age bracket is associated with a very low probability 
of achieving a job outcome. Those aged over 60 are around one-fifth as likely to 
achieve a job outcome as those aged 18 – 24, all else constant. This finding tallies with 
the performance achieved for older programme participants in previous schemes such 
as the New Deal and Flexible New Deal (Foster et al., 2014). Mainstream employment 
support programmes have consistently failed to achieve comparable employment 
outcomes for older and younger participants and it is therefore surprising that within 
the Work Programme’s differential payment model age was only included by 
separating out those JSA claimants aged under 25. By grouping all participants aged 
over 25 within the same payment categories the Work Programme payment schedule 
neglects the often-seen age-related differential in job outcome rates. 
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Figure 5.10 Predicting the characteristics of job outcomes through administrative data: demographic 
characteristics. Source: DWP administrative data 
5.8.4 Employment history 
The next block of variables assessed relates to employment history (upper portion of 
Figure 5.11) and household characteristics (lower portion of Figure 5.11). Although 
the effect associated with the number of days in employment seems small, this should 
be considered alongside the unit of this continuous variable (i.e. the odds ratio of 
1.000629 is for a single additional day in employment within the five year period). 
Were a participant to have spent an additional 6-months in employment within the 
five-year period prior to Work Programme referral then their odds of entering 
sustained work would be 1.15 times larger than another participant, without the 
additional 6-months in work, all else equal. Those participants who do not have a 
record of employment within the period 5-years prior to programme participation have 
odds of achieving sustained employment that are only around three-quarters as large 
as the odds for someone who does have an employment record, ceteris paribus. Each 
additional employment spell is associated with an increased likelihood of achieving a 
Work Programme job outcome. 
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Figure 5.11 Predicting the achievement of job outcomes through administrative data: Employment history and 
household characteristics. Source: DWP administrative data 
5.8.5 Household Characteristics 
In the lower portion of Figure 5.11 gender and the presence of dependent children 
(aged 16 or under) are included as an interaction term, thus allowing the model to 
account for differences between men and women with respect to the effect of 
dependent children on employment outcomes. There is no significant difference in the 
likely achievement of job outcomes between men who have dependent children and 
women who do not have dependent children. Compared to women with dependent 
children, men without dependent children in the household are significantly less likely 
to achieve job outcomes. All else equal, women with dependent children are 1.3 times 
more likely to achieve a job outcome than women without dependents although this 
effect does not hold when only very young children are considered. Where children 
are of school age the presence of dependents within the household is consistently 
associated with increased likelihood of entering work, controlling for other factors.  
 
As with previous research, younger lone parents fare consistently less well than non-
lone parents in terms of their job outcome rates (Rees et al., 2014). Contrastingly, all 
else equal older lone parents are 1.35 times more likely to achieve a job outcome than 
non-lone parents. This may be because older lone-parents tend to have stronger human 
capital and fuller employment histories than younger lone parents (Coleman and 
Lanceley, 2011) and this elevated human capital may not be fully detected through the 
limited variables on qualifications and work histories available in the administrative 
data. 
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5.8.6 Local geographical context 
The final set of explanatory variables relate to local geographical context and are 
shown in Figure 5.12. Geography is a generally neglected feature of what is an 
overwhelmingly a-spatial Work Programme, both in its policy design and empirical 
research analyses (discussed further in Chapter 6). Yet local authority JSA claimant 
rate has a negative effect on an individual’s prospects of achieving a sustained 
employment outcome: for each additional percentage point on the local working age 
population claiming JSA, the odds of achieving an employment outcome are 0.95 
times as large, all else equal. The degree of deprivation in a participant’s home LSOA 
(akin to a much smaller ‘neighbourhood’) is also a substantive predictor of job 
outcomes. For participants with otherwise identical characteristics, those living in the 
most deprived 10% of LSOAs have odds of achieving job outcomes that are only two-
thirds as large as the odds of sustained employment for those in the least deprived 
areas.  
 
 
Figure 5.12 Predicting the achievement of job outcomes through administrative data: local geographical context. 
Source: DWP administrative data coupled with externally prepared claimant rate and IMD figures 
5.8.7 Summary of model findings and implications for differentiated universalism 
If functioning as intended, the payment groups themselves – coherently and internally 
– would perfectly capture all variation in participant characteristics associated with 
labour market outcomes. The difference in payment levels across the groups would 
then ensure that those who, at the outset had the lowest chance of finding work, 
ultimately have the same job outcome rates as the most immediately employable 
members of the cohort. If differentiated universalism had been achieved via the Work 
Programme’s differentiated payment system then there are two important and related 
signifiers that we would expect to observe within the multivariate modelling process. 
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The first signifier in this context would be that post the application of the differential 
payments none of the usual markers of labour market disadvantage would display non-
null effect sizes (i.e. odds ratios markedly different from one in binary logit models 
such as these) since any variation in job likelihoods would have been fully captured 
and compensated for within the payment structure. Secondly, and relatedly, 
subsequent to the application of the differential payments all programme participants 
would have similar predicted probabilities of achieving job outcomes.  
 
Importantly, the analysis shown here is conducted after the application of the 
differential payment structure and yet Figure 5.8 – Figure 5.12 indicate that this first 
indicator of differentiated universalism is not met. Indeed, what we see is quite the 
opposite: across a large and relatively diverse set of independent variables there are 
statistically significant and (more importantly, given the very large sample) sizeable 
effects. Instead of neutralising the effect of these explanatory variables, in the 
aftermath of Work Programme’s payment-by-results system there remain persistent, 
sizeable and significant effects across a range of well-known indicators of labour 
market disadvantage. This inevitably has implications for the likely achievement of 
job outcomes for individuals with different personal characteristics and contexts. 
 
5.9 Considering the differentiated payment system as a ‘model’: possibilities 
for enhanced profiling in the UK context 
As noted above, the second signifier for the achievement of differentiated universalism 
is that the payment system should ensure that all participants would have very similar 
– if not identical – predicted probabilities of achieving a job outcome.  
 
The blue bars in Figure 5.13 plot the predicted probability of each participant 
achieving a job outcome (according to the full administrative model) and these 
probabilities range from close to 0, where a participant’s characteristics mean that they 
appear incredibly unlikely to achieve a job outcome, to 0.85, where a participant 
expresses characteristics that mean they have a strong likelihood of entering sustained 
employment. Participant predicted probabilities vary widely: who you are does matter 
in relation to your likely employment outcomes under the Work Programme, even 
after application of the differential payment model. Differentiated universalism has 
not been achieved, despite this being a key policy objective. 
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Figure 5.13 Exploring the achievement of job outcomes through administrative data: distribution of participant 
predicted probabilities. Source: DWP administrative data 
The key assumption within the DWP differential payment model is that the payment 
groups act as effective proxies for participants’ distance to the labour market and that 
by attaching different prices to these groups any differences in job outcome likelihood 
can be neutralised. Having now established that Work Programme’s payment system 
has failed to deliver differentiated universalism as desired, it is possible to next 
consider the reasons, implications and possibilities for improvement.  
 
There are two principle routes through which the payment system can have failed in 
this regard. Firstly, there may be an issue only in the realm of relative price setting. 
Here, the payment groups may perfectly capture the variation in participant 
characteristics – that is each payment group contains within it participants who are 
‘similar’ in their likelihood of achieving job outcomes – but the differential in payment 
levels (i.e. the steepness of the incentive gradient across the groups) may be 
inappropriately calibrated, such that ‘harder’ groups perform worse in terms of their 
job outcomes. Secondly, and more fundamentally, the payment groups may 
themselves be internally heterogeneous in terms of participant characteristics such that 
the official groups fail to adequately capture differences in participants’ likelihoods of 
achieving job outcomes. Given the availability of individual-level administrative data 
here it is possible to fully explore these issues for the first time.  
 
Though it usually is not thought of as such, the DWP differential payment system can 
be considered as a simple ‘model’ – that is a bivariate logistic regression model where 
job outcome is the dependent variable and payment group membership is the only 
predictor. The green bars in Figure 5.13 illustrate the resultant predicted probabilities 
for participants under the payment group ‘model’. Thinking in this way can facilitate 
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an initial baseline understanding of the breakdown of the payment group system in its 
pursuit of differentiated universalism. The green bars in Figure 5.13 illustrate the 
resultant predicted probabilities for participants under the payment group ‘model’. By 
exploring the predictive power of the DWP payment groups in this manner a 
comparison of model ‘fit’ between the payment group model and the alternative, 
richer, administrative data model may then be made. 
 
 
Explanatory variables Pseudo-
R2 
Correctly 
predicted 
0s 
Correctly 
predicted 
1s 
DWP payment 
group model 
Work Programme payment group 
membership 
4.04 100.00 0.00 
Full administrative 
data model 
constructed by 
author 
Full suite of employability-related 
explanatory variables available in 
administrative data, as outlined in 
Figure 5.7 
9.58 90.71 24.43 
Figure 5.14 Predicting the achievement of individuals’ job outcomes: a comparison of alternative models. Outcome 
variable is the achievement of the official programme job outcome 
There is no agreement in the literature as to how best to evaluate the fit of binary 
logistic models such as these. Figure 5.14 offers three commonly used model fit 
statistics – pseudo-R2 and correctly predicted groups (which indicates the proportion 
of job outcomes which are successfully predicted). Whilst commonly used with binary 
logit models these measures of model fit are known to be problematic – particularly 
the use of the default threshold of 0.5 to separate predicted positives and negatives – 
these are presented here for initial ease of illustration and discussion given that these 
outcomes are rare events. Although these metrics should be handled with care, they do 
however begin to give an indication of the relative predictive power of the full 
administrative model compared to the DWP payment group design.  
 
The full administrative dataset model detailed above has a larger, although still 
modest, pseudo-R2 figure, explaining just under 10% (0.096) of the variation in job 
outcomes. This is nevertheless a notably stronger predictive tool than the payment-
group-only model. What is notable is that predicting job outcomes is a challenging 
statistical task and in part this is likely to be driven by the ‘rareness’ of job outcome 
achievement amongst the Work Programme participant cohort. This serves as a 
reminder that programme participants are people who are long-term unemployed and 
less than one-third of participants achieve job outcomes. This means that it is 
considerably easier to predict ‘0s’ than ‘1s’: simply ‘predicting’ that no participant 
will achieve a job outcome can on some measures be considered a successful model 
in a technical sense, though this is clearly of limited practical use for policy. 
 
The success of any statistical profiling depends inevitably on the quality of data 
available to predict outcomes. Where good explanatory data exist then such predictive 
modelling is shown to be reasonably powerful such that it can be used to aid policy in 
the targeting of services. Though such models will never be perfect and are often 
revised over time, Ireland, Czech Republic, Kentucky (US) and Australia, have each 
successfully instituted statistical profiling to aide with the targeting or streaming of 
people who are unemployed for the receipt of particular support packages (Black et 
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al., 2003; European Commission, 2015; Lipp, 2005; Loxha and Morgandi, 2014; 
O’Connell et al., 2010; Soukup, 2011). The limited set of potential predictor variables 
held within DWP administrative datasets has in the past been understood as a key 
impediment to the application of statistical profiling in the UK (Bryson and Kasparova, 
2003; Matty, 2013) and this remains the case today. 
 
In order to reconnect this model development work to the policy task at hand it is 
pertinent to consider what these models would need to facilitate in order to move the 
Work Programme closer to the achievement of differentiated universalism through a 
reformed superior payment model. Importantly, to more effectively enable marketised 
accountability levers to move towards differentiated universalism statistical models do 
not necessarily need to perfectly predict or fully account for variation in job outcome 
likelihoods. Rather, “the policy imperative for the Work Programme in terms of 
profiling and differential payments is the particular need to differentiate between the 
relative likelihood of unemployed individuals moving into sustained employment far 
more than it is to fully account for those employment transitions; the two are related, 
but they are not identical” (Carter and Whitworth, 2015, p. 288, emphasis in original). 
 
In assessing the models’ ability to distinguish the relative likelihood of achieving 
employment outcomes this study follows previous work within the DWP (Matty, 
2013) and in this author’s previous research (Carter and Whitworth, 2015) by adopting 
segmentation analysis, which is recommended as a more conceptually and technically 
meaningful approach to evaluate model power and utility in these contexts. In this 
segmentation approach programme participants’ predicted probabilities are broken 
into ten equally sized deciles with the 10 percent of cases with the lowest predicted 
probabilities on the left-most bar through to the 10 percent of cases with the highest 
probabilities on the right. For each segmented decile in terms of their predicted 
outcome probabilities, the vertical axis shows the proportion of each group who did 
successfully achieve an official programme job outcome. Within Figure 5.15 the left-
hand pane relays information from the DWP payment group ‘model’ and the right-
hand pane is for the full administrative data model. 
 
The key features of the distribution that emerges from the DWP payment group model 
is both its irregular bumpiness – the deciles do not incrementally progress evenly from 
left to right – and the shallower gradient across the deciles when compared to the 
administrative model. The uneven way in which the decile job outcome rates progress, 
for example, with decile 4 having a job outcome rate markedly higher than both deciles 
5, 6 and 7, means that the model is not successful in ‘ordering’ participants’ relative 
likelihoods of moving into sustained work. This would suggest that for the 
achievement of differentiated universalism there is an issue not only in the realm of 
relative price setting (since those with lower predicted probabilities tend to have lower 
job outcome rates) but that the payment groups themselves do not coherently, 
internally capture variation in participant’s distance to labour market. The 
administrative model is better able to effectively ‘line up’ participants according to 
their relative likelihoods of achieving sustained employment outcomes, and its steeper 
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gradient and wider reach at the top and bottom of the distribution highlight that it is 
better able to differentiate between participants who are the very closest and furthest 
from the labour market. 
 
 
Figure 5.15 Claimant segmentation and predictive accuracy 
These findings have two important implications. Firstly, assuming economic 
rationality on the part of profit motivated providers, given that all participants within 
each payment group share the same outcome fee level those individuals with the lowest 
predicted probabilities of moving into sustained work within each payment group seem 
to be at considerable risk of being parked, while those individuals with the highest 
predicted probabilities seem most liable to be creamed. Qualitative evidence indicates 
that this is precisely the behaviour that can be observed on the part of providers, who 
ignore the official payment group structure and triage caseloads extensively according 
to detailed in-house profiling tools, targeting efforts on those participants deemed most 
likely to enter work (Meager et al., 2014; Rees et al., 2014). As indicated by this author 
previously (Carter and Whitworth, 2015), the Work Programme’s approach to 
profiling and differential pricing seems to be designing in, rather than designing out, 
provider incentives to cream and park.  
 
The second implication is that with improved approaches to understanding the likely 
achievement of employment outcomes it is possible to embark on the design of an 
alternate system to better calibrate payment levels and facilitate differentiated 
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universalism. There is considerable interest within DWP for such progress and it is to 
the exploration of this possibility that the chapter turns in its final section. 
 
5.10 An alternative payment system? – moving beyond crude payment groups 
The key finding from the model development work and comparison of model 
performance outlined above – that utilising additional explanatory variables, even 
when these are a relatively constrained set of administratively held variables, 
facilitates an improvement in the prediction of job outcomes and a more successful 
‘ordering’ of participants’ relative likelihoods of moving into sustained work – 
immediately implies that it is possible to do a better job of profiling and segmenting 
participants than has been seen with the Work Programme’s differential payment 
system. 
 
The use of modelled participant predicted probabilities emerges as a key tool through 
which to facilitate differentiated universalism. Figure 5.16 visualises these predicted 
probabilities and offers an alternative payment structure grounded in these relative 
likelihoods of employment success. The left-hand portion of Figure 5.16 makes 
explicit the weaknesses with the current Work Programme payment group structure. 
The navy points plot the individual predicted probabilities of moving into sustained 
work from a random 1 percent sample of the full Work Programme administrative 
data, based on the full administrative data model outlined above. The payment groups 
(on the horizontal axis) are a poor basis for profiling and price setting given that 
virtually all of the variation shown is within rather than between payment groups. This 
context is ripe for creaming and parking by Work Programme providers and over-
payment by the DWP who calculated outcome fees on the basis of ‘average’ 
participants rather than the easiest to help within each group.  
 
One obvious way to facilitate differentiated universalism is to calibrate payment levels 
more closely with modelled likelihoods of moving into sustained employment (Carter 
and Whitworth, 2015). This approach conditions the value of job outcome payments 
on the individualised probabilities of achieving sustained employment outcomes and 
is demonstrated in the right-hand pane of Figure 5.16. Here individual participant 
predicted probabilities are used to segment the cohort into three provisional payment 
groups or programme streams. The left-most stream captures those participants with 
predicted probabilities more than 1 standard deviation below the mean predicted 
probability for the cohort, this group therefore includes individuals with markedly 
lower than average probabilities of moving into employment. To achieve differentiated 
universalism this is the group who would be expected to require more intensive and 
costly tailored support from providers in order to elevate their job outcome 
probabilities and under the revised payment proposal would therefore attract a ‘high 
fee’. Correspondingly, the middle stream contains those participants whose predicted 
probability of achieving a job outcome sits within 1 standard deviation of the mean. It 
is suggested that these participants with middling probabilities become associated with 
a mid-level job outcome fee. Finally, the right-most stream holds those participants 
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who have the highest probabilities of entering sustained work and who would therefore 
form a low-fee stream within the revised payment structure. 
 
 
Figure 5.16 From predicted probabilities to an improved differential payments system. Source: DWP 
administrative data 
It is possible to add a more granular scheme within this overall approach by using 
different thresholds to identify any number of distinct payment groups. Crucially, the 
design of this payment system seeks directly to act as a richer and stronger counter-
weight to known variation in the more richly evidenced likelihoods of participants 
entering paid work.  Nevertheless, while this proposed revised payment structure is 
preferable to Work Programme’s official payment model in terms of its ability to 
deliver differentiated universalism, there are three important caveats. 
 
Firstly, the participant predicted probabilities derived from the administrative data 
model, and hence, underpinning the revised payment levels, are far from perfect. No 
profiling approach will ever be perfect since there will always be unobservable as well 
as purely random aspects of whether and when a person will (re)enter employment.  
As argued by this author elsewhere (Carter and Whitworth, 2015), and demonstrated 
internationally (O’Connell et al., 2010), the key question is not whether richer 
statistically based approaches to profiling and payment model design are in an absolute 
sense perfect – they are not, and never can be – but instead whether they are in relative-
terms better than alternative approaches and, as  result, better able to help policy 
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makers achieve their desires around differentiated universalism through market-like 
means. 
 
Secondly, where service providers are capable of more subtle profiling than 
commissioners – which is always viable given their ability to dedicate time in the early 
portion of the participant support process on more detailed data collection and triage 
than is typically practicable for commissioners – even a statistically enhanced payment 
structure will never fully eliminate risks of provider gaming. A more subtle statistically 
informed pricing structure will never on its own fully mitigate against risks around the 
delivery of differentiated universalism, and nor is it a reasonable expectation for it to 
be able to do so. Yet statistically enhanced approaches to profiling and segmentation 
can more effectively deliver a (partial) role in future UK provision to better support 
differentiated universalism, alongside other suitably designed accountability levers to 
buttress remaining (albeit lesser) vulnerabilities.  
 
To improve the ability of a statistically-led profiling approach to facilitate equality in 
the achievement of job outcomes for participants a broader and richer set of 
explanatory variables will need to be collected for all unemployed programme 
participants, prior to enrolment. The detailed profiling approaches adopted by 
providers themselves – through for example, thorough questionnaires on employment 
history, skills, qualifications and caring commitments – offer clues for a more sensitive 
calibration of the payment system, as do the best practice international examples 
pursued in Ireland, Czech Republic, Kentucky and Australia. 
 
Finally, the analysis outlined above is limited in that it does not explicitly set the 
precise cash values of job outcome payments within the revised payment system. The 
approach offered is a schematic through which to more appropriately set relative 
prices, but does not offer a methodology for allocating final values of payments. A 
simplistic approach might work from within the existing spending envelope and 
simply redistribute outcome payments in proportion to predicted probabilities. This 
simplistic linear inversion between probabilities and cash values for outcomes – while 
intuitive – seems unlikely to be the most appropriate function for translating predicted 
probabilities to outcome fees. Given the known high support costs for those individuals 
most distant from the labour market (Morphy et al., 2012) and known 
underperformance even within high fee paying groups would suggest that both higher 
overall outcome fees and a greater assurance (for example moving away from such 
heavy weighting of payment on outcomes and introducing alternative non-marketised 
accountability levers, as discussed in Chapter 8) may be required to move the British 
employment support system closer to differentiated universalism.  
 
5.11 Chapter summary 
Irrespective of its initial apparent subtlety compared to previous employment 
programmes, this chapter’s original analyses – using an unprecedented empirical 
approach in terms of data richness and comprehensiveness – reveal that the Work 
Programme’s differentiated payment model has failed woefully to deliver its 
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objectives around differentiated universalism. Instead of neutralising the effect of 
well-known indicators of labour market disadvantage, in the aftermath of the Work 
Programme’s payment-by-results system there remain persistent, sizeable and 
significant effects remaining across a range of participant characteristics and contexts. 
 
Advancing UK policy design around richer statistically informed profiling and 
payment design remains a priority in the coming decade. Further data than is currently 
available within DWP’s administrative records will be a key part of this, as will 
enhanced design of other non-market accountability levers. Yet even within the 
constraints of current administrative data the enhanced analysis, considerations, and 
comparative assessment set out in this chapter indicate that it is viable for UK policy 
makers to do better and offers a proposed way forwards.  
 

6 Jeopardising geography? The spatial patterning of Work 
Programme performance 
6.1 Chapter summary 
This chapter investigates the geography of incentives and performance in the Work 
Programme, assessing potential tensions between the spatially extensive Contract 
Package Areas (CPAs) and far smaller local labour market contexts within which 
providers and service users exist and act. The chapter asks: Is the geographical 
container of regional Contract Package Areas an appropriate spatial scale at which 
to build key elements of welfare-to-work programmes including upholding minimum 
performance levels and incentivising [competition between] providers? 
 
The analysis investigates variation in Work Programme performance between 
different geographic areas and at different geographic scales. One of the key criticisms 
levelled at previous work-first employment support schemes is that they entrench pre-
existing spatial inequalities (Peck, 1998; Turok and Webster, 1998; Sunley et al., 
2006). Indeed, the title for this chapter is adapted from Turok and Webster’s (1998, p. 
309) paper which asks whether Labour’s New Deal would be “jeopardised by the 
geography of unemployment?”, a concern that turned out empirically to be well 
founded (Sunley et al., 2001, 2006). The analysis in this chapter therefore assesses the 
nature and extent of spatial variation in programme performance as well as the 
relationship between local labour market context (considered at a range of geographic 
scales) and programme performance. This is investigated using descriptive statistics, 
mapping, and regression based approaches to deliver a spatially sensitive ‘contextual 
value added’ performance metric for Prime contractor performance taking into account 
other factors. 
 
6.2 Reprising the spatial logic of the Work Programme’s private power market 
Under the Work Programme’s private power market the intention and belief on the 
part of policy-makers is that the competitive forces within quasi-markets will keep 
prices low, ensure that the best, most efficient practices are adopted and that innovation 
will emerge and be swiftly mainstreamed (OECD, 2014). An inevitable and persistent 
challenge within such marketised systems, however, is the effective management of 
principal-agent relationships (Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008; Struyven and Steurs, 
2005). Increasingly, the challenge of steering provider behaviour has been pursued 
through the application of payment-by-results where providers are largely (and as per 
the later years of the Work Programme contract, only) paid following the delivery of 
specified, measurable social outcomes. This forms a conceptually and operationally 
straightforward backbone for programmes to direct and measure the performance and 
financial rewards of outsourced providers. Rhetorically the payment-by-results 
mechanism is frequently presented by politicians as a simplistic resolution to the 
principal-agent problem since “taxpayers only pay for results” (Duncan Smith in 
DWP, 2015). 
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Payment-by-results (particularly within a private power market) has been pursued 
more widely and positioned by UK government at the core of the public-service reform 
agenda (Cabinet Office, 2011). Central government protagonists have, however, 
explicitly noted that the approach must be pursued in a way that “align[s] incentives 
correctly between the provider and the public interest”, with a parallel 
acknowledgement that additional design complexity is required in order to prevent 
gaming (Cabinet Office, 2011, p. 33). As described in the previous chapters, the 
straightforward application of payment for results may not do justice to the full suite 
of programmatic objectives (as captured in Figure 3.7). Policy-makers, in their role as 
market-stewards, therefore recognise (to greater or lesser degrees) that it is necessary 
to add subtlety to the incentive structure through additional accountability levers and 
design tools. The implication then is that payment-by-results in a private power market 
is not a single mechanistic ‘fix’ which in and of itself will resolve issues of steering 
and incentives: there are other design prerogatives which need to be brought to bear in 
order to allow the market to operate without the commissioner being ‘played’ by 
providers. 
 
As noted above, the cost-minimising strategies which are expected to be pursued by 
profit-seeking providers in private power market arrangement are linked to particular 
risks. A considerable body of international literature has consistently raised fears that 
in lightly regulated, outsourced payment-by-results schemes, providers will respond 
to financial pressures and incentives by ‘creaming’ off easier to help participants 
whilst ‘parking’ those who are harder to help and hence less likely to trigger paid for 
outcomes (Carter and Whitworth, 2015; Considine et al., 2011; Struyven and Steurs, 
2005). Indeed, the challenge of unlocking the policy ambition of differentiated 
universalism sits at the heart of the preceding empirical chapter.  
 
Of particular relevance to this chapter, these concerns around ‘gaming’ through 
creaming and parking processes have however been highly individualised. Critics have 
asked whether payment-by-results incentive structures are appropriately calibrated to 
ensure that appropriate support is provided regardless of the level, complexity and cost 
of an individual’s labour market barriers (WPSC, 2013; Davies and Raikes, 2014; 
Holmes, 2014). Calibration of incentives at the level of individual programme 
participants has been a central preoccupation, both in terms of programme design (with 
hubristic claims made for the differential payment structure from programme 
designers (Carter and Whitworth, 2015)) and from those scrutinising the programme 
(PAC, 2012; WPSC, 2013).  
 
Considerably less well discussed however is the equivalent – but neglected – spatial 
dimension to these risks and needs. The geographical dimension of Work Programme 
functioning has received some limited coverage in think tank research (Davies and 
Raikes, 2014) but no detailed scrutiny from either government select committees or 
the academic community. The absence of geographical considerations in programme 
design and analysis is particularly surprising given the emphasis placed by academics 
on the need for a broader conception of employability that incorporates situation and 
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context (McQuaid et al., 2005; McQuaid and Lindsay, 2005) and the findings of 
previous research which suggest that the effectiveness of welfare-to-work policies – 
and in particular work first employment support  programmes – differ significantly 
across local labour markets (Sunley et al., 2006; Theodore, 2007; Turok and Webster, 
1998). This chapter responds to the overlooked spatial dimension in extant Work 
Programme analysis by considering the role of geography in mediating the 
effectiveness of programme incentives across space.   
 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds firstly by introducing key design features of the 
programme including the ‘geographical’ structure in terms of the crude, large-scale 
spatial containers within which provision is organised. The empirical material then 
explores the extent of spatial variation in Work Programme performance for cohorts 
receiving 2-full years of service provision (for participants who joined the programme 
from June 2011 – June 2014 inclusive) considering local contextual factors associated 
with performance. 
 
6.3 The geography of Work Programme incentives: contracts to tempt 
international providers versus meaningful local labour markets 
Before turning to an analysis of the geographical variations in Work Programme 
performance it is appropriate to unpick the potential for (and protections against) 
unevenness in programme performance across space. Sunley et al. (2006) suggest that 
the geographical outcomes of activation programmes can be understood as being 
driven by two sets of processes. Firstly, outcomes reflect programme governance: the 
ways in which central and local agencies interact and allocate resources, functions and 
responsibilities. The second set of processes is informed by “the interactions between 
the intended and unintended effects of the programme and local labour market 
conditions, which shape local outcomes” (Sunley et al., 2006, p. 19). This two part 
framing informs the discussion below, which begins with the geography of programme 
governance on paper whilst the empirics seek to reveal in practice the ways in which 
the anticipated spatial neutrality interacts with spatially uneven local labour market 
realities. 
 
The Work Programme operates from within an a-spatial understanding of the 
unemployment challenge. Its design is rooted in supply-side orthodoxy which presents 
unemployment as the result of individual’s ‘employability’ deficit (Crisp and Powell, 
2017). The onus of worklessness is placed squarely upon individuals and has been 
repeatedly framed by politicians as a cultural deficit (Grover, 2007; Slater, 2012; 
Wiggan, 2012) despite detailed evidence rebutting the presence of ‘dependency 
culture’ (Harkness et al., 2012; Macdonald et al., 2014). Structural aspects of persistent 
unemployment and poverty are marginalised in favour of a behavioural explanation 
(Slater, 2012; Wiggan, 2012). 
 
Despite the Work Programme’s a-spatial understandings of unemployment the 
governance of the programme does have a geography, of sorts: within the programme 
Britain is divided into 18 regional Contract Package Areas (CPAs) at which level 
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contracts are awarded to Prime providers. The CPAs are geographically large: all of 
Scotland sits as a single CPA for example (see Figure 6.1). 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Work Programme Contract Package Areas and Prime providers.  
Source: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130507013604/https:/www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uplo
ads/attachment_data/file/186922/cpa-preferred-bidders.pdf 
These CPAs represent the scale at which the tender contest for providers originally 
took place with two or three Prime providers contracted to operate within each CPA. 
For Freud – as noted above, a leading figure in UK activation redesign over the past 
decade due principally to his authoring of the key Freud Report (2007) and role from 
2010 as Minister for Welfare Reform – the large geographic extent of these contracts 
was intended to offer the large financial scale “appropriate to attract major players 
from around the world” who would have sufficient scale to arrange private finance and 
tap into investment from the banking community (2007, p. 63).  
 
The justification for these large scale contracts is fully aligned with the underlying 
programmatic logic of the private power market that to unlock stronger innovation and 
higher performance levels than has been seen in previous schemes the programme 
must unleash the entrepreneurialism of private providers. Through the Prime provider 
model the DWP sought to reduce the administrative complexity and costs of its 
contractual arrangements (in 2008 the department had 1,419 welfare-to-work contracts 
with over 580 contractors (WPSC, 2009)). The Department considered that the risks 
and cash flow implications inherent within its preferred outcome-based contracts 
 
Work Programme – Contract Package Area and Prime Provider  
Shetland Isles 
CUMBRIA & 
LANCASHIRE 
13 Wales – Working Links & Rehab 
3 West London – Ingeus, Reed & 
Maximus 
1 East of England – Ingeus & 
Seetec 
9 Thames Valley, Hampshire and Isle of Wight – 
A4e & Maximus 
10 Surrey, Sussex & Kent – 
Avanta & G4S 
5 North East – Avanta & Ingeus 
7 North, West and Greater 
Manchester, Cheshire & Warrington – 
Avanta, G4S & Seetec 
6 Merseyside, Halton, Cumbria and 
Lancashire – A4e & Ingeus 
11 Devon, Cornwall, Somerset & Dorset – 
Prospect Services & Working Links 
12 Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and West of England – 
Rehab & JHP Group Ltd 
14 Birmingham, Solihull & the Black Country – 
EOS, Pertemps People Development Group & 
Newcastle College 
15 Coventry, Warwickshire, 
Staffordshire and The Marches – 
Employability and Skills Group & Serco 2 East Midlands – A4e & Ingeus 
18 North East Yorkshire and the Humber – G4S  
& Newcastle College 
16 West Yorkshire – BEST & Ingeus 
17 South Yorkshire – A4e & Serco 
4 East London – A4e, Careers 
Development Group & Seetec 
8 Scotland – Working Links & Ingeus 
*Numbers refer to the Contract Package Area number 
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would best be carried by large ‘top-tier’ providers who would then manage “healthy, 
high performing supply chains” and where longer contracts would offer sufficient 
length (subject to performance) to enable long-term planning and investment (DWP, 
2008, p. 20). Crucially, this large regional geography was designed with an eye to 
attracting capitalised providers rather than because CPAs are the relevant, internally 
coherent and meaningful economic geography of Britain. 
 
At the level of countries and CPA regions the Work Programme bidding process built 
in the potential for Prime providers to anticipate cross-regional variation in the ease 
of achieving employment outcomes. Primes were able to offer discounts on the value 
of job outcome payments in their bid proposals. The understanding was that Primes 
would offer more sizeable discounts in regions with more buoyant labour markets 
where it was expected to be cheaper (in aggregate) to support programme participants 
into work (Holmes, 2014). Importantly, this discounting occurred at the level of the 
CPA only and there is no variation in pricing below these extensive contract areas. 
 
Arguably, on paper the differential payment structure exerted across individual 
programme participants (the payment groups discussed in the preceding chapter) may 
accommodate some variation in the compositional characteristics of people who are 
long-term unemployed from place to place. Crucially, however, and as evidenced in 
Chapter 5, the differential payment system is known to be highly imperfect as a tool 
for calibrating appropriate support for participants with more complex or compound 
support needs. Further, the payment-by-results system takes no account of sub-CPA 
contextual demand-side factors. Spatial variability and parking are in this context just 
as much a risk – even if a largely neglected risk in current policy analysis – as 
individual variation and parking. Indeed, the interaction of ‘hard to help’ people’ with 
‘hard to help’ places represents a potential ‘double whammy’ of currently unexplored 
risk in such activation programmes.  
 
Looking back across the academic discussion surrounding the rise of outsourced 
welfare-to-work interventions first articulated in the 1990s it is perhaps surprising that 
the geography of labour markets and the spatial variation of programme successes 
have not been more fully considered in the latest wave of programme design. Peck, 
largely informed by the US experience (though helpfully so, given the rate of trans-
Atlantic policy transfer that has occurred), concluded as early as 1998 that the 
successes of and indeed variability of work-first activation models is “predicated on a 
very particular set of local conditions” (Peck, 1998, p. 553). A comprehensive UK 
investigation into the geography of New Labour’s New Deal for Young People 
similarly found that the performance for this suite of interventions varied significantly 
between different local labour market areas across Britain and in particular had been 
markedly less effective in inner-urban and depressed industrial labour markets (Sunley 
et al., 2001, 2006). A key conclusion from this work as well as official policy 
evaluations (Beale et al., 2008) is that the issue of local labour demand – both in terms 
of the volume and range of jobs available – is vital within such schemes. Absence of 
demand locally cannot be assumed away as self-correcting. 
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Given this previous experience of spatial variation in performance, both internationally 
and in the British context, it is helpful to reflect on the ways that local labour market 
conditions were discussed by officials and ministers in the early phases of Work 
Programme design, commissioning and delivery. Post-2010 there has been a partial 
acknowledgement in the UK policy context that there is sub-regional variation in local 
labour market conditions and that these may intersect with welfare-to-work 
programming: “typically every single one of these regions [CPAs] has more variation 
in unemployment inside it than there is between regions” (Devereux, 2012 in PAC, 
2012: Ev19). Yet whilst variation across labour markets is acknowledged, there is no 
explicit attempt to calibrate pricing or performance metrics and processes to reflect the 
relative differences in difficulty of transitioning to employment in different local 
contexts, nor are any other accountability mechanisms brought to bear on mitigating 
the potential for sub-regional performance variation. 
 
The absence of design features to account for sub-CPA labour market variation has 
been justified along two lines. Firstly, Robert Devereux, Permanent Secretary for the 
DWP (from January 2011 – January 2018) has stressed that: “…everybody [Primes] 
is having to manage areas that have got hotspots and very difficult labour markets” 
(Devereux, 2012 in PAC, 2012: Ev19). In essence, CPAs – at an aggregate level – are 
seen by DWP as ‘equal’ in the sense that each contains some difficult labour markets 
and, therefore, on the basis of CPA-level performance monitoring sub-regional 
variation is of little or no consequence. Secondly, and contrastingly, a former DWP 
minister has argued that locally differential payments would bring excessive 
complexity to the system (Grayling, 2011 in WPSC, 2011). Under this view the spatial 
variation in labour market context does not warrant the additional complexity that a 
local-corrective was perceived to entail, though clearly the variations across 
individuals were deemed worthy of response via the differential payments model. 
 
Large regional CPAs therefore continue as the only contractually relevant geography 
to Primes since they are the scale at which performance levels are calculated and any 
breach of minimum performance levels is judged. It is at the CPA level that the on-
going ‘competition’ between primes through market share shift to higher-performing 
providers takes place (Lane et al., 2013). Crucially, it is only at this aggregate CPA 
scale that performance ‘matters’ in the sense that it is only at the CPA level that 
performance is assessed by DWP and has contractual and financial ramifications.  
 
Variation in performance levels within CPAs is not part of formal performance or 
contractual monitoring. There is no flexibility to adjust pricing to accommodate 
changing economic conditions or local labour market factors within the contracting 
areas. In sum, while Work Programme is nationally uniform in terms of participant 
eligibility, referral mechanisms and payment model there is no explicit commitment 
to horizontal spatial equity. In the programmatic intention to narrow the gap “in 
employment rates for disadvantaged groups and everyone else” (DWP, 2010a, p. 4) 
the experience of ‘disadvantage’ is never fully described nor explicitly acknowledged 
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as an experience that might vary over space. Spatial variation may however implicitly 
and insidiously undercut the ambition to close the gaps in employment rates. Sub-CPA 
spatial variation in performance is effectively ‘invisible’ – and designed to be invisible 
– within contractual arrangements, despite a considerable body of evidence indicating 
that local context matters in the achievement of job outcomes. Any patterning of 
performance below the CPA level is unlikely to be detected given that it is not being 
looked for and there are neither financial sticks nor carrots through which to mitigate 
such spatialised variation in performance where it occurs. Spatial variation and 
spatialised parking emerge as significant risks in this policy context. 
 
In the Work Programme’s private power market, by specifying only outcomes to be 
achieved government commissioners absolve themselves from designing the 
programme’s response to need and there is no assurance that wherever a person resides 
uniform standards of treatment will be received. Proponents of payment-by-results 
may argue that this is a benefit of the approach and that locally specific interventions, 
tailored appropriately to respond to local context, is enabled. This flexibility is 
undoubtedly unlocked. But the more pertinent question is whether the failure to 
include geographical considerations in programme design enables (and potentially 
encourages) spatially variegated risks and programme performance. 
 
The programme logics on paper may then interact in anticipated (for academics and 
commentators) or unanticipated (for the political sponsors of Work Programme) ways 
with local labour market conditions to shape outcomes. There is a clear risk that the 
failure to calibrate for locally varied labour market contexts will work against the 
programmatic ambition to reduce gaps in performance outcomes between the easier- 
and harder-to-help neighbourhoods and areas.  
 
Not only is this spatial unevenness in outcomes of concern for those interested in 
differentiated universalism and equity. Spatially varying programme performance is 
also relevant for the Work Programme’s internal logic of ‘value for money’ (Carter 
and Whitworth, 2015). If the programme is experiencing variation in the spatial 
distribution of ‘results’ such that a greater volume of employment outcomes are being 
triggered and paid for in ‘easier’ local contexts then the commissioner must be 
systematically overpaying for these outcomes, since payment levels relate to average 
costs and outcome likelihoods. If a process of procyclical spatial performance 
variation is occurring then this has the potential to undermine the logic of the payment-
by-results mechanism itself. 
 
6.4 From paper to practice: is there spatial variation in performance? 
If the Work Programme’s design had worked in accordance with the presumed 
regional labour market functioning of the scheme designers, it would be expected that 
the programme would show comparable levels of job outcome success in the CPAs 
across Britain. The aggregate job outcome rates for the four largest (by way of 
participant numbers) payment groups 1, 2, 3 and 6 are represented with the green 
triangle markers in Figure 6.2 for each of the 18 CPAs.  
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Figure 6.2 Job outcome rates within alternative spatial scales: CPA, contract and local authority 
In practice then there is some variation across the regions although the standard 
deviation in CPA-level job outcome rate is never larger than 3.3 for any of the payment 
groups (Figure 6.3). There is however a notable gap between the better and worse 
performing contract package areas. Thames Valley and Hampshire (CPA 9), Surrey, 
Sussex and Kent (CPA 10)) and Greater Manchester (CPA 6) are consistently amongst 
the better performing contract areas. By contrast, the worst performing CPAs are 
typically Scotland, Wales and parts of Northern England (North East Yorkshire and 
Humber (CPA 18) and West Yorkshire (CPA 16)). There is less variation across the 
CPAs in the performance of the health-related ESA payment group 6 compared to the 
JSA-related payment groups. 
 
 
Mean CPA 
job outcome 
rate 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum 
CPA rate 
Maximum 
CPA rate 
Percentage 
point gap 
(max-min) 
Payment group 1 42.98 2.57 39.02 47.58 8.57 
Payment group 2 37.29 3.22 32.43 44.90 12.47 
Payment group 3 32.61 3.28 25.43 37.84 12.41 
Payment group 6 15.32 1.97 12.00 18.65 6.65 
Figure 6.3 CPA-level job outcome rates, descriptive statistics (N = 18) 
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Even at this regional scale, therefore, spatial variation exists and the Work Programme 
does not fully break out of the persistent and entrenched regional spatial economic 
imbalance of the UK, where London and its surrounds have been dominant since the 
middle of the nineteenth century (Crafts, 2005; Gardiner et al., 2013). 
 
Within each of the CPAs the Prime’s contract level job outcome rate is marked by the 
red Xs (Figure 6.2). There are statistically significant differences between Prime 
contractors operating in the same CPA (Dorsett and Lucchino, 2016). What is notable 
here is the substantively small variation in performance between the contracts inside 
each CPA. Figure 6.4 provides detail on the performance gap between the best and 
worst performing contracts inside each CPA by payment group. On average, within 
each contract there is only a 2 percentage point gap in job outcome rate between the 
best and worst performing Prime contract. This suggests that when judged at the level 
of CPA there is little differentiation between the performance of alternative Prime 
providers.  
 
 
Mean contract 
performance gap within 
CPA 
Minimum gap in 
contract 
performance 
Maximum gap in 
contract 
performance 
Payment group 1 1.71 0.16 3.62 
Payment group 2 1.92 0.01 5.43 
Payment group 3 2.16 0.51 4.48 
Payment group 6 2.07 0.48 5.46 
Figure 6.4 Job outcome performance gap between contracts within each CPA 
The contract performance figures presented here incorporate the variation in 
participant volumes across providers driven by the market share shift mechanism 
(which took effect from 5 August 2013, (DWP, 2017b)) which, if anything, would be 
expected to amplify the performance gap between ‘better’ and ‘worse’ performing 
providers. The DWP is artificially animating market competition according to the 
variation in contract performance within CPAs, which is actually smaller than the 
variation across CPAs at a national level (i.e. comparing variation in red Xs within a 
CPA to the divergence in CPA aggregate performance across Britain).  
 
Figure 6.2 also plots the job outcome rates at local authority level within each of the 
CPAs, shown by the navy dot markers. Two local authorities: Isles of Scilly and City 
of London are removed from all of the analysis shown in this chapter due to very low 
cell counts (fewer than 10 participants in one or more payment groups). What is 
striking about the 378 local authority job outcome rates is the high degree of 
performance variation both nationally and within each of the CPAs. The percentage 
point gap between the best and worst performing local authorities nationally is 25.6 
for payment group 6 but is over 30 for the other core payment groups (see Figure 6.5). 
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Mean local 
authority job 
outcome rate 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum 
local 
authority rate 
Maximum 
local 
authority rate 
Percentage 
point gap 
(max-min) 
Payment group 
1 
44.51 5.23 30.32 64.89 34.57 
Payment group 
2 
39.07 5.00 24.15 54.84 30.69 
Payment group 
3 
35.16 6.26 20.82 58.82 38.00 
Payment group 
6 
16.36 3.98 6.61 32.17 25.56 
Figure 6.5 Description of Local Authority job outcome performance variation (N = 378) 
Hence, spatial variation in job outcome performance rates is markedly greater at the 
individual local authority level than at CPA or contract scale. The standard deviation 
in job outcome rate for payment group 1 and 6 at local authority level is more than 
double that of the standard deviation across CPAs. And each of the CPAs contains 
enormous variation in local authority job outcome rates. 
 
Importantly, not only is the key payment-by-results model a-spatial but the contractual 
Minimum Performance Levels (MPLs) and other performance metrics and processes 
for prime providers are specified at CPA level. These performance metrics are 
contractually specified for payment groups 1, 2 and 6 whilst performance expectations 
are specified through illustrative indicators for other payment groups. These MPLs set 
the number of job outcomes a provider must achieve in a year, as a proportion of the 
number of referrals the provider receives in that year (DWP, 2010a; Lester, 2013). The 
calculation of MPLs has been highly criticised (UK Statistics Authority, 2013; CESI, 
2013; OECD, 2014) particularly as the metric is not comparable over time and since 
the numerator and denominator are not temporally aligned. Changes in referral 
patterns can impact the annual MPL (a pattern of declining referrals will make 
performance appear better, irrespective of ‘actual’ performance) (CESI, 2013; Lester, 
2013). The DWP has adjusted the metrics used for performance monitoring over time 
and increasingly utilises a ‘transparency indicator’ which calculates the proportion of 
individuals in each monthly intake to reach three/six months in work during their first 
year (DWP, n.d.). Nevertheless, minimum expected performance levels for providers 
are still measured and monitored at the level of the contract and function as an indicator 
of unacceptably low performance in the DWP’s eyes. The DWP expects providers to 
significantly exceed these minimum levels and failure to achieve them is punishable 
by contractual action, including contract termination (DWP, 2010).  
 
The Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion have produced minimum benchmark 
job outcome measures equivalent to the MPLs and these are reproduced in Figure 6.6. 
This provides an overall job outcome measure, capturing the average proportion of 
participants achieving a job outcome, for all those who have completed the programme 
 164 
and so this is equivalent to the job outcome rates produced by the author across the 
thesis.  
 
 
Overall job outcome 
measure (%), equivalent 
minimum benchmark 
PG 1 - JSA 18 to 24 38 
PG 2 - JSA 25 and over 29 
PG 3 - JSA early entrant 19 
PG 6 - New ESA claimants 18 
Figure 6.6 Equivalent minimum performance benchmarks, reproduced from CESI, 2013 
Within payment groups 1, 2 and 6 there are a number of local authorities which are 
breaching the minimum benchmarks equivalent to the MPLs. Importantly, for payment 
groups 1, 2 and 3 at CPA level (and contract level) none of the Prime contracts have 
performance that sits below these minimum thresholds. For payment group 6 there are 
contracts which flout this baseline minima at CPA level and indeed the poor 
performance of payment group 6 has been a considerable concern throughout live 
running (Riley et al., 2014; Davies and Raikes, 2014; Quirke, 2015; WPSC, 2015). 
What is more striking is that for payment groups 1 and 2, and inevitably for payment 
group 6, many local authorities are experiencing job outcome rates below these 
minimum benchmarks. There are a considerable number of local authorities which, 
were contractual performance to be judged at this scale, would be breaching the 
specified contractual minima and where Primes would therefore be subject to targeted 
performance management intervention from DWP and under threat of contract 
termination. Importantly, however, because the contractual agreements are sited at the 
level of CPAs these local authorities with unacceptably low job outcome performance 
are contractually invisible since they are diluted, concealed and deemed irrelevant 
within the CPA aggregate performance figures. 
 
6.5 Understanding contract performance variation or routes to ‘winning’ 
within the Work Programme incentive structure 
As noted above, in the Work Programme key aspects of the incentive structure, both 
carrots (winning market share shift) and sticks (breach of contractual MPLs), are sited 
at the level of CPA. The risk and danger is that in conjunction with the considerable 
flexibilities afforded by the private power market Primes can be judged as market 
leaders irrespective of their spatial behaviours and outcomes, despite programmatic 
commitments to narrow gaps.  
 
Reflecting specifically on the ways in which Primes might achieve high aggregate job 
outcome performance at CPA level, this might be achieved by enhancing job outcome 
rates in what are already better performing local areas, enhancing performance in more 
challenging local labour market contexts or, indeed, spatially parking those more 
challenging local labour market contexts and focusing scarce resources on ‘easier’ 
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local labour market areas. All might in principle lead to upwards shifts in aggregate 
CPA performance, but all are clearly not equal in terms of their spatial (and, within 
these spaces, individual) impacts. 
 
Figure 6.7 to Figure 6.10 plot the relationship between aggregate contract performance 
rates and three within-CPA performance metrics: firstly, the percentage point 
performance gap between the best and worst performing local authorities within the 
contract; secondly, the job outcome rate in the best performing local authority (i.e. 
performance at the ‘top end’); and, thirdly, the job outcome rate in the worst 
performing local authority within the contract (low end performance).  
 
 
Figure 6.7 Within Prime contract local area performance variation for payment group 1 
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Figure 6.8 Within Prime contract local area performance variation for payment group 2 
 
Figure 6.9 Within Prime contract local area performance variation for payment group 3 
 167 
 
Figure 6.10 Within Prime contract local area performance variation for payment group 6 
Across none of the payment groups is there a particularly clear relationship between 
aggregate contract performance and the gap between better- and worse-performing 
local authorities. There is a slight upward trend across each of the contract-level 
indicators. When tested as explanatory variables the relationships are not sufficient to 
suggest that improved aggregate performance at contract level has been achieved in 
conjunction with widening spatial inequality. However, the absence of clear 
associations does suggest that it is possible to ‘win’ and be a better performing Prime 
contract at CPA level without closing the gap in performance across local authority 
areas and without driving better performance in less well performing areas.  
 
These figures, in conjunction with further statistical tests for the strength of association 
(not shown), indicate that contract allocation is not a strong predictor of local area 
performance. The following section begins to unpick these issues further by 
investigating other factors which might be associated with spatial variation in Work 
Programme performance. 
 
6.6 Predictable patterns of success? Mapping Work Programme performance 
at local authority level 
Beyond the wide variation in local authority job outcome performance, for those 
familiar with the economic geography of Britain the performance follows a clear 
spatial pattern. For reference a map indicating local authority deprivation levels across 
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Britain is shown in Figure 6.11 where lower levels of deprivation are indicated with 
paler shading.  
 
Figure 6.12 toFigure 6.15 map the job outcome rate for each of the core payment 
groups at local authority level across Great Britain. In each map, local authority job 
outcome performance is shaded according to performance quintiles. The darker 
shading indicates those with lower performance (with the darkest shading representing 
the 20 percent of local authorities experiencing the worst job outcome performance 
rates) and lighter shading signifying those areas with above average performance (and 
with white shading representing the 20 percent of local authorities with the highest job 
outcome rates). 
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Figure 6.11 Local authority deprivation across Britain, standardised indicator sourced from CRESR and produced 
as described in Abel et al., (2016) 
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Figure 6.12 Proportion of payment group 1 participants achieving job outcomes at local authority level 
 171 
 
Figure 6.13 Proportion of payment group 2 participants achieving job outcomes at local authority level 
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Figure 6.14 Proportion of payment group 3 participants achieving job outcomes at local authority level 
 173 
 
Figure 6.15 Proportion of payment group 6 participants achieving job outcomes at local authority level 
Across each of the maps the places with the weakest job outcome performance are 
predominantly found in the de-industrialising areas of Northern England, Scotland and 
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the Welsh Valleys. Seaside towns and to a lesser extent some inner city areas also 
appear to be performing poorly. Contrastingly, a large band in the South East 
surrounding London contains almost all of the best performing authority areas. Whilst 
by no means perfectly aligned, the overlaps between locality deprivation and Work 
programme performance are evident visually. 
 
6.7 Making sense of the variation 
In order to promote a further understanding of this spatial patterning a series of 
potential independent variables were considered for inclusion in regression analysis, 
the intention being to identify those contextual variables that would contribute to the 
successful prediction of job outcome performance levels for local authorities.  
 
Figure 6.16 and Figure 6.17 show the relationship between local authority job outcome 
performance and two key local authority explanatory variables. The first of these, 
shown in the upper panels, is the relative deprivation of the local authority. This is 
captured through the population weighted index of multiple deprivation scores for 
component small areas, standardised across Britain by Abel et al. (2016). Higher 
values indicate authorities with a higher incidence of local area deprivation. The 
second local authority variable explored is the percentage of the local authority 
working age population who have been referred to participate in the Work Programme 
(shown in the lower panes). Since programme eligibility is framed around long-term 
unemployment this proportion can be understood as capturing the incidence of long-
term unemployment and hence the intensity of ‘need’ for the programme within the 
authority area. The working age population figure is calculated using the mean ONS 
mid-year population estimate for 2011 – 2014 sourced through NOMIS.  
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Figure 6.16 Association between job outcome rates and i) local authority deprivation; and ii) proportion of working 
age population participating in the Work Programme, for payment groups 1 and 2 
 
Figure 6.17 Association between job outcome rates and i) local authority deprivation; and ii) proportion of working 
age population participating in the Work Programme, for payment groups 3 and 6 
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The negative relationships between the indicators of local authority deprivation and 
need and programme performance visualised in Figure 6.16 and Figure 6.17 are 
confirmed using simple bivariate regression analysis (Figure 6.18). The predictive 
power of local context is stronger for the mainstream JSA groups (for payment group 
2 the indicators separately account for over one-fifth of the variation in performance 
(R2 = 0.219 and 0.202)) and local area context appears to be a less powerful predictor 
for the performance of payment group 6 (here the R2 = 0.128 and 0.074), though the 
predictive power is understandably weaker given that there is less variation in the 
performance of payment group 6 which is almost universally poor.  
 
The significance and gradient of the slopes in Figure 6.16 and Figure 6.17 is captured 
through the bivariate regression table in Figure 6.18 where the coefficient for each of 
the models gives a sense of the likely change in job outcome rates as we move across 
local authorities with different levels of deprivation and long term unemployment 
rates. For mainstream JSA participants in payment group 2, a single percentage point 
increase in the proportion of the local working age population participating in Work 
Programme is on average associated with a 1.2 percentage point reduction in the job 
outcome rate. Similar relationships hold for the other JSA payment groups 1 (JSA 18 
– 24) and 3 (JSA early access), where a one percentage point increase in participation 
rates is associated with an average of -0.994 (payment group 1) or -1.753 (payment 
group 3) percentage point drop in job outcome performance. The gradient for the new 
Employment and Support Allowance participants in payment group 6, i.e. those who 
are newly in receipt of health and disability related unemployment benefits, is 
markedly shallower at -0.591. For this group the gap in job outcome rates between 
local authorities with a low-incidence of long-term unemployment and those with a 
higher long-term unemployment rate is less sizeable.  
 
The indicator for local authority deprivation, the weighted average adjusted IMD 
score, ranges from 3.4 (least deprived) to 39.8 (for the most deprived local authority). 
A one unit increase in this deprivation measure is consistently associated with a 
statistically significant reduction in local authority job outcome rates across all the 
payment groups with relatively similar effect sizes between roughly -0.2 and -0.4 
percentage point reduction in job outcome rates.  
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Local authority deprivation Proportion of working age 
population referred to 
programme 
Payment group 1 
B-coefficient -0.259 *** -0.994 *** 
Constant 49.084 *** 47.994 *** 
Observations 378 
 
378 
 
R-squared 0.147 
 
0.121 
 
Payment group 2 
B-coefficient -0.302 *** -1.230 *** 
Constant 44.394 *** 43.378 *** 
Observations 378 
 
378 
 
R-squared 0.219 
 
0.202 
 
Payment group 3 
B-coefficient -0.404 *** -1.753 *** 
Constant 42.297 *** 41.296 *** 
Observations 378 
 
378 
 
R-squared 0.250 
 
0.262 
 
Payment group 6 
B-coefficient -0.183 *** -0.591 *** 
Constant 19.595 *** 18.429 *** 
Observations 378 
 
378 
 
R-squared 0.128 
 
0.074 
 
Figure 6.18 Exploring local authority Work Programme performance. Outcome variable is job outcome rate *** 
p < 0.001 
Taken together, on average the more challenging a local area is in terms of long-term 
unemployment and deprivation the lower the Work Programme job outcome rate. This 
is a counter-intuitive investment pattern for a programme seeking to best support those 
furthest from the labour market. 
 
The implications of this patterning are spelled out in Figure 6.19 which uses the 
programmes own payment-by-results logic to investigate performance patterns. There 
is no official single metric which comprehensively captures programme performance. 
An all-inclusive metric would need to convey the ‘value’ of outcomes across a series 
of programme priorities capturing not only job outcomes but also the duration of 
sustainment and moreover valuing job outcomes differently according to individuals’ 
relative distance to the labour market. Ultimately the programme’s payment-by-results 
structure itself provides a key framework through which to trace this complex mix of 
performance priorities. Guided by the incentive structure a single measure traces the 
maximum potential extent of payment (i.e. should every programme participant in an 
area achieve full payable job and sustainment outcomes according to their payment 
group and sustainment payment cap). Following the logic of payment-by-results, 
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‘better’ performance ought to be equated with a higher level of disbursement against 
the potential payment pot. ‘Proportion of potential PbR achieved’ then conveys the 
ratio of achieved (and paid for) outcomes to the maximum potential within local 
authorities and Figure 6.19 shows the relationship between this aggregate metric of 
success and the two indicators of local need and deprivation.  
 
 
Figure 6.19 Variation in local authority payment-by-results 'success' by deprivation and proportion of programme 
participants amongst the working age population 
The negative direction, relatively large effect size and high statistical significance of 
these effects shown in Figure 6.20 is particularly concerning. Aggregate programme 
performance is shown to be systematically weaker in those areas in which programme 
successes are most needed, be that expressed through high levels of long-term 
unemployment (right hand pane Figure 6.19) or greater extent of deprivation within 
the local area (left hand pane). Instead, as the need for Work Programme success to 
narrow spatial gaps increases the performance of the programme worsens: a spatially 
perverse result contrary to programmatic commitments and re-inscribing pre-existing 
patterns of geographical local labour market disadvantage.  
  
 179 
 
 
 
Local authority 
deprivation 
Proportion of working 
age population 
referred to 
programme 
B-coefficient -0.225 *** -0.802 *** 
Constant 34.287 *** 33.132 *** 
Observations 378 
 
378 
 
R-squared 0.220 
 
0.156 
 
Figure 6.20 Exploring variation in local authority payment-by-results 'success' by deprivation and proportion of 
programme participants amongst the working age population. Outcome variable is proportion of potential PbR 
achieved 
6.8 Putting people in their place 
Knowing that the Work Programme’s payment groups are poor proxies for person-
level characteristics (Chapter 5), a potential criticism of the analysis presented above 
is that the work may be conflating individual and area-level effects and overstating the 
latter.  
 
Area-level or ‘neighbourhood’ effects are notoriously difficult to identify as they are 
located and constituted amongst a number of circuitous and interrelated multi-level 
social processes (Buck, 2001). Indeed, questions have been raised as to whether it is 
appropriate to seek to partition the “false dualism” of context and composition since 
there is likely a mutually reinforcing relationship between people and place (Cummins 
et al., 2007, p. 1835). Nevertheless there seems little doubt that neighbourhood effects 
exist (Ellen and Turner, 1997; van Ham et al., 2012b; Dorling, 2001). 
 
In order to ‘put people in their place’, Figure 6.21 gives an indication of the degree to 
which local context may matter independently from and in addition to person-level 
characteristics. This analysis reproduces the model used to predict job outcome 
likelihood developed in the preceding chapter but uses only characteristics sited at the 
level of the person and household (blocks of variables related to benefit history; 
employment history; health and disability; household and caring obligations). These 
are effectively ‘individual level’ predicted probabilities. Bands of people with the 
same individual level probabilities (i.e. the ten percent of participants estimated to be 
the most-likely to enter sustained employment given their personal characteristics, the 
middle ten percent, and bottom ten percent) are then identified and their job outcome 
rates are produced across deciles of local area unemployment benefit claimant rate. 
For example, the first blue bar on the left indicates the job outcome rate for individuals 
within the top ten percent of person-level predicted probabilities and who live in the 
ten percent of local authority areas with the lowest unemployment rates (captured by 
claimant rates). 
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In Figure 6.21 the downward gradient is clear for all levels of individual-level 
predicted probabilities. This is as would be expected from the previous regression 
analysis where explanatory variables capturing local area context retain significance 
when included alongside individual-level characteristics. Individual-level 
characteristics and experiences emerge as likely stronger predictors of job outcome 
success but place clearly ‘matters’. What can also be seen is that ‘place matters’ to a 
different extent depending on where individuals sit within the distribution of person-
level predicted probabilities. There seems to be a non-linear interaction effect at play: 
local area context matters less for individuals with low personal predicted probabilities 
than for those whose individual-level characteristics make them likely candidates for 
(re)entering and sustaining paid work. Even amongst participants whose individual 
characteristics suggest they are close to work there is not a clear linear decay in job 
outcome likelihoods across local area context. 
 
 
Figure 6.21 Plotting job outcome rates for 'people in place' 
6.9 Discussion: controlling for composition and context 
The flexibilities of the private power market, in conjunction with the general absence 
of contextual considerations in the design of key programme steering mechanisms, has 
left the Work Programme susceptible to spatial variation in performance. In practice 
there is highly variegated programme job outcome performance across Britain. The 
Work Programme’s geography of incentives is structured around two levels – at the 
level of the individual (since the bulk of payments are made once an individual 
achieves and sustains a job outcome) and at the level of the large scale regional CPAs 
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(where contractual performance expectations are set and assessed and where ‘high 
performance’ within each CPA is rewarded through market share shift).  
 
Job outcome performance does vary across these extensive CPA regions and 
performance is consistently higher in more buoyant regions surrounding London and 
the South East. Competition is orchestrated between the two or three Prime providers 
operating within each of these CPAs but performance variation across contracts is 
small when compared to the variation in job outcome rates between local authorities 
within each CPA. Because the contractual agreements are sited at the level of CPA 
those local authorities with unacceptably low job outcome performance are 
contractually invisible, even if of significant spatial policy concern given their low 
performance, since they are diluted and concealed within the CPA aggregate 
performance figures. 
 
As a result, there are three serious concerns around the current reliance on such large, 
undifferentiated regional CPAs as a unit for constructing key programme steering 
tools. Firstly, since the contractual minimum performance levels are standardised 
across Britain and this unadjusted national standard is applied indiscriminately, there 
is a risk that Primes are judged as ‘underperforming’ when their lower aggregate 
performance at the level of CPA may be informed by lower prevailing levels of a 
demand across a particular region. Providers in regions of higher unemployment are 
likely to find it more challenging to achieve job outcome rates at a level above the 
nationally set targets. Indeed, the OECD (2014, p. 201) note that “a provider might 
underperform against MPLs when in fact their performance is good” whilst providers 
in areas with better-performing labour markets might coast to performance above the 
MPLs. As a result the sanctions for underperformance may not be applied 
appropriately. 
 
Secondly, and relatedly, none of the official programme performance indicators allow 
for meaningful comparison of performance between CPAs nationally. While it is 
possible to compare performance across the two or three Prime providers within the 
same CPA (as participants are randomly allocated between the providers) “it is not 
clear whether they are both high- or low-performers” (OECD, 2014, p. 28). Average 
job outcome rates do vary across the CPAs and according to current performance 
monitoring approaches adopted by the DWP it is not clear to what extent this reflects 
genuine variation in provider performance or, rather, differences in regional context 
and labour market characteristics. 
 
Thirdly, and more substantively, the Work Programme design makes no attempt to 
neutralise the far greater variation in difficulty in entering the labour market within 
CPAs. The empirical findings presented above indicate stark sub-regional patterning 
in performance where more deprived local authority areas with proportionally larger 
long-term unemployed populations are experiencing significantly worse performance 
than more economically buoyant areas. The programme’s structure of regional CPA 
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competition and contractual minima appear to have done nothing to mitigate these 
spatial inequalities, nor would they be expected to function in this way.  
 
While these patterns are consistent with a process of spatialised creaming and parking, 
from the available data it is not possible to determine whether this procyclical variation 
in performance – where better outcomes are achieved and paid for where they are 
needed least – has occurred due to the cynical and systematic behaviour of providers 
or because, despite provider efforts, outcomes are consistently harder and hence less-
likely to be achieved in some parts of Britain. Nonetheless, it is clear that the high 
degree of spatial variation matters for participant outcomes. Given what is known 
about the well-being effects of non-meaningful activation interventions (Carter and 
Whitworth, 2017) this leaves participants living in deprived areas particularly 
vulnerable. The failure to calibrate for locally varied labour market contexts works 
against the programmatic ambition to reduce gaps in performance outcomes between 
the easier- and harder-to-help neighbourhoods and areas. 
 
In sum, the undifferentiated geographical container of regional Contract Package 
Areas does not appear to be functioning as an appropriate geographical unit to uphold 
minimum performance standards or incentivise providers towards the pursuit of 
programmatic objectives. Potential responses to this situation can be contemplated on 
two fronts: there is a need to consider a more appropriate indicator of provider 
performance, which is sensitive to context; and there is the need for a re-scaling of 
tools to incentivise provider behaviours at a level below the CPA. 
 
Turning to the first of these, there is a need to move beyond an ‘unadjusted’ indicator 
of performance to a metric which is sensitive to context in making performance 
comparisons. In the UK, a similar challenge has been tackled in the presentation of 
examination results for schools. The danger here is that through an unadjusted 
comparison of average examination results schools in less deprived areas who have 
higher attaining pupils at intake will tend to score more highly in absolute terms 
irrespective of the effectiveness of the schooling provided (Leckie and Goldstein, 
2016). Differences in schools’ pass rates are “too often attributed solely to a supposed 
difference in the educational effectiveness of the two schools” (Leckie and Goldstein, 
2016, p. 4). From 2006 – 2010 UK Government sought to better separate schools’ 
‘true’ effects from the composition and context of their intakes using a regression-
based ‘contextual value-added’ (CVA) approach. 
 
Relatedly, the Job Services Australia model advances a form of performance 
measurement system which is sensitive to local labour market conditions as well as 
jobseeker characteristics. The “Star Ratings” system uses statistical regression analysis 
to allow the comparison of provider performances across Australia. By controlling for 
a set of established job seeker and labour market characteristics which impact most on 
the achievement of job outcomes, the Star Ratings model calculates the performance 
“providers could reasonably be expected to have achieved given the unique set of job 
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seekers they have assisted in their specific labour market” (Australian Government, 
2012, p. 2). 
 
Figure 6.22 shows the output from a prototype of Contextual Value Added 
performance for the Work Programme by introducing ‘contracts’ as dummy variables 
alongside the fully specified individual-level model to predict job outcomes developed 
in Chapter 5. This approach then controls for a detailed set of programme participant 
characteristics, an indicator of local area deprivation, and labour market conditions. 
Any ‘effect’ carried by the contract dummy variables can be understood as identifying 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ relative performance, compared to the expected level of performance 
for the specific cohort and operating environment of the contract. The model is 
constructed as a binary logistic regression model and the ‘reference’ for the contract 
dummy variables is contract 1. In the exploratory analysis shown in Figure 6.22, the 
interpretation of odds ratios on the contracts is made in reference to contract 1, which 
in itself is a higher performing contract. 
 
In Figure 6.22, moving down the pane the contracts are ordered from ‘worst’ to ‘best’ 
performance (the blue bars) according to DWP’s current assessment of performance, 
which is built only using payment groups and contracts. By contrast, the red bars 
represent an indicator of CVA – that is holding the full set of explanatory variables 
constant. Notably, the ‘best performing’ contract under the current assessment 
approach (contract 22) is not the best performing when controlling for composition 
and context. There are also a series of contracts where raw performance is well below 
the performance of the reference contract (i.e. blue bars are a considerable distance 
below an odds ratio of 1, where the dashed line indicates performance comparable to 
the reference contract) but where the red bars are nearly touching the reference line. 
These contracts are those which might be seen as ‘underperforming’ on the basis of 
current performance metrics but which are in ‘contextual value added’ terms 
performing comparably well. 
 
The ‘Contextual Value Added’ approach piloted here begins to offer a more 
appropriate route to make comparisons of contractual performance across Britain and 
hence offers a more sensible basis on which to consider grounds for performance 
management interventions, contract extension or termination. However, provided that 
this approach is applied only at the level of CPA then such a metric in itself will do 
nothing to better calibrate incentives to counteract the important variation in context 
within the contract areas. To incentivise providers to work more intensively in less 
promising local labour markets within CPAs a series of reforms to the operation of the 
market structure and contracting is required.  
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Figure 6.22 Alternative measures of contract performance: a 'Contextual Value Added' for Work Programme Prime 
providers 
 185 
To achieve this contextual sensitivity and incentivise providers to work against the 
grain of pre-existing spatial inequalities, the unit of performance assessment and 
incentives will need to be substantially reduced in geographic extent. For example, in 
the 2015 Australian Star Ratings 751 distinct office areas are incorporated within the 
Star Rating analysis, noting that the working age populations of the UK and Australia 
are broadly similar, at 64.92 and 66.46 million respectively (OECD, 2018).  
 
There are then choices as to whether to ‘steer’ on an ongoing marketised basis, for 
example using counter-cyclic price adjustments for these new sub-CPA labour market 
units or perhaps to actively construct and monitor contractual performance minima at 
this revised scale. Indeed, it may well be sensible to look beyond marketised levers to 
consider greater use of procedural accountabilities such as clearer and more intensive 
minimum service expectations. 
 
The implementation of a more deep-seated set of reforms in this vein would necessitate 
a critical reflection on the appropriate geographical unit of performance assessment 
and incentive setting. In the analyses above, local authorities clearly offer a predictive 
improvement compared to CPA but they do not necessarily capture the ‘local labour 
market’ context for programme participants. Previous spatial analysis of British 
employment support programmes have pragmatically adopted the management 
structure or office units used for programme implementation (for example, Sunley et 
al., 2006, 2001). In the Australian case, although the full model specification is not 
available in the public domain the description of the Star Rating system suggests that 
the unit at which contextual variables is incorporated is based on “Bureau of Statistics 
Statistical Regions” (Australian Government, 2012). Conceptually, units to capture 
relevant contextual factors ought to include dimensions of the local labour market 
which inform programme participant job-seeking and employment experiences, for 
example: the speed of job potential job transitions; employment stability; pay; hours; 
contract-type; and care compatibility of employment options within an appropriately 
commutable area. 
 
Background preparations for this chapter produced ‘Tailored Travel to Work Areas’ 
which flexibly incorporated vacancies and job densities across malleable ‘catchment 
areas’ of frequently commuted journeys for those working in lower skill jobs whilst 
residing in the ‘home’ Middle Super Output Area for programme participants. This 
represents one viable tailored small scale geographical unit around which to think 
more realistically about which localised labour market contexts matter for programme 
participants. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to resolve this issue, rather the aim 
is more modestly to highlight the importance of spatial considerations. There still 
remains a question as to the most appropriate scale at which to accommodate 
contextual factors. Ultimately the scale for incorporating context needs to promote a 
balance between being an appropriate and flexible ‘local’ labour market for 
participants (i.e. a geography with meaning) with the need for transparent and 
comprehensible computation and application. Simply overlooking or assuming away 
the structural contextual features of local labour markets however is not justified. 
7 Crafting incentives for sustained employment: Investigating 
employment and earning trajectories for Work Programme 
participants 
7.1 Chapter summary 
The previous empirical chapters have focused, in different ways, on Work 
Programme’s headline job outcome performance. This is a key metric for 
understanding programme performance, yet also central to the Work Programme’s 
design considerations is the challenge of pursuing sustained employment outcomes. 
 
Within Work Programme the specification of job outcomes – which require 6 months 
of cumulative or continuous employment for the majority of participants – combined 
with a long and intricately constructed ‘tail’ of sustainment payment are intended to 
encourage Prime providers to support programme participants into stable employment. 
The incentive structure aspires to break the well-known ‘low-pay no-pay’ cycle 
experienced by many on the lower rungs of the UK labour market. 
 
To examine this issue of sustainment in unprecedented richness, the author’s unique 
academic access to a set of Real Time Information on the month-to-month earnings of 
a sample of Work Programme participants facilitates the first of its kind analysis of 
earning trajectories using sequence analysis.  
 
7.2 Introduction: The evolution of payable ‘outcomes’ within welfare-to-work 
payment-by-results systems 
In the field of quasi-marketised welfare-to-work services there are multiple and diverse 
outcome standards that have been applied both internationally and over time in the UK 
(Finn, 2010a, 2010b, 2011b, 2011c, 2012; Martin, 2015). US states, for example, vary 
considerably in the complexion and composition of outcomes specification drawing 
on measures related to job retention, training and qualifications, wages and benefits, 
and earnings gains (Finn, 2010b).  
 
In part, this variation in outcomes specification can be understood to stem from the 
variability in the overarching objectives of activation policies which – as noted 
previously in Chapter 3 – encompass a diverse range of intentions and which 
themselves vary over time and space (ranging from social inclusion and poverty 
reduction to tighter employment targets) (Bonoli, 2013; Eichorst and Konle-Seidl, 
2008; Weishaupt, 2011). Importantly, these alternative outcome specifications do not 
appear to be solely associated with different institutional settings and objectives. 
Rather, outcomes definition seem to be suspended within a process of constant and 
incremental evolution as policymakers strive iteratively to strike the optimal balance 
between competing concerns around outcome clarity, complexity, measurability, 
attribution, and the avoidance of perverse incentives (Carter, Forthcoming; Considine, 
2005; Finn, 2008, 2010b). 
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In the Work Programme a particularly strong emphasis has been placed on sustained 
employment outcomes. Within the programme’s private power market there is a heavy 
reliance on financial incentives through payment-by-results to steer provider 
behaviours and shape service provision. Within this, the length of sustained 
employment outcomes required to obtain maximum payments for providers is novel 
in comparison to previous employment programmes in the UK and is also seen to be 
innovative compared to other bold marketisers internationally such as the Australian 
model (OECD, 2014). 
 
The ‘job outcome’ metric in the Work Programme is something of a misnomer: no 
payment is made for entry to employment. The job outcome is more strenuous than 
the labour market attachment ‘job entry’ rewards used in previous schemes on two key 
dimensions. Firstly, for the majority of participants (those in payment groups 1, 2 and 
9) providers need to secure 26 weeks of continuous or cumulative spells in 
employment before they can claim a job outcome payment. Even for those participants 
in ‘harder to help’ payment groups 13 weeks of employment is required before any 
outcome payments will be made, which is much longer than for previous programmes 
(NAO, 2012; OECD, 2014). Secondly, job outcome (and sustainment) payments are 
only paid for periods of employment where participants have moved off out-of-work 
benefits which means that they must be working for at least 16 hours per week (DWP, 
2010a). Even where participants enter employment it may not be of sufficient duration 
or of sufficient quantity (in terms of hours) to qualify as a ‘job outcome’.  
 
However, it is through ‘sustainment payments’ for sustaining employment after initial 
job outcome payments that the vast majority of potential payments are located in Work 
Programme. Sustainment fees can be claimed every four weeks after the job-outcome 
payment for another one to two years, depending on payment groups. Work 
Programme’s bold experiment in its financial elevation of sustained employment 
within the overall payment profile has not been formally evaluated however, and 
certainly not using sophisticated sequence analysis techniques, with previous analyses 
focusing instead (somewhat understandably) on the simplest and headline binary job 
outcome performance measure. This chapter seeks to respond to the uncertain impacts 
of the programme’s incentive structure, which is designed in such a way as to reify 
sustained employment outcomes, on the employment and earning experiences of 
participants on the ground.  
 
The discussion proceeds across three core sections. Firstly the chapter briefly traces 
the imperatives which have informed the growing focus on sustained employment 
outcomes at the heart of employment support programmes, including contextual 
considerations of employment stability and the low-pay no-pay cycle on the lower 
rungs of the UK labour market. The second section outlines the complexities of the 
incentive structure and the competing expectations from policy designers and expert 
practitioners in the degree to which the incentives were expected to hold traction for 
provider behaviours. The third core section offers original empirical analysis of the 
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RTI earnings data for a sample of programme participants in order to answer the 
research question: What are the employment and earning trajectories of Work 
Programme participants? Has the use of sustainment payments broken the low-pay 
no-pay cycle? 
 
Importantly, the extreme use of sustainment payments cannot be evaluated through 
conventional impact evaluation techniques due to the simultaneous national roll out of 
the Work Programme’s private power market and consequent lack of an appropriate 
comparator group. A key contribution of the chapter therefore is the creative 
introduction of an innovative statistical technique to investigate the granular month-
to-month earning and employment experiences of programme participants. The 
empirical section implements sequence analysis and Optimal Matching for the first 
time on a set of earnings data for participant in a welfare-to-work scheme. This method 
has not previously been applied to the investigation of welfare-to-work outcomes in 
the UK context (or indeed, elsewhere). Yet this methodological approach  enables a 
more holistic and considerably more advanced understanding of employment 
experiences than would be available through more conventional statistical techniques 
by producing a typology of earnings and employment trajectories. 
 
This empirical contribution then facilitates critical reflection on the degree to which 
payment incentives are related to earnings (in)stability amongst Work Programme 
participants. While there has been considerable critical air-time given to the way that 
the Work Programme payment-by-results system fails in some regards – most notably, 
the way that price levels are irresponsive to participant ‘need’ (Chapter 5); local 
context (Chapter 6); and the way that distance travelled towards work is wholly un-
acknowledged (Morphy et al., 2012; Suleiman, 2014; WPSC, 2015) – there has been 
almost no consideration of the degree to which the complex payment structure has 
stimulated or stymied the achievement of genuinely sustained employment outcomes 
for participants, despite this being one of its key programme objectives and design 
considerations. This is considered for the first time here, and in unprecedented richness 
and methodological subtlety.  
 
7.3 The low-pay no-pay cycle: a background to unstable employment 
outcomes 
The importance of sustainable employment as an objective for policy designers has  
been enshrined through three interrelated features of Work Programme context.  
Firstly, the challenge of sustainment sits alongside concerns around low-pay no-  
pay cycling at the lower-skill end of the UK labour market. Secondly, the temporary 
nature of employment outcomes and programme ‘churning’ has been raised as an issue 
within previous UK employment support programmes. Finally, sustained employment 
outcomes have been inscribed deep within the justificatory narrative of the Freud 
report (2007) where the foundational logic for the Work Programme is presented as its 
ability to deliver ‘savings’ to HM Treasury which can only be achieved through longer 
employment spells. Each of these dimensions is introduced in turn, before outlining 
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the incentive structure intended to promote sustained employment within the 
programme. 
 
Since the 2000s there has been a growing awareness that contemporary accounts of 
poverty and social exclusion overlooked the significance of low wages and insecure 
work, informed by Byrne’s suggestion that “poor work is the big story” representing 
“the most significant kind of excluded life” (Byrne, 1999, p. 74; McKnight, 2002; 
Oakley, 2015). This sat uncomfortably with the defining political mantra of UK 
governments that “employment is the best route out of poverty”, a proposition central 
to policy on welfare since that time (Shildrick et al., 2012, p. 8). Shildrick’s extensive 
longitudinal qualitative research identified graphically the phenomenon of the ‘low 
pay no pay cycle’ where the predominant experience of low-income interviewees was 
one of moving in and out of low-paid, short-term jobs, repeatedly cycling on and off 
benefits (Shildrick, 2012; Shildrick et al., 2012). 
 
Quantitative analysis bolsters the credence of these findings and several studies have 
used the DWP’s administrative data to identify the issue of ‘repeat claims’ (Carpenter, 
2006; Leitch, 2006; NAO, 2007). Amongst those who transitioned from benefits into 
work, more than one in five were found to reclaim the benefit within 13 weeks and 40 
percent were reclaiming within 6 months (PAC, 2008). Importantly, the transience of 
these employment spells does not appear to be experienced by choice or by the 
inability of people seeking jobs to sustain work: the majority of those entering 
temporary jobs take them because they are unable to find a permanent position 
(Ashworth and Liu, 2001; Tomlinson and Walker, 2010). 
 
Given the extent of low-pay no-pay cycling experienced by people exiting out-of-work 
benefits it is perhaps unsurprising that welfare-to-work programmes have historically 
struggled to achieve sustained employment for participants. Both international and UK 
evidence indicates issues of cyclical participation in employment support schemes. An 
evaluation of the much heralded Wisconsin Works scheme for unemployed women 
with families found that over a six-year period only 35 percent of programme 
participants averaged more than three-quarters of each year in employment (Wu et al., 
2008). In the UK, across the 2000s the New Deals equally experienced problems with 
‘revolving-door’ participation, since while initial job entry figures were promising it 
increasingly became apparent that participants moved from training into short-term 
employment, “and then back to unemployment, eventually repeating their 
participation in training” (Lindsay et al., 2007, p. 543). Around 20 per cent of those 
who participated in the New Deal for Young People in 2006 were attending the 
programme for at least the second time (ONS, 2006 in Lindsay et al., 2007).  
 
There are important personal costs for individuals involved in low-pay no-pay cycling 
including reduced feelings of self-worth and confidence, reductions in future earning 
potential and declining chances for stable future employment (Booth et al., 2002; 
Goulden, 2010; Gregg, 2001; Mulheirn et al., 2009; Walker and Kellard, 2001). Yet it 
is parallel concerns of financial cost that appear to have been a preoccupation for 
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policymakers since employment sustainability is of paramount importance to the cost-
effectiveness of employment programmes (Mulheirn et al., 2009; NAO, 2007). Given 
the high costs of achieving ‘additional’ job starts participants would need to remain in 
employment and ‘off benefit’ for considerable periods before the cost of interventions 
is effectively recouped (Mulheirn et al., 2009; NAO, 2007). 
 
In the Work Programme the important connections between ‘value for money’ and 
duration of employment outcomes are further heightened since the large scale and 
universality of the scheme has in large part been justified by the savings expected to 
accrue to HM Treasury through reduced benefit spending and elevated revenue from 
taxation (Freud, 2007). Freud successfully argued for the DEL/AME switch – 
effectively uncapping the total amount that could be spent on outcomes in the Work 
Programme (where employment support is conventionally constrained by 
Departmental Expenditure Limits) – because “spending on welfare to work 
programmes could come from the very savings made from reducing the benefit bill as 
a result of them” (Haddon, 2012, p. 7). Because of this financing arrangement, in 
addition to the usual pressures experienced by civil servants to design a coherent 
outcome-based payment model, the ‘results’ payments in the Work Programme 
needed to be tied explicitly to welfare savings. 
 
Importantly, whilst it is sometimes argued that issues of employment insecurity require 
interventions on the demand side, either by shifting sectors towards higher skill levels 
and hence higher wages and more secure contract terms or by tightening employment 
regulation to minimise the use of temporary or ‘zero-hours contracts’ for example, 
commentators are quick to point out that such considerations seem firmly off the table 
for policymakers (Hepple, 2013). The Coalition administration has shown no desire to 
hamper the hyper-flexibility of the UK labour market (Hepple, 2013; Wiggan, 2012). 
The residual challenge then is for employment support interventions to “get the best 
of both worlds: a flexible labour market in which people who would otherwise cycle 
in and out of employment are supported to remain in work and move between jobs 
without long and repeated periods of unemployment” (Mulheirn et al., 2009, p. 38).  
 
The clear imperative then is to motivate Work Programme Prime providers to deliver 
sustainable job outcomes. But Mulheirn et al., (2009) also indicate there is a need for 
subtlety in terms of tying cash incentives to sustained job outcomes, in particular that 
the results system should be calibrated to avoid bias against helping those who are 
least likely to enter and retain employment (as discussed in Chapter 5) and moreover 
that incentives should be designed in such a way as to avoid making providers averse 
to promoting temporary employment at all. Several reports acknowledge the potential 
importance of temporary jobs to re-engage and support entry to stable employment 
over time (Booth et al., 2002; Zijl et al., 2004). The design challenge “is to structure 
incentives in a way to ensure that service providers turn temporary jobs into stepping 
stones to permanent employment” (Mulheirn et al., 2009, p. 19).  
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7.4 Coherent incentives? A complex response from designers in steering for 
sustainment   
The design of payable outcomes within the Work Programme’s payment-by-results 
schedule clearly seeks to respond to these concerns as seen in the payment model 
schematic reproduced in Figure 7.1. The long tail of sustainment fees account for 
between 57 and 76 percent of the potential income from participants starting in the 
first year and with increasing relevance in subsequent years due to the incremental 
reduction and eventual removal of attachment fees (OECD, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Illustration of Work Programme payment model, reproduced from DWP, 2010b, p. 11 
Notionally, were the set of financial incentives manifest in the payment schedule 
responded to wholeheartedly (and ‘rationally’) by Primes it is anticipated that this 
would stimulate either (or all) of three responses, which would mark the programme 
as distinct from previous schemes. In addition to the support conventionally provided 
to target entry to employment (quickly, but regardless of job type or fit) it would be 
expected that providers would in these circumstances: 
1) Deliver support to enable participants to remain in employment, overcoming 
any challenges or issues that might have been expected to lead to participants 
dropping out of the labour market (e.g. with issues around childcare) and 
potentially also to give support for participants to convert temporary jobs to 
permanent roles. In terms of intervention focus, the type of job entered does 
not change but in work support to retain employment is increased; 
2) Provide a brokerage role once a participant has entered a (first) job to enable 
them to quickly enter alternative (second or third) roles once an initial 
temporary contract reaches its end. Again the initial intervention does not 
change the type of job first entered but in-work support looks to enable 
participants to quickly ‘step’ from one job to another; 
3) Support participants to enter jobs that are markedly different in employment 
terms and quality from the employment typically entered by those exiting out-
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of-work benefits. Services would shift from focusing on available employment 
to centre on jobs that offer permanent employment, which is compatible with 
participants’ wider ambitions and responsibilities such that job entry becomes 
synonymous with long-term (>1 year) employment and there is minimal risk 
of a participant dropping out of the labour market. Here the objective of initial 
intervention shifts from the speedy insertion of participants into any job, and 
instead offers a more ‘choosy’ approach to identify jobs with longer-term 
prospects. 
Importantly, however, overlaying the already complex set of job outcomes and 
sustainment outcomes, the incentives for sustainment vary over time and interact in 
somewhat complex ways with the timelines of programme engagement for each 
participant. While participants are within the 104 week initial window of ‘allotted 
time’ on the programme then employment may be built up cumulatively to contribute 
to the ultimate achievement of job outcomes. Likewise it is possible for periods 
contributing to ‘sustainment’ in employment to be accrued cumulatively, so there is – 
counter to the labelling – scope for there to be breaks in employment between 
sustainment payments. When a period in employment spans the time point 104 weeks 
after initial programme attachment providers are still able to continue to claim job 
outcomes and sustainment payments up to the maximum number. However, if there is 
a break in employment of 2-days or more after the 104 week marker then no further 
sustainment (or job outcome) payments can be claimed (DWP, 2010a).10 This means 
that whether and when it is deemed worthwhile for Primes to expend effort on the 
pursuit of sustained employment through the tactics outlined above is rather intricate 
and will further vary in accordance with the payment group into which a participant 
has been allocated. 
 
7.4.1 Anticipated response to sustainment incentives – the ‘known unknown’ in 
Work Programme design 
A key assumption on the part of programme designers then is that providers are both 
capable of interpreting and operationalising these incentives and that an appropriate 
toolkit of in-work support is available in response. Both assumptions have been 
contested. 
 
In evidence presented to the Work and Pensions Select Committee the ability of 
providers to respond to the incentives for sustained employment outcomes is 
acknowledged as “one of the key known unknowns” of the Work Programme by 
experts in the field (Simmonds in WPSC, 2011, Q 30). Firstly, the complexity of the 
payment structure makes the incentives challenging for providers to operationalise. 
Secondly, the value accorded to sustained employment may or may not align with the 
relative difficulty of enabling different participants to sustain work (and given the 
                                               
10 Similarly, if a period of employment which would have been eligible for a job outcome payment 
begins prior to the 104 week marker, but is broken after 104 weeks and before the full period of 
employment required for the achievement of a job outcome is achieved, then no payment will be made. 
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analysis in Chapter 5 showing that the differential job outcome payments fail to align 
with distance to labour market, it would seem sensible to be wary in relation to the 
alignment). Moreover, the financial value of connecting shorter spells of intermittent 
work varies at different time points across the participation window. Again, 
commentary from experts presented at Select Committee hearings emphasises this: 
 
“It’s a very complex structure…In itself as a design it seems to answer some of the 
problems about sustainability, for example, but I think there are going to be some real 
issues in the delivery…and the question is whether it will tweak the right kinds of 
incentives.” 
 
Finn in WPSC, 2011, Q50 
Furthermore,  that “[W]e can see the logic of including all those different 
payments…but there is a danger that the very complexity leads to an unravelling and 
a whole load of unintended consequences” (Simmonds in WPSC, 2011, Q50). 
 
There is evidence that the specification of employment eligible for outcome payments 
within a payment-by-results framework has tangible impacts on the characteristics of 
work entered by programme participants. Hales et al., (2003) compared a cohort of 
participants in the Employment Zones programme with a similar group of participants 
in the Jobcentre Plus New Deal: although the net effect for treatment (the Employment 
Zone participants compared to New Deal) was not statistically significant for all jobs, 
Employment Zone participation showed a positive and highly statistically significant 
effect for jobs at 16-hours per week and over. Bruttel (2004) suggests that this was 
likely to have been achieved because providers concentrate on 16-hour plus jobs as 
they are only able to claim a full outcome fee for programme participants who are 
working at least 16 hours per week. The implication of this finding is that the 
specification of job outcomes and sustainment in the Work Programme may shape the 
type of jobs that providers support participants to enter. 
 
The ultimate response to the incentive structure is highly ambiguous and there is a 
concern that the complexity may mean that at the front-line services proceed ‘as usual’ 
with an approach that pursues ‘work-first’ and ‘any available job’. In a situation where 
providers do seek to respond to the incentives and aspire to provide in-work support 
to those participants requiring this, it is both assumed that providers are able to 
effectively identify those participants who would benefit from such interventions and 
that effective in-work interventions to support sustained employment are available. 
Crucially, the evidence base on ‘what works’ for in-work support is acknowledged as 
being very limited at this stage (SASC, 2017; WPSC, 2016). 
 
Hence the research and policy community finds itself presently in a position where it 
is not clear whether the incentives designed into the payment-by-results mechanism 
are capable of stimulating the desired results in terms of sustained employment for 
participants. It is here where UK Work Programme evaluations so far are highly 
limited. Whilst the nature of payment-by-results inevitably means that it is only 
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eligible portions of sustained work which are ‘paid for’ by commissioners this does 
not necessarily mean that the incentive structure is working effectively or as expected 
in terms of encouraging job entries to lead to sustained employment. There is 
considerable uncertainty as to how effectively Work Programme supports are 
facilitating translation of job entry to sustained, ongoing employment and in-work 
provision has been particularly questionable (Meager et al., 2014). Although it is only 
sustained work which is being paid for, the programme itself is not measuring or 
recording the degree to which this is not achieved. The perturbations, interruptions and 
cycles between unemployment and work are not documented. 
 
It is here that this chapter drives forward the discussion by providing original empirical 
material which brings a more subtle analysis of employment and earning experiences. 
This more detailed investigation must necessarily draw on data beyond the official 
Work Programme performance figures and official payment records – since these are 
inevitably constrained by the way they record only those spells of employment which 
have successfully delivered job outcome payments and sustainment payments for 
providers. The essential facet for underlying data in this analysis is that it is able to 
convey any spell of employment – both those that ultimately contribute to the 
achievement of provider payments – but crucially – also those which do not. 
Additionally, one would ideally wish not only to understand in a binary sense whether 
there is or is not employment at any given point in time but also to go further in 
understanding something about the earnings during those employment spells. Here, 
the author’s unique academic access to a set of Real Time Information on the month-
to-month earnings of a sample of Work Programme participants has facilitated the first 
of its kind analysis of earning trajectories using sequence analysis. 
 
7.5 Putting employment trajectories in context: common earning patterns for 
Work Programme participants 
Before presenting the results of the OM and cluster analysis it is important to position 
the empirical findings alongside a broader consideration of the employment and 
earnings experiences of Work Programme participants.  
Figure 7.2 sets out the high-level characteristics associated with the sample. Only 45% 
of those attached to Work Programme between April 2013 and September 2014 feature 
in the RTI earnings dataset. This is comparable to the findings reported in the official 
programme evaluation, produced by Meager et al., (2014) where a statistically 
representative telephone survey found that 44% of participants had been in work at 
some point since their referral to the programme. The corollary is that around half of 
programme participants leave the scheme after two years of support without having 
spent any time at all in paid work (Meager et al., 2014).  
 195 
 
Figure 7.2 Earnings profile for participants attached to Work Programme between April 2013 and September 
2014, final column presents overall percentage breakdown 
7.5.1 The gulf between ‘job entry’ and ‘job outcomes’ 
Importantly, entry to employment – in other words, experiencing at least one month 
of non-zero earnings in the RTI dataset – is not tantamount to achieving a job outcome. 
Prior to the analysis presented here, the best indication of the mismatch between job 
entry and job outcome rates could only be considered by placing unofficial Work 
Programme performance figures published by the Employment Related Services 
Association (ERSA, the representative body for the employment support sector) 
alongside the official job outcome data provided by DWP. Positioning these sources 
alongside one another immediately suggested that there was a discrepancy between 
entry to employment and official job outcome rates. ERSA do not position their figures 
as a proxy for government statistics, rather the publications are intended to provide a 
more timely report on Work Programme performance. ERSA’s figures do however 
helpfully illustrate the discrepancy between the numbers of participants who have 
spent any time in paid work and those who ultimately achieve job outcomes. ERSA 
suggest that between 65% and 85% of job starts will convert into job outcomes (ERSA, 
2013). The initial breakdown of job outcomes for the RTI sample indicates that the 
conversion from job entry to job outcome is likely to be towards the lower end of this 
range: the job outcome rate for those participants who feature in the RTI is 62%. This 
suggests that around one-third of those who enter work are unable to sustain this 
sufficiently to achieve a job outcome.11 
 
There is also the potential for further decay in terms of job stability since not all those 
who achieve a job outcome sustain employment and hence fail to deliver the maximum 
possible number of sustainment payments to their Prime provider. DWP’s official 
statistics suggest that for early waves of referrals with sufficient time following a job 
                                               
11 It should be noted that those participants referred towards the end of the RTI window (from May 
2014 – September 2014) will not have been attached to the programme for the full 24-month period 
when the Work Programme administrative data was merged to the RTI, and hence, the job outcome rate 
for those featuring in the RTI dataset is ultimately likely to be marginally higher. 
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outcome payment, of those who achieved a job outcome only 65.2% go on to attain 
the maximum possible number of sustainment payments (DWP, 2013c, p. 2013). 
Unfortunately, the limitation of a 15-month window for the RTI data serves as an 
impediment to the further investigation of longer-term stability of employment 
amongst those who have achieved job outcomes. The analytical focus in this chapter 
provides a more general exploration of employment and earning experiences, rather 
than focusing only on longer term sustainment amongst those with job outcomes. 
Overall, the initial hints of a ‘missing third’ of job entries which have not been 
successfully converted to job outcomes for Work Programme participants – as seen 
through the ‘gap’ between ERSA and DWP figures – is supported more concretely by 
the highly imperfect job outcome rate amongst those who feature in the RTI dataset. 
The job outcome rate amongst those participants who have earnings recorded in the 
RTI dataset is 62 percent, suggesting that the experience of entering employment is 
not automatically or easily converted to sustained work.  
The complexity of these employment and earning histories and their fractured and 
potentially circuitous nature has not previously been investigated but it is to these 
patterns and trajectories that the analysis now turns. 
7.6 Understanding employment and earnings over time 
Informed by the growing sequence analysis literature (Brzinsky-Fay, 2007; Dorsett 
and Lucchino, 2014; Quintini and Manfredi, 2009), the analysis traces individual 
unemployment-earning trajectories and classifies them into several transition 
pathways. This approach seeks to unpack the entire employment and earning trajectory 
experienced by programme participants following attachment to the programme, 
including the nature of each month’s labour market status and the ordering of spells 
within the wider transition pattern. As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, a pragmatic, 
policy-informed approach is taken to constructing the distinct monthly labour market 
status types. 
 
Element Definition 
Z No earnings recorded for this month in RTI 
L 
‘Low earning month’ earnings are equivalent to earning less than 16hr per week 
at NMW 
M 
‘Middle earning month’ earnings are equivalent to earning more than 16hr per 
week at NMW but less than 35hr per week at NMW 
H 
‘Higher earning month’ earnings are equivalent to earning more than 35hr per 
week at NMW 
U No RTI data available  
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Figure 7.3 Definition of distinct labour market elements within participant employment trajectories 
Conveying diverse patterns in temporal data is analytically challenging and hence 
there is great value in pursuing analytical approaches that are more sensitive to 
variations in patterns of progression over time. The charts in Figure 7.4 offer two 
preliminary graphical representations of the earning and employment status for the full 
Work Programme cohort attached between April 2013 and September 2014.  
The upper panel shows, for each month following the month of attachment (horizontal 
axis), the proportion of Work Programme participants in each of the five element types 
(vertical axis). This has the advantage of being straightforward to ‘read’ but has 
important limitations, as highlighted by Quintini and Manfredi (2009). Given that it 
does not follow individuals over time the upper chart cannot be used by itself to 
determine the characteristics of a group of sequences. For example, while a significant 
portion of Work Programme participants are experiencing ‘0 earnings’ at the end of 
the observation period it is unclear whether these are the same individuals who were 
without earnings at the start of the tracking window, a wholly different group who 
became unemployed at a later point in the window, or indeed, some combination of 
the two.  
For the purposes of sequence analysis then the lower portion of Figure 7.4 provides a 
more helpful representation. Here entire individual earning trajectories are plotted 
horizontally, meaning that each horizontal stripe when read from left to right 
represents the 16 monthly activity statuses experienced by one individual. Five shades 
are used to denote the different element types, and each change in colour corresponds 
to a change in status. 
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Figure 7.4 Investigating employment and earnings pathways: Comparing cohort-level representation to sequence 
index plot for Work Programme participants 
Recalling the method described in Chapter 4, within Optimal Matching the sequence 
for every participant – i.e. the month-to-month series of particular employment and 
earning ‘element’ types (Figure 7.5) – is compared to that of every other participant.  
 
Figure 7.5 Earnings trajectories as a sequence of distinct elements 
The number and type of changes (substitutions, or insert/delete functions as in Figure 
7.6) that would be needed to convert one sequence to the other is referred to as 
‘alignment’. This process is used to produce a measure of dissimilarity and the 
comparison of more ‘dissimilar’ sequences effectively results in larger difference 
values (the Levenshtein distance). The key output from the OM process is a distance 
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matrix: a symmetric matrix where both rows (i) and columns (j) represent the 
individual trajectories in the sample and each cell aij contains the distance between the 
sequence of individual i and of individual j. Cluster analysis is then used to bring 
clusters of sequences together in such a way that the resultant clusters maximise the 
similarity of sequences within each cluster and maximise the differences or 
dissimilarities between different clusters. 
 
 
Figure 7.6 Optimal Matching operations 
Running OM is a highly computationally intensive process and therefore the analysis 
that follows has been developed using a random sample of 20,000 Work Programme 
participants who feature in the RTI dataset. Cluster analysis is applied to the derived 
measures of dissimilarity in order to group more similar trajectories together.  
 
A degree of discretion and judgement are applied in order to identify the most 
appropriate number of clusters since there is no formal statistical method for 
identifying the ‘best’ solution. Cluster analysis stopping rules have been developed to 
support this task and the commonly applied (and well supported, Milligan and Cooper, 
1985) Caliński-Harabasz pseudo-F index (Caliński and Harabasz, 1974) is displayed 
in Figure 7.7. This was produced using functions within the ‘clustermat stop’ 
command in Stata 10 which calculates the Caliński-Harabasz index from the pairwise 
dissimilarities in the distance matrix (Halpin, 2016 and personal correspondence with 
Halpin).  
 
 200 
 
Figure 7.7 Identifying the optimal cluster solution: Caliński-Harabasz pseudo-F index for Ward’s method 
For interpretation, larger values of the Caliński -Harabasz index are indicative of 
distinct clustering (StataCorp, 2013) and so the slight uplift in the curve at the 9-cluster 
mark suggests that this might offer an appropriate solution. Brzinsky-Fay (2007) notes 
that contextual arguments should be used to define the appropriate number of clusters 
and suggests that the observation of analytically meaningful groups each containing a 
sufficient number of cases should be used to define the appropriate number of clusters. 
Further investigation of each of the solutions from 2 – 15 clusters confirms that the 9 
cluster solution offers a meaningful resolution and discussions of the results with 
policymakers and analytical staff at DWP confirm that this cluster solution is 
analytically meaningful. As Ward’s is a hierarchical agglomerative clustering method 
(i.e. it works by fusing clusters from the bottom up) it is also possible to consider the 
nine clusters as nested within 4 overarching ‘super-clusters’ as shown in the 
abbreviated dendogram in Figure 7.8. 
 
Figure 7.8 Ward’s linkage identifies 9 clusters (blue) within 4 ‘super-clusters’ (grey) 
 201 
7.7 A typology of employment and earnings trajectories amongst Work 
Programme participants 
Overall, therefore, nine groups of earning trajectories were identified amongst those 
Work Programme participants who appear in the RTI dataset and these are grouped 
into four high-level categories or ‘super-clusters’. The trajectories typifying each of 
the groups are visualised through sequence index plots which show the full 
employment and earning histories for each group member. The high-level categories 
are named according to the dominant features of the trajectories in each group and are 
described in turn below.  
 
7.7.1 Super-cluster 1: ‘slow and unstable’ 
The earning trajectories experienced by Work Programme participants in the four 
clusters within the first ‘super-cluster’ are characterised either by the instability of 
earning trajectories or through the relatively long time periods taken to first enter 
employment (or both), hence the selection of the title for this super-cluster as ‘slow 
and unstable’. 
 
 
Figure 7.9 Sequence index plot for super-cluster 1: ‘slow and unstable’ earning trajectories 
Cluster 1 shows trajectories where it has taken particularly long periods for 
participants to enter paid work, conveyed by the large expanse of non-earning months 
in the left-hand phase of the sequence index plot. On average, participants in this 
cluster take nearly ten months to enter employment for the first time (Figure 7.14 
presents a high-level summary of characteristics for each of the clusters). Those 
trajectories in the lower portion of the sequence plot show that where employment has 
been experienced more quickly, nil-earning months are again experienced after this 
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initial spell in work. This is by far the most populous of the clusters identified and 
6,042 people sit within this group. Just over half (56.1%) of those experiencing this 
trajectory type go on to achieve job outcomes.  
 
Those whose earnings trajectories are grouped in cluster 2 move into work more 
quickly (the mean time to enter employment for this cluster is 5.7 months) but 
experience several different earning levels across the RTI tracking period. While it 
seems common for individuals in this group to experience higher earnings levels at 
around 10 months following attachment, the following months are characterised by 
fragmented or lower earnings levels. Only 69 percent of this group ultimately achieve 
job outcomes. 
  
Cluster 3 groups together some of the most chequered earning trajectories where 
employment instability is the norm. Members of this group experience a ‘Joseph’s 
coat’ of earning statuses and most earning trajectories in this group are punctuated by 
several months of unemployment (zero earnings) at ten-fourteen months subsequent 
to attachment. Unsurprisingly, the employment instability of this group is associated 
with particularly low levels of conversion from employment entry to the fulfilment of 
job outcome criteria and only 24 percent of this group achieve official job outcomes. 
Average earnings for participants in this group across the RTI tracking period are the 
lowest of all the clusters, at £1,171.  
 
Cluster 4 has the smallest population of the clusters and contains only 1,080 
participants. The trajectories initially appear quite similar to those of cluster 2 but with 
quicker initial employment transitions to generally higher earnings levels. The earning 
trajectories here dip or become fragmented and tend to fall away from the ‘higher 
earning’ phase from around 9 months onward. The cohort visualisation of the clusters 
shown in Figure 7.13 assists in clarifying the distinction between clusters 2 and 4 and 
the ‘dip’ in terms of earnings and employment occurs at an earlier point for those in 
cluster 4. Despite the preponderance for trajectories to dip to lower earnings levels in 
the later portion of the trajectory, around 70 percent (71.3%) of cluster members do 
trigger job outcomes. This is a much higher translation rate of employment entry to 
job outcome achievement than experienced in other clusters within this overarching 
super-cluster.  
 
By making a reasonable assumption that the random sample of 20,000 trajectories 
drawn from the full RTI data for inclusion in the sequence analysis are representative 
of the full RTI dataset, and assuming that those attached to the Work Programme from 
April 2013 – September 2014, are broadly representative of the programme’s cohort 
as a whole, then it would be expected that just over a quarter (26.2%) of all those 
attached to the Work Programme would experience an employment and earning 
trajectory of the sort characterised by the ‘slow and unstable’ super-cluster.  
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7.7.2 Super-cluster 2: ‘stuck in low-pay’ 
Super-cluster 2 contains only one cluster and trajectories for participants in this group 
are dominated by the low earning elements, with the title ‘stuck in low-pay’ reflecting 
this. 
 
 
Figure 7.10 Sequence index plot for super-cluster 2: 'stuck in low-pay’ earning trajectories 
Again acknowledging the assumptions of representativeness outlined above, it would 
be expected that 5% of people attached to the Work Programme would experience this 
type of trajectory. Although the average time taken to enter employment is the quickest 
of all the clusters (1.3 months), average earnings for participants in this group across 
the 16-month window are considerably lower than for many of the other trajectory 
types at £4,421. The trajectories of participants in this group contain very few elements 
that are not low earning months. Indeed, in this cluster, 415 people were in paid work 
(and earning at a low-level) in the month they were attached to the programme and 
record low level earnings for every month within the 15-month RTI tracking period, 
never progressing above the equivalent of 16 hours a week at NMW. Around half of 
people (53%) experiencing this trajectory type ultimately achieve job outcomes for 
their providers. 
  
7.7.3 Super-cluster 3: ‘general earnings success’ 
The third super-cluster contains three clusters whose trajectories can be considered to 
convey ‘general earnings success’. The trajectories of super-cluster 3 would be 
expected to represent the experiences of 9.8% of Work Programme participants.  
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Figure 7.11 Sequence index plot for super-cluster 3: 'general earnings success’ earning trajectories 
Cluster 6 contains 1,156 people – equivalent to 2.6 percent of all Work Programme 
participants – and trajectories in this group mostly convey a single step from 
unemployment to higher-level earnings. On average, people in this group take just 
below 6 months to enter employment (5.8 months) and once employment has been 
achieved this is generally sustained for the remainder of the tracking period. This is 
reflected in the relatively high job outcome rates amongst group members at 90 
percent.  
Cluster 7 shows trajectories where a relatively speedy employment entry (the average 
time taken to enter employment for this group is 5.2 months) leads to more of a mixed-
earning-level experience. The green ‘middle-earning’ elements dominate the right 
hand portion of the graph, suggesting that these participants are entering work that is 
part-time (less than 35-hours a week at national minimum wage) and for many that 
earnings levels change across the later portion of the window, with middle earning 
months often punctuated by one (or more) periods of higher earnings above the 35 
hour NMW threshold. Although earnings for this group may be modest, with average 
earnings at £6,653 across the full RTI window, this group is particularly successful in 
securing official programme job outcomes, with 92 percent of group members doing 
so. 
The trajectories in cluster 8 again express a pattern of ‘general earnings success’. The 
initial transitions into paid work by members of this group are even quicker following 
attachment than for the visually similar cluster 7, suggesting that participants here are 
very much ‘ready for work’ at programme start. Indeed, some of the trajectories in this 
cluster show that participants entered paid work within their month of programme 
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attachment. Unlike cluster 5, however, the earnings profile for these participants 
appears to be one of progression to ‘higher earning’ elements, suggesting an increase 
in either hours and/or pay for group members across the tracking window. Compared 
to cluster 7, trajectories for members of this group show a greater preponderance of 
higher-earning months, although again month-to-month earning levels fluctuate. As 
with other trajectory types in this cluster there is a high conversion rate of employment 
entry to official employment outcomes and 89 percent of the 2,073 people in this 
cluster achieve payable job outcomes.  
7.7.4 Super-cluster 4: ‘gold standard’ 
This super-cluster contains only one sub-group and describes the trajectories of 1,748 
participants. Of all the super-clusters identified it is the smallest in terms of population 
is equivalent to just below 4 percent of the Work Programme population as a whole. 
Rapid transitions to employment are achieved, on average taking just 1.9 months for 
participants to enter paid work. Earnings are then sustained at stable, higher levels, 
shown through the on-going occurrence of ‘higher earning’ months throughout. There 
is a high (but not perfect) rate of job outcome achievement with 90% of group 
members attaining successful job outcomes.  
 
Figure 7.12 Sequence index plot for super-cluster 4: 'gold standard ’ earning trajectories 
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Figure 7.13 Cohort representation of earnings trajectory clusters for Work Programme participants 
Cluster Cluster size Job outcome 
rate 
Mean time to 
first earning 
(months) 
Mean 
earnings (£) 
Expected 
proportion of 
all WP 
attachments 
1 6,042 56.1 9.6 2,611 13.6 
2 1,255 68.8 5.7 3,987 2.8 
3 3,252 24.3 3.6 1,171 7.3 
4 1,080 71.3 2.2 7,216 2.4 
Slow and unstable 
(summary) 
11,629 50.0 
  
26.2 
5 'stuck in low pay' 2,264 53.3 1.3 4,421 5.1 
6 1,156 89.8 5.8 11,285 2.6 
7 1,129 91.9 5.2 6,653 2.5 
8 2,073 89.3 2.0 9,912 4.7 
General earnings 
success (summary) 
4,358 90.1 
  
9.8 
9 'gold standard' 1,748 89.8 1.9 16,996 3.9 
Grey non-RTI 
group 
 6.0 NA NA 55 
Figure 7.14 Employment and earnings trajectory clusters and relative size 
 
7.8 Reflections and considerations on employment and earning trajectories 
The sequence analysis appears to have been successful in terms of producing an 
analytically meaningful typology of earnings trajectories for its large random sample 
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of Work Programme participants. The identification of four distinct earning pathways 
– ‘slow and unstable’, ‘stuck in low-pay’, ‘general earnings success’, and ‘gold 
standard’ – and the relative proportions of Work Programme participants was 
considered an insightful and helpful contribution by policymakers and analysts in May 
2016 who were involved in reflecting on the Work Programme and designing its 
successor scheme.  
 
In considering these distinct earning trajectory experiences it is important also to recall 
the large monotone block of grey in the lower portion of Figure 7.4 representing over 
half (55%) of all Work Programme participants who do not feature in the RTI. This is 
a crucial policy weakness. The majority of Work Programme participants will not be 
in paid work at the end of their allotted time on the scheme and return to Jobcentre 
Plus to receive ongoing employment support once their 2-year period of attachment 
has ended.  
 
Of those participants who do feature in the RTI data, as a result of experiencing at least 
1-month of earnings from paid work during the tracking window, the analysis 
identifies two of the four overarching trajectory classes as fulfilling the intentions of 
programme designers where participants undertake transitions to paid work which then 
extend over lengthy time periods and which are associated with earning levels 
compatible with working more than 16 hours a week at NMW. The sequences 
illustrated by the ‘gold standard’ group of participants can be understood as the most 
‘successful’ in terms of the ambitions both of the Work Programme and wider policy 
objectives around shifting the UK to a “higher wage, lower welfare economy” 
(Oakley, 2015, p. 4). Unfortunately, the trajectories in these two groups convey the 
minority experience for participants: only 13.7% of all Work Programme participants 
would be expected to follow these successful earning pathways.  
 
Particularly concerning in relation to this chapter’s focus on sustained employment 
beyond job entry is the programme’s seemingly limited ability to convert entry to 
employment into sustained, ongoing earning pathways at levels compatible with non-
claiming of unemployment benefits. Super-clusters 1 and 2 are both worrisome in this 
regard. The slow transitions of those participants in the ‘slow and unstable’ type are in 
themselves not troubling, indeed the intention of the programme’s prolonged 
attachment window is to stimulate provision even for those participants who may take 
some time to initially enter paid work. Rather, the issue is with the instability and 
disruption to employment once job entries do occur. Providers do not appear to be 
working effectively to enable temporary work placements to be ‘joined up’ or 
sustained. For many, temporary employment does not appear to have functioned as a 
stepping stone to more secure work, but rather offers a teetering journey of unstable 
earnings. 
 
7.9 Policy implications and challenges in predicting cluster membership 
Understandably, individuals in the two less-successful trajectory groupings will be of 
greatest interest to policymakers and service providers. In particular, the ability to 
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identify those programme participants who are most at risk of cycling between low-
pay and no-pay, or who remain on a low-earning trajectory month-to-month, will be 
important in targeting and designing appropriate and effective additional supports 
(assuming that long-term earnings success remains the ultimate policy objective). 
Figure 7.15 offers a preliminary description of the demographic characteristics of 
programme participants who fall within each of the employment and earning clusters.  
 
 
1 'Slow and 
unstable' 
2 'stuck in 
low-pay' 
3 'general 
earnings 
success' 
4 'golden 
ticket' 
5 'no 
earnings 
record' 
Full cohort 
Male (%) 64 44 59 76 56 59 
Age (mean) 33 41 33 36 39 37 
Has a disability 
or health 
condition (%) 
28 39 22 21 56 43 
Has children 
(%) 
28 33 28 22 31 30 
Lone-parent (%) 12 21 14 5 10 11 
Substance 
issues (%) 
1 1 0 1 3 2 
Offender (%) 6 1 4 7 6 6 
Figure 7.15 Demographic characteristics of programme participants within trajectory groups 
Relative to the two more successful earning trajectory types, those who are stuck in 
low-pay are more likely to be women, have children and be a little older. Lone parents 
are also more commonly found in this group. Offenders and other more vulnerable 
jobseekers who are eligible for membership of Payment Group 3 are more prevalent 
in the ‘slow and unstable’ group. People with a disability are most commonly found 
not to feature in the RTI dataset.  
 
Following Dorsett and Lucchino (2012), statistical techniques are also used to explore 
whether there are any distinctive characteristics at the point of programme referral 
which could help predict an individual’s future earnings trajectory type. Multinomial 
logit estimators are used to predict membership of high-level trajectory types and 
separate binary logistic models are also developed to predict membership of each of 
the overarching groups individually. The ambition here is not to establish causality but 
rather to assess the presence of strong correlation and hence predictive power 
sufficient to identify in advance who is at risk of an unsuccessful earnings trajectory.  
 
This model development work is not shown since the models to predict membership 
for each of the earning trajectory groups have relatively weak explanatory power. A 
particular challenge in predicting membership of each of the trajectory clusters is that 
many of the available explanatory variables function in a similar way – i.e. with the 
same direction and similar effect size – for each of the earning trajectory groups. The 
implication here is that while there are characteristics which function as effective 
predictors of entry versus non-entry to employment, the same set of variables do not 
seem to offer discriminatory power across the different earning trajectory types. It may 
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be that with a richer set of explanatory variables, particularly with greater detail on 
employment history, the terms of previous employment, and qualifications, that 
stronger models could be built, capable of predicting which individuals are likely to 
enter each of the trajectory groups. If so, providers are better placed than 
commissioners to establish and use these data. It may be, however, that it is simply 
highly challenging to establish a set of explanatory variables that robustly predicts 
members of these longitudinal sustainment types.  
 
7.10 Conclusions 
By paying only for results within a Prime-provider quasi-market there is a consensus 
that the Work Programme has delivered broadly similar employment outcomes for a 
lower cost per participant than under previous programmes (WPSC, 2015). However, 
there is an important distinction between ‘cheap’ results and an appropriate incentive 
structure that has desirable effects in terms of steering provider behaviour and shaping 
outcomes achieved. To date the employment and earning experiences of Work 
Programme participants have only been explored through the high level information 
relating to the numbers of participants achieving official job outcomes and sustainment 
outcomes (DWP statistical releases) or crude counts of those entering employment (for 
example, ERSA, 2013). This chapter has for the first time used sophisticated 
longitudinal classificatory methods and uniquely rich earnings data to investigate the 
employment trajectories of participants. The empirical findings suggest that there may 
be a disconnect between the intended incentive structure and the experience of 
participants. 
 
A key contribution is the use of Optimal Matching on a newly available dataset of 
month-to-month RTI earning records to examine employment and earning experiences 
in a holistic way and with greater sensitivity to whole transition pathways than afforded 
through conventional statistical approaches. Drawing on this method, and combining 
it with cluster analysis, enables the identification of nine distinct trajectory clusters 
which sit within four higher level categories. These groups of trajectories can be 
summarised as ‘slow and unstable’, ‘stuck in low-pay’, ‘general earnings success’, and 
‘gold standard’ earnings. The latter two trajectory categories can be understood as 
embodying the characteristics desired by policymakers: they generally feature 
relatively quick transitions into sustained employment, with earning levels which each 
month tend to be above an income level equivalent to 35-hours per week at NMW. 
Although programme designers are likely to take some satisfaction from these 
‘successful’ earning trajectories, these pathways in practice would only be expected to 
apply to less than 14 percent (13.7%) of people attached to the programme. By far the 
most common experience is never having entered paid work at all. 
 
The first two trajectory groups offer particularly striking findings for a programme that 
has placed such considerable effort in designing a payment structure that rewards 
‘sustained’ employment outcomes. These two groups – which likely account for nearly 
a third of participant experiences (31.3%) – show trajectories where participants enter 
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employment but experience either an unstable employment pathway or will be stuck 
in a low-earning employment pattern.  
 
Whilst it is not possible to draw systematic comparisons with previous employment 
support schemes, judged by the ongoing presence of unstable and low-paid 
employment patterns the Work Programme’s complex sustainment payment structure 
does not seem to be incentivising providers to develop provision and supports that 
enable entry to employment to be successfully converted to sustainable, well-paid 
employment trajectories (as is the programmatic objective). For most Work 
Programme participants no work is the outcome whilst for those participants who do 
successfully move into paid work the low-pay no-pay cycle all too often persists. 
 

8 Making markets in employment support: does the variety of 
quasi-market matter for people with disabilities and health 
conditions? 
8.1 Chapter summary 
This chapter offers a more synoptic reflection on the Work Programme’s private power 
market. It returns to the analytic framework on varieties of quasi-market developed in 
Chapter 2 and through an intelligently constructed quasi-experimental analysis 
assesses the employment and earnings outcomes of two alternatively configured quasi-
marketised employment support programmes which have run in tandem in the British 
context since 2011: Work Programme and Work Choice.  
 
8.2 Introduction: the uncomfortable gulf in job outcome rates for people with 
health conditions and disabilities 
With the application of the provider-directed quasi-market configuration in the Work 
Programme there has been a large and persistent gulf in the employment outcomes for 
those participants who have a long-term health condition or disability and those others 
who do not (Figure 8.1). The experiences of people with health conditions and 
disabilities jars against the programmatic ambition to “ensure that providers have 
strong incentives to help all of their customers”, and close the performance gap 
between the easiest- and hardest-to-help (DWP, 2012, p. 6, emphasis added). The gulf 
in outcomes now also sits uncomfortably against the Government’s manifesto 
commitment to tackle the disability employment gap and “get 1 million more people 
with disabilities into employment over the next ten years” (Conservative Party, 2017, 
p. 57). Voluntary sector organisations and think tanks have been united in arguing that 
the ambition for such high levels of employment cannot be reached on the basis of the 
current performance of welfare-to-work programmes (Disability Rights UK, 2016; 
Oakley, 2015; Purvis et al., 2014). 
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Figure 8.1 Job outcome rates for Work Programme participants over time, by self-reported health condition and 
disability status 
Somewhat peculiarly, given policy-maker’s confidence that the ‘universal’ Work 
Programme can effectively and simultaneously serve a large cohort of participants 
with a highly diverse set of characteristics, work experiences and employment support 
needs (DWP, 2012; WPSC, 2013), there is a parallel programme: ‘Work Choice’.  
 
Work Choice is a specialist disability welfare-to-work programme commissioned by 
the DWP and which runs in tandem to the Work Programme across Great Britain. 
Work Choice is a voluntary programme focused on those individuals whose health and 
disability-related support needs mean that standard Jobcentre Plus support is unlikely 
to be appropriate and is delivered by a range of employment support providers from 
the private, voluntary and public sectors. Work Programme and Work Choice are 
grounded in the same commissioning strategy, but demonstrate important differences 
in the degree to which they embrace highly-marketised provider-directed governance 
arrangements (Jantz et al., 2015) and particularly in the extent to which they implement 
payment-by-results principles. Given the mixed findings from studies of marketised 
outcome-based commissioning across policy fields, but particularly in the area of 
welfare-to-work, the twin track approach of the Work Programme and Work Choice 
provides a powerful opportunity to consider potential differences in the impacts of the 
two alternative quasi-marketised service configurations. This chapter implements a 
novel quasi-experimental analysis to investigate the implications of these alternate 
quasi-market formulations for delivery and outcomes, drawing on the original 
analytical framework advanced in Chapter 2. 
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8.3 The particularities of the quasi-market configuration embodied by the 
Work Programme and Work Choice 
Both the Work Programme and Work Choice were commissioned subsequent to the 
DWP 2008 Commissioning Strategy, which was heavily informed by the work of Lord 
Freud. Despite being commissioned according to the same overarching strategy 
however, there are important variations in the design and consequent quasi-market 
configuration of the two schemes and it is this variation that this chapter exploits 
analytically and empirically.  
 
8.3.1 Applying dimensions of variation as a comparative tool: variation on the 
allocation dimension 
Returning to the analytical lens outlined in Chapter 2, the allocation dimension which 
relates to the financing and regulation of service provision is reprised in Figure 8.2. 
The first component conveys whether services are collectively financed by society or 
whether provision relies, in full, or in part on private resources of individuals. The 
second allocation component captures the degree and strength of regulation for 
provider activity.  
 
There is no variation between the two programmes in terms of the formal financing 
component of the allocation dimension. As with all UK employment support 
programmes these two schemes are both collectively funded – hence the stacked 
position of the programme markers at the left-hand side of the top axis in Figure 8.2. 
The key driver of variation across the allocation dimension in UK activation 
programmes is therefore the regulation of service quality (Wiggan, 2015a).  
 
Under the Work Programme service quality is intended to be held up by ‘minimum 
service guarantees’ (MSGs), which are designed and published by Prime providers 
themselves. As noted in earlier chapters, “weaknesses in the substance, consistency 
and, in some cases, even the possible enforceability of providers’ minimum service 
guarantees render these a far less useful and reliable protection than they could be” 
(Carter and Whitworth, 2015, p. 281). The National Audit Office has criticised the 
variability of MSGs and has suggested that in practice this system provides only 
limited safeguards for participants who may receive few services or experience 
‘improper practice’ (NAO, 2012). 
 
By contrast, in Work Choice, there is a high degree of clarity over contractual service 
minima. The Invitation to Tender (DWP, 2009) set out a contractual requirement for 
providers to devote a minimum number of support hours per week to each participant 
across the different service modules (see Figure 8.4 for detail on module service 
expectations). Programme evaluation material suggests that the minimum contractual 
requirements appear to have set high expectations in terms of provision, that frontline 
staff are highly aware of these support commitments, and that under the auditing 
approach providers appear to adhere to the high levels of structured support (Purvis et 
al., 2013). 
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The lower axis of Figure 8.2 conveys this divergence between the programmes by 
positioning a considerable distance between the Work Programme – which sits at the 
provider-directed, light touch end of the service regulation spectrum – and Work 
Choice – which is more congruent with state-directed standards and more robust 
quality assurance. 
 
 
Figure 8.2 Visualising the allocation dimension for the Work Programme and Work Choice quasi-markets 
8.3.2 Applying dimensions of variation as a comparative tool: variation on the 
production dimension 
The production dimension covers choice and competition – the way that a service is 
‘produced’ within the quasi-market (described more fully in section 2.7.2). The first 
sub-component (upper portion of Figure 8.3) relates to how ‘open’ the market is to 
new provider entrants and captures the degree to which the quasi-market arrangements 
service the hegemony of specific or incumbent providers. This spans from an open, 
highly contestable and accessible market (far left) to a situation where access is 
constrained or limited.  
 
The second axis captures the control apportioned to the state versus service providers 
in the design and stipulation of provider activity. At the left-most extent, there is a high 
degree of public sector control over provider activity, since payment to providers is 
explicitly tied to the delivery of fixed service components. Shifting rightwards, the 
dimension portrays an increasingly outcomes-led approach whereby service providers 
are afforded the freedom to innovate and design flexible services geared to pursuing 
specified outcomes but where the public sector takes a position of agnosticism on the 
means of securing these outcomes.  
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The final axis in the lower portion of Figure 8.3 captures the function of user choice 
and voice within service production. Here, the left-most portion of the axis conveys a 
situation where service users are powerful agents whilst at the right-hand extent 
service user perspectives have no mechanism for shaping services. For each axis 
within Figure 8.3 a position closer to the extreme right-hand side reflects a stronger 
provider position be that through minimal competition (upper axis), minimal state 
control (middle axis) or minimal responsiveness to user preferences (lower axis). 
 
Considering the relative positioning of Work Programme and Work Choice on the first 
component – that of market access – both programmes were procured through variants 
of a ‘Prime Contractor’ model which limits the direct contractual relationship between 
DWP to a relatively small number of top tier, ‘Prime’ providers who are then 
responsible for managing supply chains of provision (Armstrong et al., 2010; DWP, 
2008). There are however, distinctions between the programmes in the degree to which 
particular forms and sizes of provider have a stronghold over provision as Prime 
contractors. Despite its smaller size (in terms of participant numbers, and hence, 
contract value), Work Choice has a greater number of Contract Package Areas (CPAs) 
and contracts were awarded to Primes in 28 CPAs compared to Work Programme’s 
18. Where Scotland operates as a single CPA in the Work Programme, provision is 
divided across 4 CPAs in Work Choice for example. The tender process for Work 
Choice was preceded by a pre-qualification questionnaire but unlike Work Programme 
this had no hard thresholds in terms of capital requirements or turnover. This, in 
conjunction with the smaller contract sizes meant that, compared to Work Programme, 
a wider range of organisations were in a position to compete for contracts.  
 
 
Figure 8.3 Visualising the production dimension for the Work Programme and Work Choice quasi-markets 
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The size and stipulations associated with Prime contracts in the two schemes has clear 
implications for the types of providers involved. Of the eight organisations who 
successfully became Work Choice Prime providers four are from the private sector 
and four are from the voluntary sector.12 When considering the number of contracts 
held by these Primes, over 70 percent of provision is led by voluntary sector providers 
(Post Tender Discussion Documentation in Thompson et al., 2011). For the Work 
Programme there were considerably tighter requirements for bidding as the DWP 
sought to ensure that Prime contracts were held by organisations capable of financing 
upfront investment in services and shouldering the significant financial pressures of 
back-ended outcomes payments at a large scale.  
 
The Work Programme is therefore positioned as comparatively more ‘closed’ on the 
market access dimension (upper portion Figure 8.3) since tendering requirements 
reduced competition for contracts and situated existing private sector providers (and 
those on the ERSS framework) in a dominant position to tender for future contracts. 
Work Choice is comparatively more open, although the long contracting periods do 
inculcate some degree of ‘lock in’. 
 
Both programmes implement outcome-based funding arrangements for providers but 
there are key differences in the payment models for the two schemes, most notably in 
the extent to which payment-by-results dominates the payment profile. Work Choice 
providers receive a monthly service fee equivalent to 70 percent of their contract price 
with around 30 percent of programme funding being contingent on outcomes 
(Thompson et al., 2011). Purvis et al. (2013) note that in Work Choice there is a tension 
between the Commissioning Strategy principle of minimum service prescription 
intended to facilitate a flexible and personalised approach and the need to guarantee 
robust minimum levels of service delivery, which is seen as the quid pro quo for the 
substantial service fee element of the programme. Under Work Choice the 
commissioning Department has established a highly specified set of modular 
components which offer a high level of structured contact between participants and 
service providers whilst aiming to ensure progression towards the ultimate goal of 
unsupported employment, where this is appropriate (DWP, 2009; Purvis et al., 2013,  
see Figure 8.4). This balance between prescribed components and provider discretion 
can be considered a ‘grey box’. 
                                               
12 In practice, one of the organisations classed as ‘private sector’ is a special purpose vehicle created by 
two voluntary sector organisations. 
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Figure 8.4 Contractually specified modular intervention structure of Work Choice (adapted from Purvis et al., 
2013) 
The Work Programme holds a much more extreme position on this dimension due to 
its full embrace of the ‘black box’ delivery model whereby Primes have almost 
complete discretion over the nature and extent of their intervention and where provider 
payments are based almost entirely on job outcome results (Rees et al., 2014). To 
counter tendencies for providers to neglect those participants whose barriers to work 
are greater (i.e. where payable job outcomes are less likely to be forthcoming) the 
DWP relies on its differential payment-by-results structure. In the Work Programme, 
over the course of the contract the ratio of sustained job outcome fees to attachment 
fees is intended to be 80:20 (Wiggan, 2015a). Importantly, however, the fixed 
attachment fee reduces to zero across the early years of the programme so since 2014 
the Work Programme has effectively been operating under ‘pure’ payment-by-results, 
where no portion of provider payment is guaranteed. Correspondingly, Work 
Programme is positioned at the most extreme right-hand position on this axis, whilst 
Work Choice sits in a softened hybrid position. 
 
On the final dimension relating to the function of choice there is again deviation 
between the two programmes. For service users, Work Choice is a voluntary 
programme whilst the majority of Work Programme participants are mandated to 
engage as a condition for their ongoing receipt of unemployment benefits (though 
importantly, people with long term health conditions who are understood to be distant 
from the labour market may be afforded the option of voluntary participation). In the 
main, choice in terms of programme exit is not an option if people wish to protect their 
income. User choice within the market between providers has been almost non-existent 
as a feature in UK welfare-to-work provision (Wiggan, 2015a). Under the Work 
Programme participants are randomly allocated to a Prime provider. Under Work 
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Choice, participants do have a ‘choice’ between Remploy13 provision and the single 
contracted Prime provider in their region, although the official programme evaluation 
suggests that Jobcentre Plus Disability Employment Advisors will be involved in this 
process and it is not clear that user choice exerts influence on provider practice.  
 
8.4 Pure provider-directed or hybrid forms of quasi-market? 
Along these dimensions then the Work Programme clearly sits as the embodiment of 
the ‘provider-directed’ market (sitting as it does at the right-hand edge of each of the 
axes in Figure 8.3). Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 3 the Work Programme 
specifically embodies a private power market. 
 
Contrastingly, although Work Choice was also commissioned according to Freud’s 
guiding principles it adopts a softer, less-extreme position as a ‘provider-led’ market 
formulation. Across the allocation dimensions, Work Choice bolsters the state’s power 
to regulate service quality (a preference of service users). Within the production axes, 
Work Choice leans towards a provider-directed configuration. The Prime provider 
model, outcomes-related payment, and grey box specification all point to a strong 
position for providers, and yet it fails to sit squarely at the ‘provider-directed’ right-
hand portion of these axes. The state has a much stronger role in stipulating activity 
and service users have some degree of choice (a double choice as to whether to 
participate and which of two service providers to work with). Where Work Programme 
is a full-throated version of a private power market, almost exclusively reliant on 
accountability levers of price and competition, Work Choice offers ‘Freud-lite’. Work 
Choice takes a hybridised form – where provider prerogatives are mediated by 
bolstering both the state- and user- preferences – and does not neatly sit within the 
brackets of Gingrich’s framework.  
 
Intriguingly, although we cannot attribute causation to this softer form of provider-
direction in the Work Choice configuration, concerns in relation to service quality, 
creaming and parking of clients and market stability have not dogged Work Choice in 
the same way that they have plagued the Work Programme. But it is to outcomes that 
the chapter’s empirical focus turns. Given the persistent performance critiques of the 
Work Programme in its support of participants with health conditions and disabilities 
(and, indeed, with other wider more challenging barriers, Carter and Whitworth, 2015; 
Newton et al., 2012; WPSC, 2013) the parallel operation of Work Choice offers 
something of a quasi-experiment through which to assess whether the softening of 
provider-directed marketisation levers can be seen to have led to differing experiences 
for participants as illustrated by the patterning of employment outcomes. The key 
empirical question informing the remainder of this chapter is whether these two 
programmes (embodying Freud-inspired provider-directed marketised regimes to 
                                               
13 Remploy is a non-departmental government body which is directly funded to deliver Work 
Choice by DWP under Grant in Aid arrangements and offers Work Choice provision 
nationwide alongside the contracted providers. Historically Remploy has specialised in 
supported employment provision and supported employment routes are removed from the 
subsequent empirical analysis.
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different degrees) are differently effective for participants who providers may view as 
‘harder to help’ because of their disabilities or limiting health conditions. 
 
8.5 An empirical exploration of different quasi-market configurations for 
employment and earning outcomes 
The implication of the distinct quasi-marketised configurations which are 
implemented within Work Choice and the Work Programme is that these alternate 
formulations may exert different pressures and incentives on the allocation and 
production of services for similar cohorts. This chapter for the first time offers an 
innovative quasi-experiment using rich RTI earnings data to present a cross-
programme comparative analysis of the employment and earnings outcomes achieved 
by a matched sample of participants in these two distinct quasi-marketised 
formulations. 
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Dimension Work Programme Work Choice 
Size (participants) c. 1 million in year 1 c. 20,000 per year 
Eligible participants 
(on paper) 
All long-term unemployed people 
or those at risk of becoming so 
including those with disabilities 
and LTCs 
People with disabilities who cannot 
be effectively supported into work 
through mainstream employment 
programmes or Jobcentre Plus 
provision 
Participants (in 
practice) 
As above, sizeable Jobseekers 
Allowance population who self-
identify as having a disability 
Restrictions on referral numbers 
and less focussed on those with 
‘most significant needs’; majority 
of participants are claiming 
Jobseekers Allowance 
Compulsion Largely mandatory, sanction 
backed 
Voluntary, though potential for 
some participants to opt for WC in 
light of upcoming WP mandation 
Outcomes and 
objectives 
‘Sustained’ job outcomes (13 or 26 
weeks) with monthly sustainment 
payments 
Sustained, ‘unsupported’ job 
outcomes  
Figure 8.5 High-level programmatic comparison of Work Programme and Work Choice 
The comparison of Work Choice and Work Programme can be understood as a natural 
experiment since although on paper the programmes targeted different cohorts of 
service users in practice ambiguities and tensions in the referral processes for the two 
programmes mean that participants in each scheme are much more similar in terms of 
their disability-related employment challenges than when the programmes were 
initially conceived. Figure 8.5 provides a summary of programme characteristics and 
eligibility criteria. The empirical analyses bolster this overlap further with the use of 
propensity score matching techniques.  
 
Many Work Programme participants are facing multiple and complex barriers to 
employment, including significant disability-related support needs (Newton et al., 
2012; Purvis et al., 2013). The official Work Choice evaluation has identified “a 
number of situations where disabled people with complex support needs, who might 
have been suitable for Work Choice support, were being referred to the Work 
Programme” (Purvis et al., 2013, p. 145). In parallel, there has been slippage in the 
degree to which Work Choice participation has been targeted at those with the most 
profound disability-related employment support needs: the majority of Work Choice 
participants are claiming Jobseekers Allowance rather than a specialist, disability-
related benefit as DWP expected at the programme design stage. Each of these 
programmes has experienced stretch and tension in relation to referral routes and 
eligibility criteria and this leads to a situation where there is marked overlap in terms 
of the characteristics displayed by participants attending each of the schemes.  
 
Thus, in summary, there is a group of people who are claiming out of work benefits, 
have health and disability-related barriers to entering the labour market, and who could 
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have been referred to either scheme. This partial overlap of participants with similar 
characteristics at the intersection of the two programmes unlocks the potential for 
quasi-experimental analysis and specifically raises the ability to use propensity score 
matching for the construction of an artificial comparator group. Considering the Work 
Choice participants as the ‘treated’ individuals, matching is used to find a non-
participant from the control group of Work Programme participants with the most 
similar observed characteristics possible (Gertler et al., 2016). This method has been 
used widely in the evaluation of British welfare-to-work policies; has an intuitive 
appeal arising from the way it mimics random assignment through the construction of 
a control group post hoc; and is based on fewer assumptions than conventional 
regression based approaches (Bryson et al., 2002). 
 
Access to participant-level administrative data held by the DWP has uniquely 
facilitated the analysis presented here. The evaluation uses administrative data for all 
individuals attached to the Work Programme and to Work Choice from April 2013 to 
September 2014. The participant level information is based on National Benefit Data 
records coupled with the specific administrative datasets for each of the programmes. 
P45/P60 records are used to construct pre-programme employment histories. This 
delivers a rich set of matching covariates including pre-programme benefit claim detail 
and employment durations, fixed individual demographic characteristics, and time 
coded programme attachment details used to ensure that participants in both treatment 
and controlgroups are experiencing interventions in a shared macroeconomic climate. 
The logistic regression model used to produce the propensity scores is shown in Figure 
8.6. 
 
The requirement for a standardised outcome metric for treatment and control 
participants is facilitated through the author’s unique academic access to HMRC RTI 
which provides immediate, regular data on employee earnings (Tarr and Finn, 2012). 
For the sample of Work Programme and Work Choice participants this data holds a 
record of gross earnings received by each participant, each month, for the month of 
attachment to their respective programmes and for 15 consecutive months.  
 
Historically an ‘off-benefit’ measure has been used within DWP programme 
evaluations but the earnings data presented here offer a more subtle analysis that more 
closely proxies programme objectives around employment and earnings rather than 
benefits off-flows. For both Work Choice and Work Programme the overarching intent 
is to secure stable employment for participants that endures for the long-term and this 
objective occurs in a wider policy context which aspires to shift the UK to a “higher 
wage, lower welfare economy” (Oakley, 2015, p. 4). Hence paid employment which 
is both more stable and higher paying is the desirable policy outcome across both 
programmes. Therefore, both the number of months with earnings (where a greater 
number of months with recorded earnings is the preferable outcome) and earnings 
value (where greater income levels are seen as superior) serve as appropriate metrics 
to capture programme ‘effect’ in a comparable manner across the two interventions.  
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After data cleaning, the preparation of standardised variables and the removal of those 
Work Choice participants who were in supported employment, there were 405,417 
Work Programme cases and 23,916 Work Choice cases available for analysis.14 A 
range of information relating to individual demographics, household characteristics, 
employment and benefit claiming histories and local context are used to produce the 
final model to predict Work Choice participation and the propensity scores (Figure 
8.6). There is a general consensus in the propensity score matching literature that either 
a logit or a probit model may be used to estimate treatment (1 or 0) and that there is 
no strong advantage to using one or the other (Heinrich et al., 2010). A logit model is 
used here. 
  
                                               
14 Within Work Choice there is a pathway to payable outcomes for ‘supported employment’ and those 
participants who are routed to this supported employment outcome (3,255 individuals) are excluded 
from the analysis. It is not deemed appropriate to compare job outcomes achieved in the open economy 
to employment income derived from a supported business; the analysis rules out any additional 
employment or earnings effect from Work Choice being associated with supported or ‘sheltered’ 
employment. 
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Odds 
Ratio 
Standard 
Error 
P value 
Self-reported disability (binary; reference: 0) 14.427 0.470 0.000 
Days with active ESA claim in 2-year prior to attachment 0.991 0.000 0.000 
Days with active JSA claim in 2-year prior to attachment 1.002 0.000 0.000 
Days in paid employment in 2-year prior to attachment 1.003 0.000 0.000 
Days with active ESA claim in 5-year prior to attachment 1.002 0.000 0.000 
Days with active JSA claim in 5-year prior to attachment 1.002 0.000 0.000 
Number of JSA spells in 2-year prior to attachment 1.120 0.007 0.000 
Number of ESA spells in 2-year prior to attachment 0.554 0.009 0.000 
Number of paid employment spells in 2-year prior to attachment  0.895 0.005 0.000 
Mixed ethnicity (reference: white) 0.844 0.062 0.020 
Asian or British Asian ethnicity (reference: white) 0.707 0.034 0.000 
Black or black British (reference: white) 0.923 0.043 0.086 
Chinese or other ethnic group (reference: white) 0.724 0.056 0.000 
Unknown ethnicity (reference: white) 1.127 0.049 0.006 
Disadvantaged due to drugs, alcohol or ex-offender status (binary: 
reference: 0) 
0.167 0.013 0.000 
Cumulative measure of limitations associated with disability  1.185 0.008 0.000 
Male 1.158 0.021 0.000 
Age 0.978 0.001 0.000 
Has dependent children (reference: no dependent children) 0.442 0.013 0.000 
Lone parent (reference: not lone parent) 2.688 0.137 0.000 
Has ICD code (reference: no ICD recorded) 12.132 0.337 0.000 
Local Authority dummies not shown 
 
N 429,333 
  
Pseudo R2 0.459 
  
Figure 8.6 Logistic regression model to predict Work Choice participation 
OLS models to predict earnings value and time in employment are also constructed 
and demonstrate that the set of explanatory variables are also associated with 
employment outcomes. This test ensures that the explanatory variables are associated 
with both ‘treatment’ and ‘outcomes’ and is a key criterion for propensity score 
matching. The large number of significant variables in the propensity score model 
indicates that there were important differences in the composition of Work Programme 
and Work Choice programme populations, and Dorsett (2004) has argued that this 
highlights the potential for matching to be an effective approach. The final model to 
predict participation in Work Choice provision has a Pseudo R2 value of 46% and can 
be seen as a relatively powerful model. The analysis therefore proceeds on the premise 
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that although the final propensity score model is unlikely to have controlled 
exhaustively for differences between Work Choice and Work Programme participants 
there is little remaining unobserved heterogeneity between the groups that is 
systematically correlated with participation and outcomes. 
 
8.5.1 Propensity scores and matching algorithm 
The predicted probability of participating in Work Choice is used as the propensity 
score for each participant in the Work Programme ‘control’ and Work Choice 
‘treatment’ groups. The distribution of propensity scores is shown in Figure 8.7. 
 
 
Figure 8.7 Distribution of propensity scores for Work Choice and Work Programme participants 
Once the propensity scores have been produced for each case there are a number of 
alternative mechanisms by which the process of matching can take place. Studies 
reveal that in practice the choice of matching algorithm makes little difference to the 
resultant estimates of effect size (Smith and Todd, 2002 in Dorsett, 2004). Dehejia and 
Wahba (2002) found that enabling control participants to be used as matches to 
multiple treated individuals through replacement improved the performance of the 
match. Using ‘replacement’ in the match of Work Programme participants to the Work 
Choice treatment group is particularly relevant, since at the highest levels of propensity 
score (seen in Figure 8.7) there are a greater number of treatment individuals than there 
are control pool match candidates.  
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The 1:1 nearest neighbour match with replacement is implemented using the psmatch2 
programme (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003) in Stata. Following convention, those 
treatment cases that have propensity scores falling beyond the maximum extent of 
corresponding propensity scores for the comparator group are discarded. This results 
in the removal of just 53 cases from the analysis. This constitutes a low level of 
rejection (other studies have removed close to one-third of treated cases) and is not a 
concern regarding the representativeness of the results. 
 
 
Figure 8.8 Propensity scores of Work Choice ‘treatment’ and matched ‘Work Programme ‘control’ group 
8.5.2 Quality of the ‘match’ 
Figure 8.8 shows the distribution of propensity scores post-match, that is, only the 
treatment group cases (with support) and their matched control group. As expected, it 
can be seen that the density of control group cases is higher at lower propensity scores. 
To facilitate the closest match some Work Programme individuals have been used 
multiple times and this has occurred most often at higher levels of propensity score. 
Dorsett (2004) notes that the crucial aspect of the performance of the match is the 
degree to which it achieves balance across the variables included in the propensity 
score model. This is effectively a summary of the degree to which the synthetic control 
group expresses, in aggregate, the same characteristics as the retained treatment 
population. 
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Variable Sample Treated 
WC 
(mean) 
Untreate
d WP 
(mean) 
% bias % 
reductio
n bias 
t-test p>t 
Self-reported 
disability  
Unmatched 0.94 0.43 128.7 
 
156 0.000 
 
Matched 0.94 0.92 3.1 97.6 5.11 0.000 
Days ESA (2-
year) 
Unmatched 16.36 135.10 -70.6 
 
-81.03 0.000 
 
Matched 16.39 19.83 -2 97.1 -5.03 0.000 
Days JSA (2-
year) 
Unmatched 259.78 249.78 4.4 
 
7.18 0.000 
 
Matched 259.74 300.30 -18 -305.6 -16.94 0.000 
Days 
employment (2-
year) 
Unmatched 197.22 105.59 41.9 
 
78.2 0.000 
 
Matched 197.12 180.31 7.7 81.7 7.13 0.000 
Days ESA (5-
year) 
Unmatched 339.97 389.45 -8.7 
 
-12.36 0.000 
 
Matched 339.90 308.11 5.6 35.7 7.21 0.000 
Days JSA (5-
year) 
Unmatched 524.11 384.08 34.7 
 
58.56 0.000 
 
Matched 524.01 584.82 -15.1 56.6 -13.58 0.000 
JSA spells (2-
year) 
Unmatched 1.74 1.87 -8.6 
 
-11.13 0.000 
 
Matched 1.74 1.78 -2.8 67.3 -2.74 0.006 
ESA spells (2-
year) 
Unmatched 0.49 0.71 -26.2 
 
-35.13 0.000 
 
Matched 0.49 0.46 4.7 82 6.26 0.000 
Employment 
spells (2-year) 
Unmatched 1.65 1.36 13.6 
 
21.07 0.000 
 
Matched 1.65 1.49 7.4 45.9 8.48 0.000 
Ethnic groups Unmatched 4.66 5.39 -4.1 
 
-6.01 0.000  
Matched 4.66 4.94 -1.6 62.2 -1.73 0.084 
Disadvantaged 
due to drugs, 
alcohol or ex-
offender status 
Unmatched 0.01 0.07 -30.9 
 
-35.73 0.000 
 
Matched 0.01 0.01 -0.3 99 -0.71 0.480 
Daily limitations 
of disability 
Unmatched 2.27 0.98 91.3 
 
133.47 0.000 
 
Matched 2.27 2.41 -9.3 89.8 -9.2 0.000 
Male Unmatched 0.65 0.59 12.5 
 
18.47 0.000  
Matched 0.65 0.67 -4.8 61.3 -5.39 0.000 
Age Unmatched 38.43 36.76 12.8 
 
19.57 0.000  
Matched 38.43 37.94 3.8 70.1 4.32 0.000 
Has dependent 
children 
Unmatched 0.11 0.22 -31.4 
 
-42.07 0.000 
 
Matched 0.11 0.09 4.9 84.5 6.54 0.000 
Lone parent Unmatched 0.04 0.10 -24.5 
 
-31.36 0.000  
Matched 0.04 0.03 2.5 89.8 3.75 0.000 
Has ICD code Unmatched 0.68 0.28 87.2 
 
132.92 0.000  
Matched 0.68 0.63 11.7 86.6 12.31 0.000 
Figure 8.9 Comparison of baseline and post-match characteristics across treated and untreated groups 
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T-test based comparisons after propensity score matching are controversial and are 
particularly challenging in situations of very large sample sizes. Whilst there do appear 
to be some residual differences between the characteristics of the two groups post-
match (shown in Figure 8.9) the residual differences are considered to be small enough 
not to undermine the analysis. Post-matching, the Work Choice cohort on average 
seem to have spent slightly less time with active out of work benefit claims within the 
preceding two-years and in aggregate have a lower average value than the Work 
Programme control group on the cumulative disability-related barriers variable. A 
higher proportion of the Work Choice group do have formal record of an ICD code, 
formalising their disability or health condition. 
 
8.6 Findings: Employment and earning effects across the two programmes 
The estimated employment and earning effects of Work Choice compared to Work 
Programme participation is presented in Figure 8.10. There are two outcome variables: 
firstly, the average value of employment income earned within the 15-month tracking 
window; and secondly, the number of months, on average, individuals are in paid 
employment within the same time frame. 
 
Prior to the propensity score matching process, the average earnings of Work Choice 
participants and the full Work Programme cohort are fairly similar. Work Choice 
participants on average earned around £336 more than Work Programme participants 
over the tracking period. For the unmatched cohorts, that is, comparing Work Choice 
participants to the full Work Programme cohort there is only a very small difference 
in the average number of months in paid work between the two groups. Work Choice 
participants are on average in paid work for 1.3 more days than the full Work 
Programme population. The standard error for the time in employment effect is nearly 
as large as the effect itself, implying that there is no substantive difference. When 
considering the employment performance for the programme populations as a whole 
then – all Work Choice compared to the full Work Programme – there is little to 
separate the two interventions in terms of the employment effects achieved by 
participants. 
 
Comparing the performance of the two schemes in aggregate however, is not 
appropriate given what is known about the Work Programme’s highly diverse 
participant population, and the scheme’s known abilities to deliver job outcomes for 
those participants who are closer to the labour market. The real question of relevance 
here is the degree to which these alternate programmes and quasi-market 
configurations have been successful in supporting those with longer-term health 
conditions and disabilities.  
 
Crucially, comparing the employment effects of the two programmes after matching 
a markedly different picture emerges. When the analysis is focused on those who are 
similar in terms of their employment histories and health-related characteristics (as per 
the full list of variables in Figure 8.6), the value of average earnings and the amount 
of time in employment for Work Choice participants within common support is 
 229 
significantly higher than that demonstrated by their matched Work Programme 
counterparts. Work Choice participants, on average, earn £1,288 more than the 
matched Work Programme control group within the tracking window. Since average 
earnings for the matched Work Programme population are only £1,559 (within the 15-
month window) this is a sizeable effect.  The earnings level of Work Choice 
participants is 183% of the typical earnings for the Work Programme matched control 
group.  
 
Variable Sample Treated 
(WC) 
Controls 
(WP) 
Difference S.E. T-stat 
Earnings (£) Unmatched 2848.57 2511.69 336.88 30.97 10.88 
ATT 2846.17 1558.66 1287.51 60.68 21.22 
Time in 
employment 
(months) 
Unmatched 3.71 3.56 0.15 0.03 4.28 
ATT 3.70 2.48 1.22 0.07 17.55 
Figure 8.10 Employment effect of Work Choice compared to Work Programme 
Given such considerable differences in the average employment and earnings effects 
experienced by Work Choice participants compared to matched Work Programme 
participants questions are immediately raised as to the manner by which these 
improved outcomes are achieved.  
 
We can begin to consider this by exploring the four potential routes through which 
aggregate outcomes can be raised: is this through a greater proportion of Work Choice 
participants entering employment? Speedier transitions into employment? Different 
earning levels within work? More stable employment trajectories? Or any combination 
of these features? Here again the approach of sequence analysis using Optimal 
Matching and cluster analysis offers a novel route to investigate potential variation 
across the patterns of employment and earning trajectories experienced by participants 
in the two schemes. The same definition of policy-relevant ‘element types’ is used as 
in the preceding chapter.  
 
The chart below (Figure 8.11) presents the matched Work Programme and Work 
Choice samples through sequence index plots. This representation plots entire 
individual earning trajectories horizontally, meaning that  each horizontal stripe when 
read from left to right represents the 16 monthly activity statuses experienced by one 
individual. 
 
The majority of participants in both Work Programme and Work Choice are without 
any earnings record in the RTI (see the upper portion of Figure 8.11). Notably, a larger 
proportion of Work Programme participants are without earnings than their Work 
Choice counterparts (67% of matched Work Programme participants have no earning 
record, compared to 59% of the Work Choice cohort). So, in part the greater 
employment effects for the Work Choice programme can be understood as being 
driven by the greater number of participants on that scheme who do ultimately end up 
achieving paid employment. Work Choice participants do also enter employment more 
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quickly following programme attachment, illustrated by the sharper gradient for colour 
changes. On average Work Choice participants enter employment after 4.4 months 
following programme attachment whilst matched Work Programme participants on 
average take 5.1 months.  
 
 
Figure 8.11 Graphical representation of earning trajectories for matched Work Programme and Work Choice 
participants 
The value of average monthly earnings amongst Work Choice participants is also 
higher. Across the months with non-zero earnings, the mean monthly earnings for 
Work Choice participants is slightly higher (at £772.84) compared to the average 
monthly earnings for Work Programme participants (£631.04). Implementing Optimal 
Matching and cluster analysis on the combined Work Choice and matched Work 
Programme control group identifies six earning trajectory clusters which are nested 
within three ‘super-clusters’. These are described below: 
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Figure 8.12 Super-cluster 1: slow, chequered and unstable 
 
Figure 8.13 Super-cluster 2: stuttering transitions and low-pay 
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Figure 8.14 Super-cluster 3: quick entry to stable employment 
Earning 
trajectory 
cluster 
Work 
Programme 
Work Choice Proportion of 
WP RTI cases in 
each cluster 
Proportion of 
WC RTI cases in 
each cluster 
1 4004 3251 48.9% 32.8% 
2 210 412 2.6% 4.2% 
3 1351 1655 16.5% 16.7% 
4 1084 1220 13.2% 12.3% 
5 718 1784 8.8% 18.0% 
6 816 1584 10.0% 16.0% 
Total 8183 9906 
  
Figure 8.15 Work Programme and Work Choice participant presence within each of the earning trajectory clusters 
Of the matched Work Programme cases which feature in the RTI dataset close to half 
(48.9%) are found in the ‘slow and chequered’ group. Work Choice participants in 
contrast are more commonly found in stable earnings trajectories: over a third of Work 
Choice participants in the RTI sit within the ‘quick entry to stable employment’ group. 
Work Choice participants therefore appear less likely to experience an employment 
trajectory punctuated by spells of very low or no employment earnings. 
 
The analyses presented above suggest important differences are taking place for 
similar types of service users across these two differently configured programmes, 
with large impacts on key employment and earnings outcomes. Without a full cross-
programme linked process and impact evaluation it is not possible to be explicit on the 
specific ways and reasons for such variation in user experiences and outcomes across 
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the schemes. Their different quasi-marketised configuration seems of central 
importance, yet it is not possible in these analyses to isolate and identify the precise 
programme characteristic or, more likely, constellation of programme characteristics 
that explain this large evidenced performance gap.   
 
8.7 Discussion and conclusions 
 
By utilising the thesis’ original analytical framework presented in Chapter 2, this 
chapter operationalises the dimensions through which to understand variation in the 
way that quasi-markets may be constructed. Depending on the design of particular 
quasi-markets and their configurations with respect to these dimensions, providers and 
their service delivery activities will be differently responsive to the priorities and 
preferences of either the state, service users or providers themselves. This in turn is 
expected to have implications for the quantity, quality and distribution of services and 
consequently on any social outcomes achieved through such provision. 
 
The analytical framework’s ability to detect subtle variation in the formulation of 
quasi-markets is then operationalised within the empirical study of the Work 
Programme and Work Choice. Whilst on paper these programmes were commissioned 
according to the same commissioning strategy which sought to ‘unleash’ the 
innovation and entrepreneurialism of providers, the specific market formulation across 
the schemes varies in important ways. The positioning of the Work Programme against 
the dimensions described above suggest that it sits as a wholehearted exemplar of a 
provider-directed quasi-market configuration.  
 
Work Choice, in comparison to the Work Programme’s wholehearted positioning as a 
provider-directed market, offers a more balanced or hybridised market position. The 
Work Choice arrangement counterpoises provider dominance through an enhanced 
role for the state in stipulating activity and regulating service quality and by furnishing 
service users with an (albeit limited) degree of choice. Although it leans towards the 
provider-led configuration Work Choice retains important elements of both a state-
directed and user-responsive arrangement.  
 
The chapter draws on uniquely rich RTI earnings data and links this with an innovative 
methodological approach which connects the construction of a cross-programme 
quasi-experimental study of matched Work Programme and Work Choice participants 
with longitudinal sequence analysis to explore these earning pathways in unrivalled 
depth and detail. Critically, the enhanced outcome performance promised within the 
Work Programme’s provider-led approach is not what we witness in practice. The 
empirical work shows that amongst matched programme participants with health 
conditions and disabilities Work Programme performance is significantly worse than 
that achieved through Work Choice in terms of both employment and earnings 
outcomes. 
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The balanced and hybridised approach to quasi-market configuration advanced under 
Work Choice appears to be important when reading the empirical findings offered here 
alongside the now sizeable body of evidence on the Work Programme from within 
DWP’s official evaluation (Lane et al., 2013; Meager et al., 2014; Newton et al., 2012), 
from select committees (PAC, 2012, 2013, WPSC, 2013, 2011) and from academic 
research (Carter and Whitworth, 2015; Rees et al., 2014). 
 
This suggests that providers have not responded to the Work Programme’s provider-
led arrangement with innovative service offers tailored to the personalised support 
needs of programme participants. Instead, providers appear to have utilised their 
freedoms to maximise profits and reduce risk by cynically deprioritising services for 
those who – in providers’ eyes – may be more difficult to move into work.  This tallies 
with the findings here which indicate that poor outcomes performance for those with 
health conditions and disabilities are not inevitable and that the employment and 
earnings outcomes for these groups are markedly better within the hybridised quasi-
market configuration. Under the Work Programme the interests of providers are 
dominant and in practice this arrangement appears to function in such a way that 
disadvantages unemployed programme participants with disabilities and health 
conditions, whose employment and earnings outcomes are significantly and sizeably 
lower than what they would have been, had they participated in the alternative Work 
Choice scheme. 
 
In sum, the variation in quasi-marketised form between the Work Programme and 
Work Choice emerges as an important mediator of programme participant experiences 
across the two schemes. Whilst the cause of this performance gap cannot be surmised 
from these analyses, the analytical framework, as well as official Work Choice 
evaluation material (Purvis et al., 2013)(Purvis et al., 2013), points a suggestive finger 
towards stronger state stipulation of relatively intensive pre-employment engagement 
and guaranteed in-work support for Work Choice participants allied with a notably 
less aggressive payment-by-results profile for this cohort. 
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9 Rest In Peace Work Programme: Epitaph for a bold quasi-
market experiment 
9.1 Beginnings of the eulogy… 
In Summer 2018 the Work Programme is in its dying days: the final cohort of 
participants were referred in March 2017 and providers will continue to operate up 
until 2021 but with dwindling numbers of participants (Commercial Directorate 
Correspondence Team, 2016). Now is therefore an opportune moment to pause and 
take stock of the experiences and understandings that have emerged from this bold 
experiment in steering services through a private power market. 
 
This concluding chapter is structured across four key sections, the first three of which 
outline the core contributions, study limitations, and key conclusions across 
conceptual, empirical and policy domains respectively. The final section considers the 
emergent research agenda as a result of these Work Programme experiences and 
findings. 
 
9.2 Conceptual and analytic contributions 
The original conceptual framework developed across Chapter 2 and applied in 
Chapters 3 and 8 offers a unique and subtle contribution to the academic understanding 
of ‘the difference thesis’ (Powell, 2015) by extending and unpacking the dimensions 
of variation within alternative configurations of public service quasi-markets. By 
extending from previous work investigating varieties of quasi-marketisation in public 
service delivery (Gingrich, 2011; Wiggan 2015a; 2015b), the conceptual framework 
developed and utilised in this thesis introduces to the scholarly literature a set of richer 
graduated dimensions through which to better understand variation in the way that 
quasi-markets may be constructed.  
 
Within this frame, the allocation dimension captures the form of financing for services 
(ranging from wholesale public funding to fully private provision) and the regulation 
of provider activity by the state (stretching from very light-touch or negligible 
regulation through to comprehensive scrutiny and service quality control). The 
production dimension captures three underlying axes: how ‘open’ and competitive the 
market is, spanning from an open, highly competitive and accessible market to a 
situation where access is constrained or limited; the specification of provider activity, 
ranging from a high degree of public sector control over provider activity to an 
increasingly outcomes-led approach, where the public sector takes a position of 
agnosticism on the means of securing specified outcomes; and the role of service user 
choice and voice, spanning from a situation where the preferences and concerns of 
participating citizens act as a powerful steering mechanism for provider behaviour to 
a state where service user choice and/or voice is constrained to such a degree that it 
has no traction for service provider actions. 
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Depending on the configuration of particular quasi-markets with respect to these 
dimensions, providers and their service delivery activities are expected to be 
differently responsive to the priorities and preferences of either the state, service users 
or providers themselves. This in turn is expected to have implications for the quantity, 
quality and distribution of services and consequently on any outcomes achieved 
through such provision. 
 
A key conceptual contribution of this thesis’s original framework as a series of 
graduated axes is firstly to offer a richer articulation of important underlying 
dimensions against which quasi-marketised arrangements vary. A second core 
intellectual contribution stems from the re-conception (and visualisation) of these 
dimensions as graduated. Through these continua the framework is more alert to subtle 
variations in the extent as well as to the type of quasi-market under study. While quasi-
markets may embody the ‘pure’ alternative types of either state-, user- or provider-
directed forms, in practice gradients are likely to exist across these types. Quasi-
market arrangements in practice are messy and the formulations on offer may straddle 
the clean-cut boundaries suggested in Gingrich’s (2011) framework. This notion of 
softening, or hybrid quasi-market forms, has parallels with other work analysing 
employment support provision (Heins and Bennett, 2016, p. 40) which has identified 
classification complexity when it comes to understanding “the new welfare providers”. 
Although Heins and Bennett’s work centres on service providers, their conclusions – 
that a process of hybridisation and boundary crossing is increasingly important in order 
to understand and address concerns around organisational change and service 
orientation – have clear echoes here.  
 
The conceptual framework’s practical utility and ability to detect subtle variation in 
the formulation of quasi-markets is then utilised within the detailed appraisal of the 
Work Programme as well as in the comparative investigation of Work Programme and 
Work Choice. Compared to Gingrich’s classification, the framework developed here 
offers a greater ability to trace the rich, multi-dimensional differentiation of welfare-
to-work programmes and brings enhanced applied analytical power to comparative 
scholarly investigation. Though applied here specifically to the field of British 
welfare-to-work arrangements, the device has been conceived as a sufficiently flexible 
tool so as to have wider applicability to alternate quasi-market contexts both beyond 
the UK and beyond the field of welfare-to-work. 
 
The framework reveals itself to be valuable as an identification tool. Reading the Work 
Programme against the dimensions of this analytical framework signals the scheme to 
be a wholehearted exemplar of a provider-directed market. Considering the production 
dimension (Figure 3.6), in terms of market access the Work Programme configuration 
is relatively closed, prioritises incumbents and is only very weakly competitive. In 
relation to payment specifications Work Programme fully embraces payment-by-
results and ‘black box’ commissioning such that the state has minimal control in 
specifying services. Finally, there is limited scope for user choice and voice to inform 
the production of services. This orientation reflects a strong provider position: through 
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minimal competition (upper axis); minimal state control (middle axis); or minimal 
responsiveness to user preferences (lower axis). The consequence is that provider 
preferences are the dominant set of interests shaping the functioning of this market. 
Implicitly, service-user desires for quality and state ambitions for efficiency are 
subsumed beneath a provider logic that seeks to maximise profit from job outcomes 
within a system that gives a high degree of discretion in pursuing this aim. 
 
Importantly, tighter than expected cost-pressures have been exerted on Work 
Programme Primes from the outset due to a combination of a more difficult than 
expected macroeconomic environment which affected job outcome (and hence 
payment) levels, the strong prevalence – and apparent success of – discounting 
practices at the bidding stage (NAO, 2012), and some have suggested unrealistic 
performance expectations were set by the DWP for some groups which would have 
the effect of depressing profit margins against projected levels (Mulheirn, 2011). 
Private providers are strongly motivated to retain profit margins and this will become 
particularly apparent under such extreme cost pressures. In the Work Programme it is 
expected that providers are more able to cascade the ‘cost’ of poor or partial provision 
to service users due to weak regulation of service quality on the allocation dimension. 
Therefore, the conceptual framework devised in this thesis more specifically enables 
the identification of the Work Programme as a form of private power market. 
 
The analytic framework developed in the thesis therefore enables greater conceptual 
depth and precision to be placed on the Work Programme’s particular quasi-market 
construction. Work Programme is not just a quasi-market, it is a particular type of 
quasi-market – a private power market. Compared to existing conceptual frameworks, 
this fuller and more precise specification more powerfully identifies and articulates the 
particular and acute constellation of risks surrounding the programme. In any 
marketised arrangement there will be risks that private providers pursue cost-cutting 
innovations to improve crude efficiency at the expense of unspecified or poorly 
captured aspects of services – such as quality (Williamson, 1975). Such risks however 
will be amplified within a private power market such as the Work Programme where 
there are intentionally under-specified contracts (outcomes only) and producers have 
great control. This ‘look Mum, no hands’ form of market configuration leaves the 
Work Programme promising innovation but with acute hazards around rent-seeking 
and uncontrolled cost-cutting by providers at the expense of efficient or high-quality 
production. 
 
The final benefit of this thesis’s original conceptual device is its explicit 
acknowledgement of hybridity and the important, but often neglected, ways in which 
quasi-market alternatives may flow from the overlaying and intersection of additional 
non-market (or further marketised) accountability tools. The dimensions of variation 
provide hints to academics and policy makers as to the accountability levers that might 
be used as correctives to recalibrate quasi-market systems in situations where perverse 
behaviours, as a result of a single stakeholder’s dominance, are leading to unintended 
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and undesirable outcomes. This conceptual contribution is discussed further below in 
relation to its ensuing policy contributions. 
 
9.2.1 Critical reflections and limitations of the conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework developed within the thesis provides an important 
contribution via its rich articulation of quasi-market varieties and their underlying 
graduated dimensions (and hence hybridised forms). Nevertheless, there are 
limitations to the conceptual framework and the degree to which the current empirical 
work is able to build from and directly respond to its inferences.  
 
Via the conceptual framework the thesis implicitly generates something of a 
hypothesis: quasi-marketised public services which are organised at different points 
against the underlying axes of allocation and production dimensions will be differently 
responsive to the respective priorities and preferences of either the state, service users 
or providers. In turn it is anticipated that such configurations will have important (and 
detectable) implications for the quantity, quality and distribution of services and 
consequently on any outcomes achieved through such provision. The challenge of 
testing such expectations sits on three fronts. Firstly, there are limitations in the 
availability and clarity of metrics in support of the underlying dimensions. Secondly, 
the framework may underplay the salience of other factors associated with the quality 
of public service provision, yet which do not feature within, or directly relate to, the 
particular formulation of the quasi-market. Finally, and related to the preceding points, 
the limitations associated with available DWP administrative data constrains the 
degree to which conclusions about the causal relationship between altered quasi-
market formulation and altered achievement of social outcomes can be drawn. 
Reflections are offered on each of these issues in turn. 
 
9.2.1.1 Challenges in operationalising and scaling the underlying dimensions of 
allocation and production 
In operationalising the allocation and production dimensions within the thesis, the 
programme markers associated with alternative quasi-marketised formulations are 
positioned notionally. The positioning of the Work Programme against each of the 
dimensions was not a clear-cut or straightforward consideration. The placement 
decision was made by considering a hypothetical case at the poles of each axis and 
then making an assessment as to the relative closeness of the Work Programme 
formulation vis-à-vis these extremes. The marker was then positioned figuratively 
with polarity and distance inferred through detailed programmatic knowledge. For 
some axes this was considerably more straightforward and unambiguous than others.  
 
Within the allocation dimension the upper ‘financing’ component (Figure 3.5) directly 
positions the Work Programme at the extreme leftmost position of this axis as the 
scheme is fully congruent with a collectively financed arrangement. There is no scope 
for the Work Programme to draw in the private financial resources of individuals 
(through co-payments, for example). 
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Even in potential situations of hybridity on the financing axis there are reasonably 
straightforward and transparent routes available to the positioning of hypothetical 
programmes. For example, where direct funding for the provision of services through 
taxation has the potential to be supplemented via direct service user charging or 
insurance contributions, the positioning could be tied with reasonable accuracy to the 
relative contributions from each source. If overall financing from general taxation 
were equivalent to 75 percent of total programmatic spending with (in aggregate) a 25 
percent contribution from service users then a programme marker could be placed 
three-quarters of the way along the axis, towards the right-hand side. This is illustrated 
by the green marker with an asterisk in the upper portion of Error! Reference source 
not found.. 
 
 
Figure 9.1 Notional positioning of programme markers against allocation axes 
Contrastingly, the ‘regulation of service quality’ and the degree to which this is upheld 
via regulatory functions performed by the public sector is considerably more 
ambiguous. Grout and Stevens (2003) suggest that whether it is theoretically 
preferable for the public sector or private sector to own the assets underlying service 
provision and/or produce a service depends on the ability to contract and the 
relationship between cost reduction and quality. Complicating this, the welfare 
consequences of reductions in service quality and the challenge (and hence cost) of 
stipulating acceptable service quality in a contract varies considerably across different 
public service domains (Grout and Stevens, 2003). The question as to what form of 
contract and regulatory regime gives service providers the optimal incentives with 
respect to cost and quality remains. There is little by way of formalised tools or 
frameworks for tracing the relative intensity and efficacy of regulatory regimes applied 
to outsourced public service provision.  
 
The positioning of the Work Programme against this axis within the thesis was a purely 
notional exercise. The marker is situated towards the right hand ‘light-touch’ provider-
directed pole though in actuality there is a wide sphere within which the marker could 
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reasonably be placed. The blue shaded oval area in the lower portion of Error! 
Reference source not found. represents this high scope for ambiguity by capturing 
the range of potentially viable positions for the programme key. The programme 
position identified in Chapter 3 – though not explicit – was informed in large part by 
the narrative of the Freud report and the consequent commissioning strategy (DWP, 
2008) which captured a clear ambition for the DWP to reduce its contract monitoring 
burden. Instead the responsibility for contract management and supply chain 
management in the Work Programme is subsumed by Prime providers. This 
commitment to a ‘light touch’ regime by the department is coupled with the wider 
perception that the DWP does not – and indeed because of the variability of minimum 
service guarantees cannot – keep a tight rein on upholding service quality and access 
(Finn, 2012 and NAO, 2012). 
 
The challenge of developing standardised approaches through which to consider the 
extent and intensity of regulation applied by the state to upholding service quality is 
to be pursued through future research subsequent to the thesis. As a starting point, 
within a single policy domain or stream of public service provision one – reasonable 
but crude – proxy measure might be captured by considering the volume of resource 
(in financial terms and/or in terms of staff hours) dedicated by the public sector to 
auditing and contract management work, particularly where this is focused on 
upholding access and minimum service expectations. In some cases, such scrutiny 
functions may be undertaken by an ‘independent’ arms-length body, such as the Care 
Quality Commission in the situation of English health and social care regulation. The 
degree of quality assurance activities may then be conceived as a ratio, with the 
numerator capturing the amount spent on this quality auditing and assurance function 
and the denominator containing the total financial value of outsourced provision. 
 
A ratio capturing the relative effort applied to quality assurance vis-à-vis contractual 
service provision may provide something of a baseline or starting point for the 
understanding of regulation in different forms of quasi-marketised arrangement. The 
ratio gives potential anchor points at the poles of the ‘regulation of service quality’ 
spectrum. An extreme position, the full embodiment of ‘extensive state direction, 
auditing and assurance’ might equate to a value close to 1, that is, the scrutiny effort 
has the same financial value as the outsourced contract provision. At the other extreme, 
nil effort to regulate service access and quality on the part of the public sector would 
take a value of 0. Tracking this ratio over time may give a sense of whether quality 
scrutiny is being escalated or scaled back. Importantly, such conclusions are only 
likely to be viable in situations where contracting structure, scale of contracts and the 
nature of outsourced provision are broadly comparable over time. Without this, 
comparability may be severely compromised since the ability to regulate quality varies 
considerably. Hipp and Warner also suggest that service monitoring systems for 
outsourced provision may oscillate between ‘relational contracting’ with close 
collaboration based on trust between independent providers and public sector 
purchasers, and more formal criteria which “increase the distance between private 
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providers and government overseers” (2008, p. 88) with potential implications for 
quality and access in the long-term. 
 
Similar challenges apply to the axes underlying the production dimension. There are 
bodies of theoretical work which may helpfully underpin future operationalisation 
here. For example, on the axis of market openness and competitiveness Baumol’s 
(1982, p. 2) work moves beyond a rough continuum “with relative efficiency in 
resource allocation increasing monotonically as the number of firms expands” (i.e. an 
assumption that a plentiful array of provider organisations is a proxy for competition) 
to provide a guide to the relevant characteristics of contestability within monopolies 
and oligopolistic arrangements. Contestability may be signalled by the absence of cost 
discrimination against entrants, absence of profits beyond a normal rate, and the 
perceived vulnerability to hit-and-run entry (Baumol, 1982).  
 
Other empirical studies may provide useful metrics through which to investigate the 
axis of user choice and voice. Here, importantly, Hipp and Warner (2008) make a 
distinction between the presence of service user choice (for example, within voucher-
based training provision) and challenges to such choice having traction for provider 
behaviours (due to information asymmetries and preference misalignment). There is 
potentially a disconnect between the designed position of programmes against 
particular axes and the functioning of such a quasi-marketised formulation. Voucher 
systems are not tautologous to a user-oriented quasi-market arrangement. The 
suggestion from Hipp and Warner (2008) is that effective user choice may need to be 
buttressed by a strong performance monitoring and information-sharing function on 
the part of the public sector. We then rub against a further future conceptual and 
empirical challenge: that the axes may not be appropriately treated as independent 
entities or fields for analysis and description. There may be co-dependencies or 
interactions across the alternative quasi-market axes such that user voice can only be 
‘strong’ in situations where access and quality regulation also take a particular form. 
There is then considerable future work required in order to develop the measurement 
and appropriate benchmarks underpinning the axes of allocation and production such 
that they can be operationalised in testable hypotheses. 
 
9.2.1.2 Salience of factors beyond the quasi-market associated with the quality of 
public service provision 
 
In the comparison of two quasi-market varieties offered in Chapter 8 the discussion 
centres on the variation in the characteristics of each scheme (Work Programme and 
Work Choice) as directly related to quasi-market forms. In an ideal comparative study, 
the impact evaluation would be constructed around two programmatic forms in which 
the only difference between the schemes is in their quasi-market formulation. All other 
programmatic characteristics which might moderate the quantity, quality and 
distribution of social outcomes achieved would then be held constant. In practice such 
a ‘pure’ comparison is not viable and there are salient points of deviation which are 
not fully accounted for in each programme’s relative forms of quasi-market. In 
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particular, and as acknowledged in Chapter 8, the generosity of the funding available 
per participant is not directly comparable. Work Choice is understood to be a more 
generously funded scheme. Because of the lack of financial information available and 
the uncertainty relating to cross-subsidy between payment groups within the Work 
Programme it was not possible to control for variation in spending generosity in the 
analysis. The legal form of dominant provider organisations within each programme 
is also understood to vary. Voluntary sector providers are understood to play a stronger 
role in Work Choice and it may be expected that social mission may have implications 
for provision which extends beyond the quasi-market form. A lack of transparency on 
the composition of supply chains within the Work Programme restricts any ability to 
control for the legal form and/or social motivation of service providers directly 
engaging with participants under the scheme. 
 
There is also variation in the substance of programmatic content across Work 
Programme and Work Choice. The analysis does, in effect, conflate variation in 
programmatic content with variation in quasi-market form. However, in the Work 
Programme, due to the extreme form of payment-by-results and black box 
commissioning, there are no programmatic stipulations and hence quasi-market 
formulation and programme are one and the same. Thus, in this situation the blurring 
of programme implications and quasi-market implications for the patterning of 
employment outcomes is inevitable. Nevertheless, care must be taken when drawing 
causal conclusions in the extent to which variation in the outcomes achieved under 
each of the two schemes are solely attributable to the configuration of their respective 
quasi-markets.  
 
9.2.1.3 Constrained conclusions due to availability of data and programme 
implementation 
 
The strength of the conclusions that can be drawn in the thesis are also constrained by 
the structure of programme implementation and data accessible to the study. A key 
limitation both to this study and to the wider evaluation of the Work Programme is 
that the scheme was implemented in a way that makes impact evaluation approaches 
particularly challenging. There was no pilot programme study, no clearly defined 
comparator group and everyone eligible for support was immediately referred to the 
programme. Although the Work Programme replaced a range of preceding welfare-to-
work schemes the absence of a temporally or geographically phased implementation 
approach has made it particularly challenging to construct an appropriate and robust 
quantitative impact evaluation. Because of this, combined with the challenge of 
isolating changes in the configuration of quasi-market arrangements from other salient 
aspects of programming and support (identified above) the degree to which causal 
claims can be tied to the quasi-market configuration must necessarily be subject to 
heavy caveats. 
 
The administrative data available to the thesis relate only to the Work Programme and 
to Work Choice. Individual-level information for those participating in forerunner 
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welfare-to-work schemes was not included as part of the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the DWP and the University. A wider appraisal across a range 
of alternatively configured DWP programmes was therefore not possible. This means 
that a systematic consideration across a broader range of alternatively configured 
quasi-market arrangements has yet to be pursued. Moreover, the variation in the two 
quasi-marketised programme formulations under investigation took the form of a 
‘natural’ experiment since the variation was not induced formally by the research team. 
These programmes vary on more than one quasi-market dimension and this means that 
the variation in outcomes cannot straightforwardly and unambiguously be attributed 
to the variation in a single independent variable. The ultimate findings must be 
couched accordingly, yet there are still pertinent and unique empirical contributions 
arising from the thesis. 
 
9.3 Empirical contributions 
Under the marketised governance of public services it is expected that that 
opportunism, or ‘gaming’, will be a particular challenge. The international literature 
also makes clear that the specificities of programme design and payment structures 
can play a key role in either facilitating or buttressing against these undesirable 
provider behaviours. The implication is that through careful contractual specification 
and regulation it may be possible to overcome, or at least mitigate, these behaviours 
and to ensure that providers act in support of the full range of programmatic objectives. 
The challenge is for policymakers – through design savvy – to configure and 
implement a suite of steering tools that retain the perceived innovative and efficient 
impetus of provider-directed quasi-markets whilst ensuring that a complex set of 
public sector objectives are met.  
 
Crucially, detailed empirical work investigating these alternative accountability design 
tools is rare internationally and the detailed systematic quantitative analyses of the sort 
presented here is particularly scarce. In the case of the UK Work Programme, the detail 
and extent of empirical understanding of the impacts of the scheme and its design 
configurations have been severely hampered by the DWP’s failure to commission any 
form of quantitative impact evaluation, but even then impact evaluations of this sort 
do not link to targeted conceptual explorations of governance configurations and 
mechanisms as in this thesis. In using DWP’s administrative data the thesis is therefore 
of considerable value in extending our scholarly understanding of the implications of 
this particular and acute quasi-market design configuration. 
 
The Work Programme’s designers responded to the anticipated quasi-market risks of 
opportunism and gaming with, in many ways, a set of novel and untested design 
features in the pursuit of the government’s objectives for the programme: to support 
more participants into work, faster, for longer and whilst reducing gaps in 
performance outcomes between the easier- and harder-to-help. There are three 
particularly bold marketised accountability design elements at play within Work 
Programme: a differential payment structure in a bid to override tendencies for 
creaming and parking of participants; large regional contracting areas at which 
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minimum performance is assessed and market-share is shifted in the attempt to 
stimulate competition and higher aggregate performance; and extensive sustainment 
payments are intended to ensure longer-term sustainable employment outcomes for 
participants.  
 
The empirical work in this thesis assesses whether the Work Programme’s crafted 
design structure is sufficient and appropriate in steering the private power market to 
the achievement of the full gamut of government policy objectives. The key empirical 
contributions stem from this three-fold combination of conceptually guided empirical 
analyses, the project’s unique academic access to participant-level administrative data 
held by the DWP, and the research’s bespoke and sophisticated range of quantitative 
analyses tailored specifically to investigate those design tools and allied promises 
made within Work Programme’s private power market.  
 
Via the complex cleaning and linkage of different DWP administrative datasets it has 
been possible – at the level of the individual – to connect the outcomes data with a 
considerably larger and broader array of ‘employability’ related explanatory variables 
than ever previously studied. The result is that this thesis, unlike any previous 
independent academic analysis of the Work Programme, uses the richest possible set 
of explanatory variables and official programme outcome information sourced from 
the administrative data. 
 
Moreover, the analysis pushes far beyond the insights which have been offered in the 
official commissioned evaluation work as it centres on these particular design 
‘innovations’ which mark a strident departure from previous UK and international 
approaches to steering incentives in quasi-marketised systems. Each of the empirical 
chapters makes a distinct and empirically original contribution to the academic 
understanding of these design tools, which have not been implemented in such extreme 
forms before and hence which are appraised for the first time here. 
 
Chapter 5 investigates whether the differential payment structure has calibrated 
provider incentives within the private power market such that all programme 
participants have the same likelihood of entering and sustaining paid work, regardless 
of their characteristics and circumstances. The chapter offers an original and rich 
programme-wide quantitative assessment of the extent of claimant variation within 
payment groups and, as a result, the extent to which the Work Programme’s current 
payment-group based differential payment system may be designing in rather than, as 
intended, designing out provider incentives to cream and park claimants. Irrespective 
of its initial apparent subtlety compared to previous employment programmes, this 
chapter’s detailed original analyses reveal that the Work Programme’s differentiated 
payment model has failed woefully to deliver its objectives around differentiated 
universalism. Instead of neutralising the effect of well-known indicators of labour 
market disadvantage, in the aftermath of the Work Programme’s payment-by-results 
system there are persistent, sizeable and significant effects remaining across a range 
of participant characteristics and contexts. 
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Chapter 6 investigates the frequently neglected geography of incentives and 
performance in the Work Programme, assessing potential tensions between the 
spatially extensive regional Contract Package Areas and the far smaller local labour 
market contexts within which providers and service users exist and act. In doing so the 
chapter offers the first ever systematic consideration of spatial variation in Work 
Programme performance, despite the key spatial dimensions and spatial risks of 
welfare-to-work programmes such as the Work Programme.  
 
Specifically, Chapter 6 explores whether the geographical container of regional 
Contract Package Areas is an appropriate spatial scale at which to build key elements 
of welfare-to-work programmes including upholding minimum performance levels 
and incentivising competition between providers. The flexibilities of the private power 
market, in conjunction with the general absence of contextual considerations in the 
design of key programme steering mechanisms, has left the Work Programme 
susceptible to spatial variation in performance. The original analytical work presented 
in Chapter 6 reveals highly variegated programme job outcome performance across 
Britain. As with previous welfare-to-work programmes, the Work Programme does 
appear to be ‘jeopardised by the geography of unemployment’ since more deprived 
local authority areas, with proportionally larger long-term unemployed populations, 
are systematically experiencing significantly worse performance than more 
economically buoyant areas. The programme’s structure of competition and 
contractual minima appear to have done nothing to mitigate these spatial inequalities, 
leaving participants who are living in deprived areas particularly vulnerable to 
experiencing poor job outcomes. The failure to calibrate for locally varied labour 
market contexts works against the programmatic ambition to reduce gaps in 
performance outcomes between the easier- and harder-to-help neighbourhoods and 
areas. As a consequence, the findings presented in Chapter 6 suggest that the 
undifferentiated geographical container of regional Contract Package Areas does not 
appear to be functioning as an appropriate geographical unit to uphold minimum 
performance standards or incentivise providers for the pursuit of programmatic 
objectives. More broadly, the spatial perspective and findings outlined in Chapter 6 
highlight the need for welfare-to-work design and analysis to pay greater attention to 
the key but frequently overlooked geographical dimensions of policy, practice and 
performance. 
 
Chapter 7 analyses the Work Programme’s extensive use of sustainment payments and 
the structure of financial incentives which extend well beyond an initial period of 
employment. The author’s unique academic access to a set of Real Time Information 
on the month-to-month earnings of a sample of Work Programme participants 
facilitates the first of its kind analysis of earning trajectories using sequence analysis. 
This approach identifies clusters of common earning trajectories experienced by 
programme participants and offers a considerably more subtle longitudinal analysis of 
employment and earning trajectories than is available using conventional statistical 
techniques and currently employed in welfare-to-work analyses. It is the first of its 
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kind in relation to Work Programme outcomes in the UK context. The majority of 
Work Programme participants do not feature in the employee earning records across 
the tracking window as most do not experience any time in paid work across the 
programme (Meager et al., 2014). This is of clear policy concern, but already known. 
Amongst those who do experience time in paid employment, the analysis identifies for 
the first time in the literature four distinct participant clusters of longitudinal earning 
trajectories: ‘slow and unstable’; ‘stuck in low-pay’; ‘general earnings success’ and 
‘gold standard’.  
 
Concerningly, those earnings trajectory types which would be deemed ‘successful’ by 
policy makers only account for 13.7 percent of Work Programme participant 
experiences. The analyses presented in Chapter 7 reveal a disconnect between the 
intended incentive structure and the experience of participants, close to one-third of 
whom are likely to be experiencing low-paid and unstable employment trajectories in 
circumstances where they do ‘succeed’ in moving into paid work. The Work 
Programme’s complex sustainment payment structure does not seem to be 
incentivising providers to develop provision and supports that enable entry to 
employment to be successfully converted to sustainable, well-paid employment 
trajectories. For many Work Programme participants, even for ‘success stories’ the 
low-pay no-pay cycle none-too-successfully persists. 
 
Chapter 8 offers a more synoptic reflection on the Work Programme’s private power 
market. It returns to the analytic framework developed in Chapter 2 and uses this to 
compare the configuration of two alternative quasi-marketised employment support 
programmes which have run in tandem in the UK context since 2011 with overlap in 
their cohorts: Work Programme and Work Choice. The analytic framework enables 
important differences in the type of quasi-market adopted by the two schemes to be 
teased out – Work Programme as a private power market compared to Work Choice 
as a softer hybrid provider-directed market configuration. A novel quasi-experimental 
analysis is then used to investigate the implications of the alternate market 
formulations for those with health conditions and disabilities by comparing the 
employment and earning outcomes for a matched group of participants on the two 
programmes. This is the first known study to use a quantitative impact evaluation 
method to consider the potential implications of alternative quasi-market formulations. 
It is, inevitably therefore, the first of its kind in relation to the Work Programme (and 
Work Choice). This is of particular value given both the persistent critique of poor 
programme performance for people with health conditions and disabilities combined 
with the UK government’s commitment to halve the disability employment gap 
(Conservative Party, 2017). 
 
The findings suggest that the promises of innovation and performance improvement 
allied to the provider-directed Work Programme are not met. Employment and 
earnings outcomes are significantly and sizeably lower for the Work Programme than 
for Work Choice. The hybrid market position of Work Choice – which leans towards 
a provider-directed arrangement but retains important levers for both the state- and 
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user- preferences – emerges as an important mediator of programme participant 
experiences. The performance gap between the two is striking. Discovering its drivers 
more precisely for this key cohort emerges as a priority for research and policy.  
 
9.4 Policy contributions 
As discussed in Chapter 4, a key ambition for the research is to connect the original 
empirical insights with lessons which will be of direct relevance to policymakers 
grappling with the design of accountability tools within quasi-marketised public 
service arrangements both in the UK and beyond. These ‘incremental’ adjustments to 
current design levers are discussed first before considering the more seismic 
devolutionary shifts that are developing across the British employment support 
landscape.  
 
The key policy lesson emerging from the first empirical chapter is that the Work 
Programme’s current differential payment system seems more likely to 
design in rather than design out ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’, given that the payment 
groups which underpin the differential pricing system are so crude and the variation in 
participant characteristics within these payment groups is so sizeable. 
 
An instinctive corrective here is to calibrate payment levels more closely with 
modelled likelihoods of moving into sustained employment (Carter and Whitworth, 
2015). In response, a statistical approach to differential payment setting is explored 
using the DWP’s own administrative data. This approach conditions the value of job 
outcome payments on the individualised probabilities of achieving sustained 
employment outcomes. The statistically derived programme streams are shown to be 
a viable and more effective way to design a set of alternative and empirically grounded 
payment groups, offering greater predictive power and value-for-money than is the 
case in the current Work Programme design.  Advancing UK policy design around 
richer statistically informed profiling and payment design remains a priority in the 
coming decade. Further data than is currently available within DWP’s administrative 
records will be a key part of this. Yet even within the constraints of current 
administrative data the enhanced analysis, considerations, and comparative assessment 
set out in this chapter indicate that it is viable for UK policy makers to do better and 
offers a proposed way forwards.  
 
Chapter 6 raises concerns that the current large scale Contract Package Areas (CPAs) 
are an inappropriate tool for comparing performance across multiple Prime providers 
(beyond a single CPA) and for upholding contractual minimum performance levels. 
Two main policy implications arise from its analyses. 
 
Firstly, the extent of spatial variation discovered within CPAs, and in particular the 
extent of poor performance within those smaller local authority geographies, 
highlights Work Programme’s blind spots towards the spatial dimensions of high risk 
and weak realisation of programmatic objectives. Importantly, the empirical analyses 
presented in Chapter 6 highlight that the unit of performance assessment and 
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incentives will need to be substantially reduced in geographic extent in order to 
respond to these spatial concerns. That the UK’s new Work and Health Programme, 
the far smaller successor scheme to the Work Programme, shifts to even larger 
contractual geographies than operated in the Work Programme, and fails to offer any 
spatially sensitive accountability levers, is of significant concern. 
 
Secondly, since the current contractual minimum performance levels are standardised 
across Britain, and this unadjusted national standard is applied indiscriminately, there 
is a risk that Primes are judged as ‘underperforming’ when their lower aggregate 
performance at the level of CPA may be informed by lower prevailing levels of 
demand across a particular region. An intervening improvement would be to consider 
the development of contextually sensitive programme performance data. As a first 
step, this could be applied at the current level of CPAs (as is offered through the 
proposed ‘contextual value added’ performance metric at the close of the chapter). 
More substantively, however, if policy makers seek to enhance the performance of the 
programme in depressed local labour market areas in order to ‘close the gap’ then – 
continuing within the logic of a private power market – providers will need to be 
financially incentivised (or penalised for failure) to work against the grain of pre-
existing spatial inequalities at the level of local labour markets. 
 
The key policy conclusion emerging from Chapter 7 is that the Work Programme’s 
current emphasis on sustainment payments within the structure of financial incentives 
has not broken the low-pay no-pay cycle for many programme participants. The 
overwhelming experience of programme participants is one of not entering 
employment at all, a clear remaining area of policy concern. Yet of those who do 
feature in the HMRC earning data (i.e. people who have at least one month of 
employment-related earnings within the tracking window), also of concern is that close 
to one-third experience an earning trajectory which is categorised as slow and unstable 
or where participants only receive very low pay across the period (equivalent to 
earning less than 16-hours per week at NMW). For a programme so heavily 
emphasising sustainment in its rhetoric and payments profile this is of significant 
concern.  
 
At this stage there is no immediate or intuitive ‘fix’ to this payment-based 
accountability mechanism as conclusions cannot be drawn from the current analysis 
as to whether these patterns are associated with a failure in the transmission of 
incentives such that providers have been unable to translate the complex set of 
payment values to meaningfully alter the shape of provision at the frontline, or that 
despite the powerful incentives for sustained employment there are insufficient 
available in-work support services with a track record of success. Alongside welfare-
to-work programmes, improving in-work support is emerging as a key policy 
weakness within Universal Credit’s drive for in-work earnings progression and is 
likely to be core area of UK policy and research focus in the coming years. 
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9.4.1 Stepping out of the private power market?  
Taking a wider view, the policy recommendations flowing from the first two empirical 
chapters in particular very much keep within the logic of the private power market. 
The recommendations do not seek to disturb this particular quasi-market formulation 
but rather to refine and enhance key marketised levers of price (statistically informed 
price setting) and performance monitoring for market share manipulation purposes 
(contextually sensitive assessments of programme performance in order to better 
reward/penalise providers who are over/under performing). 
 
The disappointing performance of the Work Programme for those with health 
conditions and disabilities, and the varying performance of Work Programme and 
Work Choice outlined for the first time in the analysis of Chapter 8, may have more 
fundamental ramifications for current and future policy design.  
 
The recommendations that emerge from the final empirical chapter specifically 
suggest that for the priority cohort of participants with health conditions and 
disabilities at least the private power market configuration as conceived in the Work 
Programme has not delivered the best possible service and outcomes for these 
participants. What emerges here is the potential value in softening the extreme form 
of provider-directed quasi-market and interlacing and overlaying alternative non-
market accountability types in the pursuit of a softened, hybridised form of quasi-
market arrangement in order to better attune provider behaviours to good quality and 
sufficiently intensive provision. Each of the empirical chapters, but perhaps Chapter 8 
most unequivocally, indicate that future UK programmes would do well to bolster the 
traction of state- and user- priorities and preferences through procedural and/or 
democratic forms of accountability. 
 
Taken together the findings suggest the need for policymakers to give serious 
consideration to moving beyond the refinement of those marketised accountability 
levers which have already been heavily (and disappointingly) relied upon within the 
Work Programme and instead to look to new roles and configurations of wider 
accountability mechanism beyond such marketised levers. 
 
9.5 Burned, bruised or broken? Future policy and research directions 
As noted at the start of this chapter Work Programme is now in its dying days. In the 
aftermath of the Work Programme the follow-on scheme – the Work and Health 
Programme – is considerably smaller and is more tightly focused on people who have 
health conditions or disabilities and, in minor part, on those who are very long-term 
unemployed. The programme replaces both the Work Programme and Work Choice 
which had a combined budget in of £540.8 million in 2015/16 (£416.4 million Work 
Programme, £124.4 million Work Choice); the Work and Health Programme will by 
contrast have a budget in the order of £130 million per year in 2019/20 (Powell, 2018), 
around 20% of the financial envelope without adjusting downwards for inflationary 
reductions in its real purchasing power.  
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Whilst this might superficially be read as a sign that the DWP has been ‘burned’ by 
the Work Programme experience and is recoiling from its bold private power market 
experiment, hearsay amongst mandarins would suggest that the scaling back of British 
quasi-marketised employment support has instead been driven principally by the 
challenging spending envelope set for DWP by the Treasury rather than any great 
programmatic learning on behalf of DWP. Considered by some to be of relevance was 
the lack of a robust quantitative impact estimate for the Work Programme which made 
it understandably challenging for DWP to demonstrate value for money of the Work 
Programme to HM Treasury’s satisfaction. 
 
However, although scaled down the Work and Health Programme softens somewhat, 
but does not fundamentally scale back from, the preceding quasi-market logic and 
characteristics of the Work Programme’s private power market. The black box, lightly 
regulated, provider-directed market logic prevails. Andrew Thomas, Director 
of  Contracted Services at the DWP, explains that within the black box programme 
specification providers will set the “Customer Service Standards” (Thomas, 2017, p. 
6). Although the weighting of payment to outcomes takes a slightly softer formulation 
– 30 percent of payment will be made through guaranteed delivery fees with 70 percent 
on results – the financial incentives are overwhelmingly ‘job’ focused. There is no 
specified modular service component (which was seen as the justification for 
guaranteed payments within Work Choice). Service payments are not directly tied to 
any specific minimum service assurance. And contract areas become not smaller but 
instead far larger than in Work Programme, thought by many to reflect the far smaller 
financial envelope available and the desire by DWP to remain (at least partially) 
attractive to the market. 
 
Indeed, a new and additional quasi-marketised accountability tool is set to be 
implemented through Work and Health Programme: an accelerator payment model, 
whereby the value of outcome payments made to providers increases in step with the 
proportion of participants who achieve successful outcomes. Though this approach has 
tentatively been welcomed as a potential antidote to issues of creaming and parking, 
concerns have already been raised that such a pricing arrangement is notoriously 
difficult to model and therefore may not overcome risks of gaming and neglect 
(Wilson, 2017). 
 
While the DWP trudges on with the mantle of experimentation in its familiar mould 
of centrally contracted Prime providers in spatially vast private power markets (indeed 
the tongue in cheek subtitle for an event outlining the new Work and Health 
Programme was subtitled ‘the Sequel’), there has nevertheless been a ‘cooling’ attitude 
to large-scale payment by results schemes amongst Whitehall civil servants more 
broadly (Brown, 2013). Central government officials have acknowledged that their 
attitude was “bullish on payment-by-results at the start” (Mair, 2013, paragraph 5), 
where by ‘payment-by-results’ civil servants are typically referring to the heavy use 
of outcomes-based payment mechanisms within a lightly regulated provider-led quasi-
market. There is a growing acknowledgement within Central government that there is 
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a need for a more measured and pragmatic approach. There is therefore a question as 
to whether DWP’s approach to quasi-market formulations as seen within Work 
Programme and now Work and Health Programme is ‘bruised’ – that is, a promising 
approach that has been oversold and plagued by poor design, but potentially fixable 
(and in that case preferable) with the right design – or whether it is instead ‘broken’ 
and we should retreat from ever further adoption of marketised modes of coordination 
and look elsewhere for solutions to these internationally shared and on-going 
employment challenges. 
 
While central government considers these questions, it is at the local level in the UK 
that striking new experiments are being made in the pursuit of revised and improved 
accountability regimes surrounding employment support provision. As described by 
this author (Whitworth and Carter, 2018), “amidst persistently disappointing provision 
and outcomes performance for ‘harder-to-help’ claimants … within large national 
quasi-marketised contracted-out provision, and an increasing recognition that the 
status quo cannot continue amidst the ever-tightening fiscal squeeze of austerity, 
employment support’s devolutionary moment has come”. Within the historically 
highly centralised policy domain in the British context, city-regions – combinations of 
contiguous local authority government areas – are emerging as key new scales of 
governance in the English context. 
 
The emergence of this new commissioning scale for welfare-to-work provision is not 
simply a straightforward shrinking of the DWP’s private power markets however. 
Rather, leading city-regions articulate a progressive vision of locally integrated 
employment support ‘ecosystems’ that strategically and operationally coordinate a 
range of currently siloed and disconnected key wraparound support services and 
budgets that need to be brought together and marshalled in order to enable the delivery 
of whole-person holistic keyworker support packages (Whitworth and Carter, 2018). 
Integration is seen to be key in order to respond to individuals’ support needs and this 
requires connections to be made across personalised employment advice, skills, health, 
housing, financial advice, and family support. 
 
Whilst the DWP approach is focused squarely on an off-the-shelf quasi-marketised 
approach that spurs competition between providers based on a classic principal-agent 
relationship with a single Prime provider, city-regions in contrast appear to be pursuing 
an approach that rather than rethinking or bolstering wider accountability tools to stave 
off the worst of the negative outcomes arising from provider cost-minimisation tactics 
within this market logic are instead turning to a qualitatively different logic and model 
that seeks at heart to guide local interactions through a relational dynamic. Though 
often still based with contracted provider models these projects seek more strongly 
both to avoid the predatory competitive environment of marketised relations and also 
to pursue the cultivation of functioning horizontal network accountability in which to 
situate providers (and Jobcentre Plus). 
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City-region frontrunners – Greater Manchester, London, Sheffield City Region and 
West Midlands – have each pioneered alternative locally-developed integration 
mechanisms through which to bring together stakeholders from relevant multi-agency 
support systems. Greater Manchester’s ‘Working Well’ local integration model is out 
front in the gradual development of its local employment ecosystem, emphasising and 
consistently growing relational connectivity locally (Whitworth and Carter, 2018). 
Within Greater Manchester, for example, large-scale devolution employment pilot 
programmes, the budget for Work and Health Programme, and to a notable extent 
mainstream Jobcentre Plus activities exist within Greater Manchester’s expanding 
relational network approach, with Local Integration Boards (operational co-case 
management of wraparound services) and ecosystem development and refinement at 
its heart. Whilst much innovative activity and process change is taking place, and 
whilst there is good reason to welcome its potential in the face on on-going 
performance critique of DWP’s centralised model (whether contracted-out or 
Jobcentre Plus), these new city-region approaches to governance – what can be 
considered the practice of doing network governance locally – have yet to be subject 
to academic critique or formal impact evaluation.  
 
These localised approaches are important UK developments and represent a neat 
comparative opportunity to investigate the alternative governance strategies by which 
these city-regions are pursuing network accountability more fully than the UK’s highly 
centralised employment system has historically afforded as a means to tackle shared 
employment objectives. As these city-region activities expand and embed a set of key 
questions and priorities are emerging. In particular, there are questions as to how these 
local approaches inject resources (both in-kind services and cash), introduce and 
manage often complex governance frameworks (for service co-ordination and 
performance oversight) and instil new logics (relationships, trust and care). 
 
A particular challenge will not only be the development of effective working 
partnerships across multiple partners locally and across scales (including, importantly, 
DWP) but, from a governance perspective, finding new ways to more effectively 
overlay the full range of accountability dimensions required, including network 
accountability. There may be tensions between each of these respective logics, 
cultures, aims and needs. Robust evaluation throughout will be important both to 
assess whether this new governance approach has beneficial implications in a process 
sense for support experiences as well as positive impacts on heath and employment 
outcomes for the people such programmes seek to support. 
 
This is not only a new frontier for empirical and policy research in the UK context but 
is also a frontier of international conceptual literature, the leading edge of which 
coalesces around the nature, types and realisation of governance hybridities. The UK 
is in many ways far behind European comparators in experiences of locally integrated 
employment support and it will be important to learn from those experiences. With a 
fuller understanding of the variation in governance types, and further research on how 
this variation plays out for service experience and outcomes, the need and hope is to 
 254 
more effectively place market accountability levers within a more subtle and balanced 
governance arrangement such that markets come to be the servant to, rather than the 
master of, commissioners and service users. 
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Appendix 1 
Employment and benefit spell data cleaning for the production of variables 
on benefit claiming and employment histories 
 
To mitigate the limitations of the historic employment data used in the analysis a 
process of cleaning and adjusting of the data takes place before it is used. This process 
is heavily informed by the methods used by in-house DWP analysts and is described 
in … 
 
The cleaning of the P45/46 employment spell data begins by removing any 
inappropriate data, adjusting unreliable dates, and removing duplicate records. The 
following types of employment spell record are removed:  
• Records with no personal identifier;  
• Records where the employment start date is later than the employment end 
date; 
• Records with end dates before the beginning of the data series (a cut off set 5-
years prior to participant attachment date); 
• Occupational pension records; 
• Known benefit spells that are duplicated in DWP administration data; and  
• Records starting in the future; 
 
Start and end dates are often very approximate in the P45/46 records. Where HMRC 
do not know the date on which an employment spell started, they assign a start date of 
the 6th April in the year that they become aware of the employment spell. This may 
not be the actual year in which the spell began. A similar process occurs when HMRC 
do not know the date on which an employment spell ended.  
 
The employment spell data is examined in conjunction with DWP benefit records, 
which are reliably recorded on administration systems. Employment spell start and end 
dates are then adjusted using the start or end date of the nearest benefit record under 
the assumption that people move directly from benefits to employment or vice versa.  
Overlapping spells are handled as follows: 
 
1. When an out-of-work benefit spell wholly surrounds an employment spell the 
employment spell is removed entirely. 
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2. When a benefit spell overlaps the start of an employment spell the 
employment spell start is adjusted to the end of the benefit spell. 
 
3. When a benefit spell overlaps the end of an employment spell – the 
employment spell end is adjusted to the start of the benefit spell  
 
4. When an overlap occurs across multiple employment records the earlier spell 
record is curtailed (starts are understood to be more accurately recorded than 
end dates) so that when adding up ‘time in employment’ across multiple 
spells, this does not exceed the maximum extent of calendar days in which a 
person has active employment records: 
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The cleaned records are then used to calculate the amount of time in paid employment 
prior to participating in the programme. 
 
  
Appendix 2 
Preparation of administrative data 
Variable Definition Source Values Cleaning and coding procedure 
Ageband Participant age at point of 
programme referral, broken 
into age brackets. 
LMS 1 18 - 24; 2 25 - 34; 3 35 - 44; 45 - 54; 55 
- 59; 6 60 + 
Age is the age at point of referral to the Work Programme calculated using participant date of birth 
information from the LMS dataset. If the dob field is missing information or appears incorrectly 
populated, for example, calculated age means that a participant’s age at referral date is beyond the 
valid range for programme participation, the age variable is replaced with ‘age’ variable from older 
and/or alternative records for the same participant. In some cases this is also missing, ultimately the 
final number missing the age variable is 96 cases and these are dropped from the analysis.  
AnyIB Any spell claiming Incapacity 
Benefit (or other disability-
related out-of-work benefit, 
ESA) within 5 year period 
preceding participation in the 
Work Programme 
NBD 1 yes has IB record; 0 no Where cases are missing this means there has been an unsuccessful connection from the WPAD basefile 
to the NBD dataset. There are other datasets which could be used to provide benhistory information but 
these were not available through the assigned DWP data access business case. 2,309 cases in the WPAD 
basefile were not successfully matched to NBD and as a result were removed from the analysis (this is 
0.15% of the sample) 
Attdate Date that participant's 
programme attachment was 
recorded within the PRaP 
system 
WPAD Dates from 05 June 2011 onwards A small  proportion of cases (<2%) in the WPAD base file were referred to, but not attached to the Work 
Programme. These cases are removed from the empirical analysis developed here, which uses data only 
from those participants who were successfully attached to the programme 
Benhist Type of out-of-work benefit 
claimed at point of Work 
Programme (or Work Choice) 
referral as captured through 
alternative eligibility and 
LMS 
OPPORTUNITIES 
(also available 
in WPAD) 
1 JSA; 2 JSA ex-IB; 3 contribution based 
ESA and esa credit; 4 ESA income 
related; 5 ESA ex-IB; 6 IB/IS; (missing 
values removed) 
This is constructed from the ‘OTPTYP’ variable which captures the alternative eligibility and payment 
group options for programme participants. At the point of developing this variable 69 cases in the 
WPAD core dataset were missing OTPTYPE information. However, all of those cases with 'missing' 
OTPTYP information had a duplicate record in WPAD (i.e. multiple rows per unique id), and so the 
more fully populated record was kept. No cases were dropped as a result of missing information. 
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referral routes into 
programme 
care_lv Prior to programme 
participation JCP staff raised 
'care leaver' as a specific 
Work Programme barrier, 
that is, someone who may be 
disadvantaged by an 
experience of being a 'looked 
after child' within the local 
authority care system.  
WPAD 1 marker present; 0 marker not present; 
missing 
Only 96 cases have a marker against this record. 
carer Participant is known by JCP to 
have caring responsibilities 
LMS 1 marker present; 0 marker not present, 
missing values are presumed to be non-
care leaver 
79 % of cases have missing values and these are presumed to be 'non carers'. 6,768 cases are recorded 
as having caring responsibilities.   
CPA Contract Package Area in 
which programme participant 
resides and where Work 
Programme services are 
received 
WPAD Numerical codes from 1 – 18. All cases in WPAD have viable, non-missing CPA information.  
Contract Prime contract to which 
participant is referred 
WPAD Numerical codes Very few cases in WPAD have missing contract information. Where cases are missing contract 
information they are also missing other key sociodemographic details (incomplete records) and such 
records are removed from the analysis. 
Cumuldis An indicator of the degree to 
which day-to-day activities 
are adversely impacted by the 
participant's health condition 
or disability.  
WPAD Integers from 0 - 10 This is constructed as a composite indicator by bringing together 10 different markers on the ways in 
which everyday activities are adversely impacted by a participant's disability or health condition. It is 
produced by aggregating the responses to questions outlined in Annex XX to produce a score (out of 
10) where a higher value indicates a higher number of challenges. 
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daysesa2 Number of days recorded in 
receipt of ESA or other 
disability-related out-of-work 
benefit in 2-years preceding 
programme participation 
NBD Continuous variable from 0 - 730 The detailed procedure for cleaning benefit spell records is described in Appendix 1. 
daysesa5 Number of days recorded in 
receipt of ESA or other 
disability-related out-of-work 
benefit in 5-years preceding 
programme participation 
NBD Continuous variable from 0 - 1826  
daysjsa2 Number of days recorded in 
receipt of JSA in 2-years 
preceding programme 
participation 
NBD Continuous variable from 0 - 730 
daysjsa5 Number of days recorded in 
receipt of JSA in 5-years 
preceding programme 
participation 
NBD Continuous variable from 0 - 1826  
depch Programme participant has a 
dependent child or children 
aged under 16 
LMS 1 has dependent child or children (aged 
under 16); 0 does not have dependent 
children aged under 16 
There are considerable inconsistencies in the fields which supported the development of this variable: 
'has children' and 'date of birth of youngest child'. Where cases had a valid date for dob of youngest 
child but were missing information on the number of children, the cases were 'given' dependent 
children. Where cases had a record for dependent children, but the dob of youngest child suggested 
that all children were now aged over 16, cases were recoded to 0. 
depch_5 Programme participant has a 
dependent child aged 5 years 
or younger at point of 
programme participation 
LMS 1 has youngest child aged 5 or below; 0 
does not have dependent children or 
youngest child is aged over 5 
This variable is principally constructed from the field 'date of birth of youngest child'. Where this field 
was missing, but within the recent 'spells' (as held by NBD) a participant's record indicated that a child 
had entered the family within the preceding 5 years, the marker '1' was given. 
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disadva Programme participant is 
understood to be in a 
disadvantaged labour market 
position due to ex-offender 
status or through use of drugs 
and/or alcohol 
WPAD originally 
LMS 
0 not disadvantaged in this way; 1 'Ex-
Offender'; 2 'Misuser of Drugs'; 3 'Ex-
Offender and Misuser of Drugs'; 4 
'Misuser of Alcohol'; 5 'Ex-Offender and 
Misuser of Alcohol'; 6 'Misuser of Drugs 
and Misuser of Alcohol'; 7 'Ex-Offender, 
Misuser of Drugs and Misuser of Alcohol' 
This field is populated by bringing together the 'disadvantage' markers provided on the WPAD dataset 
and which have been populated by Jobcentre plus staff in LMS. There are no issues with missing data 
in this field. Where staff do not provide information against these particular markers of disadvantage 
it is assumed that the issue is not present '0'. Even though the classification of categories may seem 
highly specific (which would usually prevent such granular analysis in survey work) the large number 
of cases available to this study mean that there is not an issue with small cell counts. There are no 
combinations of disadvantage (cells) with fewer than 1800 cases. 
ethnicity Programme participant's 
ethnic group 
LMS 1 white British; 2 white Irish; 3 other 
white; 4 = white and black mixed; 5 
white and Asian; 6 other mixed; 7 Indian; 
8 Pakistan; 9 Bangladesh; 10 Other 
Asian; 11 Black Caribbean; 12 Black 
African; 13 other Black; 14 Chinese; 15 
Other; 16 prefer not to say/none 
The coding for different ethnic groups within the LMS dataset has changed over time and these 
alternative codings were reconciled to produce a single set of codes. Some participants elect not to 
provide this data; rather than dropping these cases an additional category is set up for those where 
ethnicity information has not been provided. 
empdays2 Number of days recorded as 
in paid employment in 2-
years preceding programme 
participation 
NBD and P45/46 Continuous variable from 0 - 730 
(though no-one at very high end of the 
scale due to programme eligibility 
criteria) 
empdays5 Number of days recorded as 
in paid employment in 5-
years preceding programme 
participation 
NBD and P45/46 Continuous variable from 0 - 1826 
(though no-one at very high end of the 
scale due to programme eligibility 
criteria) 
empspell Number of distinct spells of 
employment recorded in 5-
NBD and P45/46 0 no employment spell; integers to 20 
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years preceding programme 
participation. 
esa_spell Number of distinct ESA spells 
(or spells claiming other 
disability-related out-of-work 
benefits) within 5-year period 
preceding WP participation 
NBD and P45/46 Integer 
ex_army Prior to programme 
participation JCP staff raised 
'ex armed forces' as a specific 
Work Programme barrier 
WPAD 1 marker present; 0 marker not present; 
missing 
Only 158 cases are recorded as ex-armed forces personnel. 
ex_carer Participant is identified by JCP 
staff as a former 'carer'.  
WPAD 1 ex-carer or 0 missing not applicable There is very little documentation as to how this characteristic is identified and only 2073 cases (less 
than 0.13%) of the sample express this characteristic. 
ex_off Prior to programme 
participation JCP staff raised 
'ex offender' as a specific 
Work Programme barrier 
WPAD 1 marker present; 0 marker not present; 
missing 
33,186 cases are recorded as ex-offenders within this field. This is a lower incidence than is recorded 
in the variables supporting the 'disadva' variable although there are considerable inconsistencies in 
the cross tabs between these two variables. The 'disadva' variable is used in further analysis because 
it is more finegrained in terms of identification of particular and compound disadvantages; and 
because the suite of pre-Work Programme disadvantage variables (of which ex-off is a part) appear to 
be particularly poorly populated. 
homeless Participant is identified by JCP 
staff as being homeless 
LMS and WPAD 1 homeless; 0 not homeless There are two variables which capture information on participants who are understood to be 
homeless. 'CLNPWAFG' is the 'person without accommodation flag' collected by JCP as a matter of 
course and a question on homelessness is also situated in the battery of 'WP barriers' markers, which 
are populated prior to programme referral (ORF_CIA_WP_BAR_3). There are some inconsistencies 
between these two markers and so a decision was made to combine these two indicators. Any current 
record of 'homelessness' was used to populate this variable as '1'; all other cases are coded '0'. 
ICD group International Classification of 
Disease Code for participant 
(where provided) 
LMS 0 no ICD code; 1 mental & behavioural 
problems excluding depression, anxiety, 
alcoholism, stress & drug abuse, which 
In the original 'ICDCODE' variable missing and 0 values indicate participants without any diagnosis code 
on the system. Missing values are recoded to 0. The original variable sourced through LMS 'ICDCODE' 
contains 1062 separate codes for highly specific classifications of diseases; there are also a number of 
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are presented separately; 2 diseases of 
nervous system excluding epilepsy 
which is coded separately; 3 diseases of 
circulatory or respiratory system; 4= 
Diseases of the Musculoskeletal system 
and Connective Tissue excluding back 
pain and arthritis which is coded 
separately; 5=Injury, Poisoning and 
certain other consequences of external 
causes; 6 Other; 7 depression; 8 anxiety; 
9 back pain; 10 alcoholism; 11 pain (all 
pain except back pain); 12 epilepsy; 13 
arthritis; 14 stress; 15 drug abuse 
duplicate codes within this series (for example code 235 and 236 both relate to Emphysema). A series 
of cross tabs and collapses were performed to identify the most frequent codes for Work Programme 
participants. The resultant coding brings a degree of granularity across different conditions without 
introducing fragmentation associated with small cell counts.  
Job 
Outcome 
date 
Date on which job outcome 
payment is triggered 
WPAD Date Two separate fields containing job outcome dates are available in PrAP and DWP analysts provided 
information on the field which had been subject to validation. This is the variable which is used in the 
production of official programme statistics. 
Job 
Outcome 
binary 
Participant has achieved a 
payable Work Programme job 
outcome 
WPAD 0 participant has not achieved job 
outcome; 1 participant has achieved a 
job outcome payment 
Binary variable is constructed from job outcome dates; where job outcoe date is missing, this value is 
set to 0; where a date for job outcome is recorded the code is set to 1 
language LMS record inidcates that 
participant has problems with 
written and/or spoken English 
LMS 0 no issue; 1 has language issue 1,248,949 cases (79.56%) of sample have missing value on language variable; missing is recoded to 0. 
lone_p Participant is a lone-parent LMS 0 participant is lone parent; 1 participant 
is lone parent aged 21 or under; 2 
participant is lone parent aged 22 or over 
at time of referral to programme 
Previous research shows differential achievement of job outcomes by lone parents according to their 
age. To accommodate the divergence in the likely direction of effect sizes associated with this variable, 
additional granularity is set into the original JCP marker, by combining this with information on 
participant age. Cases with missing data are presumed not to be lone parents.  
lowqual Participant has low or no 
qualifications 
LMS 0 participant does not have marker for 
low qualification; 1 participant answers 
In the original field provided in LMS nearly 70% of Work Programme participants have missing data. 
Despite only having responses from 30 % of the sample, 123,040 programme participants (7.84%) have 
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'yes' to having low or no qualifications; 2 
participant answers 'no' to having low or 
no qualifications 
a marker indicating a potential labour market challenge from low or no qualifications. The other LMS 
variable which contains information on qualification level 'HIGHQUAL' which contains detail on the 
highest qualification level attained by programme participants is even more sparsely populated. In 
order to retain this information a three part coding structure identified - those who were not asked or 
did not respond to this question; those who identified as having low-qualifications; and those who 
actively responded 'no' in response to low qualification questions. 
ment_h Prior to programme 
participation JCP staff raised 
'mild to moderate mental 
health issues' as a specific 
Work Programme barrier 
WPAD 1 marker present; 0 marker not present; 
missing 
Only 1,013 cases (0.06% of records) have a marker against this field; 80% of cases are missing. This 
would suggest that the mental health marker is severely under populated and is therefore not used in 
further analysis. 
Noemp Within 5-year period 
preceding Work Programme 
participation participant has 
no record of paid 
employment 
NBD and P45/46 1 participant has no record of paid work; 
0 participant has record of paid work 
The detailed procedure for combining employment and benefit spell records is described in section 
XX. Where cases are missing P45/46 employment records it is assumed that programme participants 
had no time in employment within this time period. 
Postcode Home address postcode of 
programme participant 
LMS Postcode e.g. OX2 6GG Postcode information required considerable cleaning as there were inconsistencies in the formatting 
of postcode details within LMS. Subsequent to cleaning 4,415 cases (0.12% of sample) had postocde 
details which were not succesfully merged onto a national postcode look up file, which was used to 
connect postcodes to higher-level geographies (LSOA to LA). Cases which could not be connected to 
the postcode look up file could not be connected to local area context information and were therefore 
dropped from further analysis. 
Refdat Date that participant's 
programme referral was 
recorded within the PRaP 
system 
WPAD Dates from 01 June 2011 onwards All cases in WPAD have viable, non-missing referral dates.  
refugee Participant is identified by JCP 
staff as being a refugee or 
WPAD 0 None selected (default); 1 Refugee; 2 
Other humanitarian protection; 3 
Refugee and 'other humanitarian protection' are collapsed to a single binary marker (1); all other 
responses are coded 0. 19,941 cases are recorded as 1 against refugee status (1.27% of sample) 
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having other humanitarian 
protection status 
Refugee - No; 4 Prefer not to Say; 5 Not 
collected 
sex Sex of programme participant 
as recorded in 'CCSEX' 
variable 
WPAD 0 Female; 1 Male 419 cases have missing data against this variable (0.03 % of sample) and are removed from the analysis 
sr_disab Participant has a self-
reported disability or long-
term health condition 
LMS 1 has disability; 0 does not have 
disability 
Only 419 cases (0.03% of sample) have missing data for this variable. Missing values are presumed to 
be people who are without a self-reported disability and are recoded to 0 
substn Prior to programme 
participation JCP staff raised 
'history of substance 
dependency' as a specific 
Work Programme barrier 
1 marker 
present; 0 
marker not 
present; missing 
Only 756 cases (0.05% of records) have a 
marker against this field; 80% of cases 
are missing.  
Sustainment Count of the number of 
sustainment payments made 
to Prime for participant's 
sustained period in 
employment 
WPAD 0 where none; else integer up to 
maximum number of eligible 
sustainment payments 
Those who are missing sustainment payment information are presumed not to have achieved 
sustained employment and code is set to 0 
Appendix 3 
Full logistic regression output underpinning Chapter 5. 
 
 
Odds 
Ratio 
Standard 
Error 
p-value 
JSA ex-IB 1.645 0.027 0.000 
Contribution ESA 0.854 0.039 0.001 
Income-related ESA 0.558 0.022 0.000 
ESA ex-IB 0.404 0.018 0.000 
IB/IS 1.021 0.051 0.672 
Days of ESA in 2y 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Any time on IB 0.940 0.008 0.000 
Spells of ESA in 5y 0.883 0.004 0.000 
Self-reported disability 0.762 0.005 0.000 
Mental health 0.568 0.027 0.000 
Nervous system 0.706 0.042 0.000 
Circulatory or respiratory 0.769 0.038 0.000 
Musculoskeletal 0.829 0.040 0.000 
Injury 1.490 0.065 0.000 
Other ICD class 0.885 0.037 0.003 
Depression 0.797 0.032 0.000 
Anxiety 0.783 0.034 0.000 
Back pain 0.797 0.036 0.000 
Alcoholism 0.752 0.039 0.000 
Pain (excluding back pain) 0.856 0.043 0.002 
Epilepsy 0.562 0.034 0.000 
Arthritis 0.656 0.038 0.000 
Stress 1.019 0.052 0.720 
Drug abuse 0.718 0.042 0.000 
Cumulative impact of disability 0.934 0.003 0.000 
Age 25 - 34 0.680 0.004 0.000 
Age 35 - 44 0.628 0.004 0.000 
Age 45 - 54 0.553 0.003 0.000 
Age 55 - 59 0.399 0.004 0.000 
Age 60 + 0.208 0.004 0.000 
Ex-offender 0.586 0.006 0.000 
Misuser of drugs 0.482 0.019 0.000 
Ex-offender and misuser of drugs 0.346 0.015 0.000 
Misuser of alcohol 0.541 0.020 0.000 
Ex-offender and misuser of alcohol 0.471 0.031 0.000 
Misuser of drugs and alcohol 0.565 0.043 0.000 
Ex-offender and misuser of drugs and alcohol 0.404 0.031 0.000 
Low-qualifications 0.689 0.005 0.000 
Not low-qualifications 1.122 0.005 0.000 
Challenges with English language 0.850 0.007 0.000 
Homeless 0.696 0.024 0.000 
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Other white ethnicity 1.082 0.012 0.000 
Mixed ethnicity 0.973 0.013 0.035 
Indian ethnicity 1.127 0.018 0.000 
Pakistan ethnicity 1.065 0.013 0.000 
Bangladesh ethnicity 1.194 0.021 0.000 
Other Asian ethnicity 1.228 0.024 0.000 
Black Caribbean ethnicity 0.954 0.010 0.000 
Black African ethnicity 1.175 0.012 0.000 
Other Black ethnicity 1.051 0.022 0.016 
Chinese ethnicity 1.217 0.053 0.000 
Other ethnicity 1.144 0.015 0.000 
Ethnicity - prefer not to say 1.062 0.009 0.000 
Refugee or other humanitarian protection 1.228 0.020 0.000 
Days in employment 1.001 0.000 0.000 
No employment record 0.775 0.004 0.000 
Number of employment spells 1.028 0.001 0.000 
Male* 0.960 0.004 0.000 
Has children* 1.354 0.013 0.000 
Male*has children 1.016 0.012 0.158 
Woman with young child 0.597 0.009 0.000 
Lone parent aged under 21 0.671 0.062 0.000 
Lone parent aged over 21 1.354 0.013 0.000 
Local authority JSA rate 0.947 0.002 0.000 
IMD decile 2 0.986 0.016 0.361 
IMD decile 3 0.955 0.015 0.003 
IMD decile 4 0.913 0.013 0.000 
IMD decile 5 0.869 0.012 0.000 
IMD decile 6 0.843 0.012 0.000 
IMD decile 7 0.808 0.011 0.000 
IMD decile 8 0.767 0.010 0.000 
IMD decile 9 0.732 0.010 0.000 
IMD decile 10 0.672 0.009 0.000 
Observations 1,563,874 
  
Pseudo-R2 0.0958 
  
 
 
